§7.10#2ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον, ἀλλʼ ὁ τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόμενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ· "ἐλάττων"
γὰρ
"ὀρθῆς"
ἡ ὀξεῖα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὁρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὅλῳ· "τὸ"
γὰρ
"τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου"
δάκτυλος. ὥσθʼ ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα·
For those things which are parts of the formula and into which the formula is divided, these are prior, either all or some of them; but the formula of the right angle is not divided into the formula of the acute angle, but that of the acute angle into the right angle; for the one who defines the acute angle makes use of the right angle; for the acute angle is "less than a right angle." And in like manner it is with the circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by the circle, and the finger by the whole; for the finger is "such-and-such a part of a man." So that those parts which are as matter and into which it is divided as matter are posterior; but those which are as parts of the formula and of the substance according to the formula are prior, either all or some of them.
ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον,—τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνόλου πρότερα ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πάντως ἔχων δάκτυλος ζῴου, ἀλλʼ ὁμώνυμος ὁ τεθνεώς)· ἔνια δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα κύρια καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία, οἷον εἰ τοῦτο καρδία ἢ ἐγκέφαλος· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθὲν πότερον τοιοῦτον.
And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the living being) is the substance according to the formula, and the form, and the essence of such-and-such a body (at any rate, if each part is to be defined well, it will not be defined without its function, which will not exist without sensation), so that the parts of this are prior, either all or some of them, to the composite animal, and likewise indeed in each particular case, but the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is into these as into matter that not the substance but the composite is divided, — of the composite, then, these are prior in a sense, and in a sense not (for they cannot even exist when separated; for it is not a finger in any state whatsoever that is a finger of an animal, but the dead finger is homonymous); but some parts are simultaneous, namely, those which are principal and in which first the formula and the substance reside, for example, if this is the heart or the brain; for it makes no difference which of them is of this kind.
ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθʼ ἕκαστον δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. —μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἴδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς ὕλης αὐτῆς.
But man and horse and things of this kind which are applied to particulars, but universally, are not substance, but a certain composite of this formula and this matter taken universally; but Socrates is already a particular consisting of the ultimate matter, and likewise with the others. — Part, then, is a part both of the form (and by form I mean the essence) and of the composite of the form and the matter, and of the matter itself.
ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη τὰ τοῦ εἴδους μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταὐτό.
But the parts of the formula are parts of the form alone, and the formula is of the universal; for to be a circle and circle, and to be a soul and soul, are the same.
τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ—λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους—τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν· ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.
But of the composite already, for example, of this circle and of some of the particulars, either sensible or intelligible — and by intelligible I mean, for example, mathematical circles, and by sensible, for example, those of bronze and of wood — of these there is no definition, but they are known with intellection or sensation, and when they have departed from actualization it is not clear whether they exist or do not exist; but they are always spoken of and known by the universal formula.
ἡ δʼ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθʼ αὑτήν.
And matter is unknowable in itself.
ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά.
And matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood and all changeable matter, and intelligible, that which exists in sensible things not qua sensible, such as the mathematical objects.
πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, εἴρηται· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀνάγκη ἀπαντᾶν, ὅταν τις ἔρηται πότερον ἡ ὀρθὴ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ζῷον πρότερον ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἰσί, τὰ μέρη, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς.
How it is, then, in regard to whole and part, and to prior and posterior, has been stated; but to the question, when anyone asks whether the right angle and the circle and the animal are prior to the parts into which they are divided and from which they consist, we must reply that it is not simple.
εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον ἢ ἔμψυχον, ἢ ἕκαστον ἡ ἑκάστου, καὶ κύκλος τὸ κύκλῳ εἶναι, καὶ ὀρθὴ τὸ ὀρθῇ εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῆς ὀρθῆς, τὶ μὲν καὶ τινὸς φατέον ὕστερον, οἷον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τινὸς ὀρθῆς (καὶ γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, ἡ χαλκῆ ὀρθή, καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς ταῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα), ἡ δʼ ἄνευ ὕλης τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑστέρα τῶν δʼ ἐν τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστα μορίων προτέρα, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὐ φατέον· εἰ δʼ ἑτέρα καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον, καὶ οὕτω τὰ μὲν φατέον τὰ δʼ οὐ φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
For if indeed the soul is the animal or the animate being, or each is each, and the circle is to-be-a-circle, and the right angle is to-be-a-right-angle and the substance of the right angle, we must say that it is in a way posterior to some things, for example, to those in the formula, and to a certain right angle (for there is also the one with matter, the bronze right angle, and the one in particular lines), but that without matter is posterior to some of those in the formula, but prior to the parts in the particular, but absolutely we must not say so; but if it is different and the soul is not the animal, even so we must say that some things are so and some not, as has been said.