§4.4#1εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως.
But there are some who, as we said, both themselves say that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and to believe so.
χρῶνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως.
And many of those who study nature make use of this argument.
ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βεβαιοτάτη αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν.
But we have now assumed that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, and through this we have shown that this is the most certain of all principles.
ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς διʼ ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ·
But some, through lack of education, demand to demonstrate even this; for it is lack of education not to know of what things one should seek a demonstration and of what things one should not.
ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδʼ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν), εἰ δέ τινων μὴ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, τίνα ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν.
For in general, it is impossible for there to be a demonstration of absolutely everything (for it would proceed to infinity, so that not even thus would there be a demonstration); and if there are some things of which one should not seek a demonstration, they would not be able to say what they think is more such a principle than this.
ἔστι δʼ ἀποδεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν· ἂν δὲ μηθέν, γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ᾗ μὴ ἔχει· ὅμοιος γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ᾗ τοιοῦτος ἤδη.
But it is possible to demonstrate elenctically even about this that it is impossible, if only the opponent says something; but if he says nothing, it is ridiculous to seek an argument against one who has no argument for anything, insofar as he does not have it; for such a person, insofar as he is such, is already like a plant.
τὸ δʼ ἐλεγκτικῶς ἀποδεῖξαι λέγω διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἀποδεικνύων μὲν ἂν δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰτίου ὄντος ἔλεγχος ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.
And by demonstrating elenctically I mean that it differs from demonstrating, because the one who demonstrates might seem to beg the initial question, but if someone else is the cause of such a thing, it would be a refutation and not a demonstration.
ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἢ εἶναί τι λέγειν ἢ μὴ εἶναι (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχʼ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖν), ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ·
And the starting point for all such cases is not to demand that he say that something is or is not (for someone might quickly assume that this is begging the initial question), but at least to signify something both to himself and to another; for this is necessary, if indeed he says anything.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὔτʼ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλον.
For if not, such a person would have no argument, neither with himself nor with another.
ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο διδῷ, ἔσται ἀπόδειξις· ἤδη γάρ τι ἔσται ὡρισμένον.
But if anyone grants this, there will be a demonstration; for already there will be something defined.
ἀλλʼ αἴτιος οὐχ ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἀλλʼ ὁ ὑπομένων· ἀναιρῶν γὰρ λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον.
But the cause is not the one who demonstrates, but the one who submits; for in destroying argument, he submits to argument.
ἔτι δὲ ὁ τοῦτο συγχωρήσας συγκεχώρηκέ τι ἀληθὲς εἶναι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως. —πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γʼ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι·
Furthermore, the one who concedes this has conceded that something is true without demonstration. — First, then, it is clear that this at least is true, that the name signifies that it is or is not this, so that not everything would be so and not so.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει ἕν, ἔστω τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δίπουν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν τοῦτο· εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἂν ᾖ τι ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτʼ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (διαφέρει δʼ οὐθὲν οὐδʼ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ ἕτερον ὄνομα· λέγω δʼ οἷον, εἰ μὴ φαίη τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν σημαίνειν, πολλὰ δέ, ὧν ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς λόγος τὸ ζῷον δίπουν, εἶεν δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι πλείους, ὡρισμένοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν· τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθʼ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἄπειρα σημαίνειν φαίη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἓν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνῄρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, εἰ δʼ ἐνδέχεται, τεθείη ἂν ὄνομα τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕν). —ἔστω δή, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη κατʼ ἀρχάς, σημαῖνόν τι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον ἕν·
Furthermore, if "man" signifies one thing, let this be "two-footed animal." And I mean by "signifying one thing" this: if this is "man," if anything is a man, this will be what it is to be a man (though it makes no difference even if someone should say that it signifies several things, provided only they are defined, for a different name could be assigned to each definition; I mean, for example, if one should say that "man" does not signify one thing, but many, of which one definition is "two-footed animal," and there are also several others, but defined in number; for a private name would be assigned to each definition; but if not, but he should say that it signifies infinitely many things, it is manifest that there would be no argument; for not to signify one thing is to signify nothing, and if names do not signify, our conversing with one another is destroyed, and in truth even with oneself; for it is not possible to think anything without thinking one thing, but if it is possible, a single name would be assigned to this thing). — Let it be, then, as was said at the beginning, that the name signifies something and signifies one thing.
οὐ δὴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι σημαίνειν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ εἶναι, εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὴ μόνον καθʼ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦμεν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, τὸ καθʼ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἐσήμαινεν, ὥστε ἓν ἅπαντα ἔσται· συνώνυμα γάρ).
It is indeed not possible that what it is to be a man signifies just what it is to be not-man, if "man" signifies not only of one subject but also one thing (for we do not demand that "to signify one thing" means "to be of one subject," since in this way even "musical," "white," and "man" would signify one thing, so that all things will be one, for they would be synonymous).
καὶ οὐκ ἔσται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλʼ ἢ καθʼ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὃν ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωπον καλοῦμεν, ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν· τὸ δʼ ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.
And the same thing will not be and not be except by homonymy, as if what we call "man," others should call "not-man"; but the point in question is not this, whether it is possible for the same thing at the same time to be and not to be "man" in name, but in fact.
εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ· ὥστʼ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι·
But if "man" and "not-man" do not signify different things, it is clear that "what it is to be not-man" does not either from "what it is to be a man"; so that what it is to be a man will be what it is to be not-man; for they will be one.
ἓν γὰρ ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ εἶναι ἕν, τὸ ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἷς· εἰ δὲ ἔσται ἕν, ἓν σημανεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ.
For this is what it is to be one, as "cloak" and "mantle," if the definition is one; and if they are one, what it is to be a man and what it is to be not-man will signify one thing.
ἀλλʼ ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι ἕτερον σημαίνει.
But it had been shown that they signify different things.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ἄνθρωπος)· εἰ δʼ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι τότε τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον δίπουν (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὴ εἶναι)· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον.
It is necessary, therefore, if it is true to say of anything that it is a man, that it be a two-footed animal (for this was what "man" signified); and if this is necessary, it is not possible for the same thing not to be a two-footed animal at that time (for this is what "to be necessary" signifies, the impossibility of not being); it is not possible, then, for it to be true at the same time to say that the same thing is a man and is not a man.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ
And the same argument holds also for not being a man; for what it is to be a man and what...