§4.4#2μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἕτερον σημαίνει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἕτερον· πολὺ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὥστε σημαίνειν ἕτερον.
"what it is to be not-man" signifies something different, if indeed "to be white" and "to be man" are different; for the former is much more opposed, so as to signify something different.
εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν σημαίνειν, πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐροῦμεν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἓν πάντα ἔσται καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἀντικείμενα.
And if he should say that "white" also signifies the same and one thing, we shall say again what was said before, that all things will be one and not only those that are opposed.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.
But if this is not possible, what has been said follows, provided that he answers the question.
ἐὰν δὲ προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.
But if, when one asks a simple question, he adds the negations also, he does not answer the question.
οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τὸ πλῆθος· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐρομένου εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, ἀποκριτέον τὸ ἓν σημαῖνον καὶ οὐ προσθετέον ὅτι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέγα.
For nothing prevents the same thing from being both man and white and ten thousand other things in number; but nevertheless, when asked whether it is true to say that this is a man or not, he must answer what signifies one thing, and not add that it is also white and large.
καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρά γʼ ὄντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν· ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν.
For it is impossible to go through the accidents since they are infinite; so he must either go through all or none.
ὁμοίως τοίνυν εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ προσαποκριτέον τῷ ἐρομένῳ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα συμβέβηκε προσαποκριτέον, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται. —ὅλως δʼ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
Similarly, then, even if the same thing is ten thousand times a man and not-man, one should not add in answering the question whether it is a man, that it is at the same time also not-man, unless one must also add in answering all the other accidents that belong or do not belong to it; and if he does this, he is not conversing. — In general, those who say this destroy substance and what it is to be.
πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ (καίτοι αὗται ἀποφάσεις τούτου)· ἓν γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε, καὶ ἦν τοῦτό τινος οὐσία.
For they must assert that all things are accidental, and that there is no such thing as "what it is to be a man" or "to be an animal." For if there is to be such a thing as "what it is to be a man," this will not be "what it is to be a not-man" or "not to be a man" (and yet these are the negations of it); for what it signified was one thing, and this was the substance of something.
τὸ δʼ οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ.
And to signify substance is that the being for it is not anything else.
εἰ δʼ ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο ἔσται, ὥστʼ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν ὅτι οὐθενὸς ἔσται τοιοῦτος λόγος, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
But if for him "what it is to be a man" is "what it is to be a not-man" or "not to be a man," it will be something else, so that they must say that there will be no such definition of anything, but all things are by accident.
τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν.
For by this, substance and accident are distinguished; for "white" is accidental to "man" because he is white, but not just what is white.
εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθʼ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθʼ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν.
But if all things are said by accident, there will be no first subject of which they are said, if always the accident signifies the predication of some subject.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι.
It is necessary, then, to proceed to infinity.
ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω συμπλέκεται δυοῖν·
But this is impossible; for not even more than two are combined.
τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ συμβεβηκότι συμβεβηκός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκε ταὐτῷ, λέγω δʼ οἷον τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν καὶ τοῦτο λευκὸν ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν.
For an accident is not accidental to an accident, unless because both are accidental to the same thing.
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ Σωκράτης μουσικὸς οὕτως, ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκεν ἑτέρῳ τινί.
I mean, for example, that "white" is "musical" and this is "white" because both are accidental to "man." But Socrates is not musical in this way, namely, because both are accidental to some other thing.
ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δʼ ἐκείνως λέγεται συμβεβηκότα, ὅσα οὕτως λέγεται ὡς τὸ λευκὸν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, οἷον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεταί τι ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων.
Since, therefore, some accidents are said in this way and others in that, those which are said in the way that "white" is of Socrates cannot be infinite in the upward direction, as if to "white Socrates" some other thing were accidental; for some one thing does not come from them all.
οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι ἔσται συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ μουσικόν· οὐθέν τε γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ ἅμα διώρισται ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκε τὰ δʼ ὡς τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει· ὅσα δʼ οὕτως, οὐ συμβεβηκότι συμβέβηκε συμβεβηκός, ἀλλʼ ὅσα ἐκείνως, ὥστʼ οὐ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεχθήσεται.
Nor indeed will there be some other accident belonging to "white," as for instance "musical"; for this is no more accidental to that than that to this, and at the same time it is distinguished that some are accidental in this way, and others as "musical" is to Socrates; and those which are of the latter kind are not accidents accidental to an accident, but those of the former kind are, so that not everything will be said by accident.
ἔσται ἄρα τι καὶ ὣς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον.
There will be, therefore, something that signifies substance even thus.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις. —ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς ἅπαντα ἔσται ἕν.
And if this is so, it has been shown that it is impossible for contradictions to be predicated at the same time. — Furthermore, if all contradictions are true at the same time of the same subject, it is clear that all things will be one.
ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον.
For the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man, if it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything of everything, as is necessary for those who say the argument of Protagoras.
εἰ γάρ τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης· ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής.
For if to someone the man seems not to be a trireme, it is clear that he is not a trireme; so that he also is, if indeed the contradiction is true.
καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα· ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν.
And indeed there comes about the saying of Anaxagoras, "all things together"; so that nothing truly exists.
τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ὂν λέγειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.
They seem, therefore, to be speaking of the indefinite, and while thinking they are speaking of being, they are speaking of non-being; for that which is in potentiality and not in actuality is the indefinite.
ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γʼ αὐτοῖς κατὰ παντὸς παντὸς τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν·
But at all events they must say of everything either the affirmation or the negation.
ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ἑκάστῳ ἡ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει, ἡ δʼ ἑτέρου ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει·
For it would be absurd if to each thing its own negation belongs, but the negation of something else which does not belong to it does not belong to it.
λέγω δʼ οἷον εἰ ὀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ τριήρης.
I mean, for example, if it is true to say of a man that he is not a man, it is clear that he is also either a trireme or not a trireme.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάφασις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἡ κατάφασις, ἥ γε ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ αὐτοῦ.
If, then, the affirmation belongs, the negation must also belong; but if the affirmation does not belong, at least the negation will belong more than its own negation.
εἰ οὖν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρξει καὶ ἡ τῆς τριήρους· εἰ δʼ αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κατάφασις. —ταῦτά τε οὖν συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι.
If, then, that negation also belongs, the negation of trireme will also belong; and if this belongs, the affirmation also will. — These, then, are the consequences for those who say this argument, and also that it is not necessary either to assert or to deny.
εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὔτʼ ἄνθρωπος οὔτʼ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται·
For if it is true that he is a man and not-man, it is clear that he will be neither a man nor not-man.