§13.3ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐ περὶ κεχωρισμένων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτων μέν, οὐχ ᾗ δὲ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἔχειν μέγεθος ἢ εἶναι διαιρετά, δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγεθῶν εἶναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, μὴ ᾗ δὲ αἰσθητὰ ἀλλʼ ᾗ τοιαδί.
For just as the universal propositions in mathematics are not about things existing separate from magnitudes and numbers, but are about these, yet not qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible, it is clear that there can be both accounts and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not qua sensible, but qua being of such a kind.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ᾗ κινούμενα μόνον πολλοὶ λόγοι εἰσί, χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα ἢ κεχωρισμένον τι εἶναι κινούμενον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐν τούτοις τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἀφωρισμένην, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κινουμένων ἔσονται λόγοι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, οὐχ ᾗ κινούμενα δὲ ἀλλʼ ᾗ σώματα μόνον, καὶ πάλιν ᾗ ἐπίπεδα μόνον καὶ ᾗ μήκη μόνον, καὶ ᾗ διαιρετὰ καὶ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα ἔχοντα δὲ θέσιν καὶ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετα μόνον, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἁπλῶς λέγειν ἀληθὲς μὴ μόνον τὰ χωριστὰ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χωριστά (οἷον κινούμενα εἶναι), καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὅτι ἔστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοιαῦτά γε οἷα λέγουσιν.
For just as there are many accounts of things merely qua moving, apart from what each of such things is and from their accidents, and it is not necessary on this account that there should be either some moving thing separate from sensible things or some distinct nature in them, so also there will be accounts and sciences about moving things, not qua moving, but qua bodies only, and again qua planes only, and qua lines only, and qua divisible, and qua indivisible but having position, and qua indivisible only. So that since it is true to say without qualification not only that separate things exist but also that non-separate things exist (for instance, that moving things exist), it is also true to say without qualification that mathematical objects exist, and that they are such as they are said to be.
καὶ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τούτου εἶναι, οὐχὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος (οἷον ὅτι λευκοῦ, εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν λευκόν, ἡ δʼ ἔστιν ὑγιεινοῦ) ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου οὗ ἐστὶν ἑκάστη, εἰ ᾗ ὑγιεινὸν ὑγιεινοῦ, εἰ δʼ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν·
And just as it is true to say without qualification of the other sciences that they are of this, not of what is accidental (for instance, not of 'white', if what is healthy is white, and the science is of the healthy), but of that which is the object of each— of the healthy, if qua healthy, and of man, if qua man—so it is also with geometry.
οὐκ εἰ συμβέβηκεν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ὧν ἐστί, μὴ ἔστι δὲ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, οὐ μέντοι οὐσὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλων κεχωρισμένων.
Even if the things of which it treats happen to be sensible, though it does not treat of them qua sensible, the mathematical sciences will not for this reason be of sensible things, nor yet of other separate things apart from these.
πολλὰ δὲ συμβέβηκε καθʼ αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν ᾗ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ᾗ θῆλυ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ᾗ ἄρρεν, ἴδια πάθη ἔστιν (καίτοι οὐκ ἔστι τι θῆλυ οὐδʼ ἄρρεν κεχωρισμένον τῶν ζῴων)· ὥστε καὶ ᾗ μήκη μόνον καὶ ᾗ ἐπίπεδα.
And many properties belong essentially to things in virtue of each such character they have; since even qua female and qua male, there are proper attributes of the animal (and yet there is no 'female' or 'male' separate from animals); so also qua lines only and qua planes only.
καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἁπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τὸ ἀκριβές (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν), ὥστε ἄνευ τε μεγέθους μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ μεγέθους, καὶ μάλιστα ἄνευ κινήσεως, ἐὰν δὲ κίνησιν, μάλιστα τὴν πρώτην· ἁπλουστάτη γάρ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ὁμαλή.
And by how much the things are prior in definition and simpler, by so much more do they have exactness (and this is the simple); so that they have more exactness without magnitude than with magnitude, and especially without motion, but if they have motion, especially the primary motion, for this is the simplest, and of this the uniform is the simplest.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἁρμονικῆς καὶ ὀπτικῆς· οὐδετέρα γὰρ ᾗ ὄψις ἢ ᾗ φωνὴ θεωρεῖ, ἀλλʼ ᾗ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοί (οἰκεῖα μέντοι ταῦτα πάθη ἐκείνων), καὶ ἡ μηχανικὴ δὲ ὡσαύτως, ὥστʼ εἴ τις θέμενος κεχωρισμένα τῶν συμβεβηκότων σκοπεῖ τι περὶ τούτων ᾗ τοιαῦτα, οὐθὲν διὰ τοῦτο ψεῦδος ψεύσεται, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ γράφῃ καὶ ποδιαίαν φῇ τὴν μὴ ποδιαίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσι τὸ ψεῦδος.
The same account holds also of harmonics and optics; for neither of them studies its subject qua sight or qua voice, but qua lines and numbers (though these are proper attributes of those subjects); and mechanics likewise. So that if one posits things separate from their accidents and studies something about them qua such, he will not speak falsely on this account, any more than when he draws a line on the ground and says it is a foot long when it is not a foot long; for the falsehood is not in the premises.
ἄριστα δʼ ἂν οὕτω θεωρηθείη ἕκαστον, εἴ τις τὸ μὴ κεχωρισμένον θείη χωρίσας, ὅπερ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ποιεῖ καὶ ὁ γεωμέτρης.
And each thing would be best studied in this way, if one posits that which is not separate as separate, which is what the arithmetician and the geometer do.
ἓν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ᾗ ἄνθρωπος· ὁ δʼ ἔθετο ἓν ἀδιαίρετον, εἶτʼ ἐθεώρησεν εἴ τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ᾗ ἀδιαίρετος.
For man qua man is one and indivisible; but the arithmetician posits him as one indivisible, and then studies whether anything belongs to man qua indivisible.
ὁ δὲ γεωμέτρης οὔθʼ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος οὔθʼ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετος ἀλλʼ ᾗ στερεόν.
But the geometer studies him neither qua man nor qua indivisible, but qua solid.
ἃ γὰρ κἂν εἰ μή που ἦν ἀδιαίρετος ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῷ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσι, καὶ περὶ ὄντων διαλέγονται, καὶ ὄντα ἐστίν· διττὸν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ δʼ ὑλικῶς.
For the things which would belong to him even if he were not indivisible can clearly belong to him even without these attributes. Therefore, for this reason, geometers speak correctly, and they discuss things which exist, and these are things that exist; for being is double, on the one hand in actuality and on the other hand materially.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις), οἱ φάσκοντες οὐδὲν λέγειν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας περὶ καλοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ψεύδονται.
And since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former is always in action, while the beautiful is also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing about the beautiful or the good are in error.
λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ δεικνύουσι μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὀνομάζουσι τὰ δʼ ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν.
For they speak of them and demonstrate them in the highest degree; for if they do not name them, but demonstrate their results and definitions, they do not fail to speak of them.
τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.
And the most important forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in the highest degree.
καὶ ἐπεί γε πολλῶν αἴτια φαίνεται ταῦτα (λέγω δʼ οἷον ἡ τάξις καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον), δῆλον ὅτι λέγοιεν ἂν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν ὡς τὸ καλὸν αἴτιον τρόπον τινά.
And since these (I mean, e.g., order and definiteness) appear to be causes of many things, it is clear that they would also speak, in a way, of this kind of cause, i.e. the cause in the sense of the beautiful.
μᾶλλον δὲ γνωρίμως ἐν ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν.
But we shall speak of these more clearly in other places.