§11.3ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καθόλου καὶ οὐ κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δʼ ὂν πολλαχῶς καὶ οὐ καθʼ ἕνα λέγεται τρόπον· εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμωνύμως κατὰ δὲ κοινὸν μηδέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην (οὐ γὰρ ἓν γένος τῶν τοιούτων), εἰ δὲ κατά τι κοινόν, εἴη ἂν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην.
But since the science of the philosopher is of being qua being, universally and not in part, and being is spoken of in many ways and not in one way; if, then, it is spoken of homonymously and with nothing in common, it does not fall under one science (for there is not one genus of such things), but if it is according to some common thing, it would fall under one science.
ἔοικε δὴ τὸν εἰρημένον λέγεσθαι τρόπον καθάπερ τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ ὑγιεινόν· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἑκάτερον πολλαχῶς λέγομεν.
Now it seems to be spoken of in the manner mentioned, just as 'medical' and 'healthy' are; for we speak of each of these in many ways.
λέγεται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον τῷ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγεσθαί πως τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν τὸ δʼ ἄλλως, πρὸς ταὐτὸ δʼ ἕκαστον.
And each is spoken of in this manner because the one is referred in some way to the medical science, the another to health, and another in some other way, but each to the same thing.
ἰατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ χρήσιμον.
For a medical discourse and a scalpel are so called because the one is from the medical science and the other is useful to it.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι σημαντικὸν ὑγιείας τὸ δʼ ὅτι ποιητικόν.
And similarly with 'healthy'; for one is so called because it is significant of health, and another because it is productive of it.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
And the same manner applies to the rest.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν πάθος ἢ ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις ἢ κίνησις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι λέγεται ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὄν.
In the very same manner all being is also spoken of; for each of them is said to be a being because it is an affection, or state, or disposition, or motion, or some other such thing of being qua being.
ἐπεὶ δὲ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἡ ἀναγωγὴ γίγνεται, καὶ τῶν ἐναντιώσεων ἑκάστη πρὸς τὰς πρώτας διαφορὰς καὶ ἐναντιώσεις ἀναχθήσεται τοῦ ὄντος, εἴτε πλῆθος καὶ ἓν εἴθʼ ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης αἱ πρῶται τοῦ ὄντος εἰσὶ διαφοραί, εἴτʼ ἄλλαι τινές· ἔστωσαν γὰρ αὗται τεθεωρημέναι.
And since the reference of all being is to some one and common thing, each of the contrarieties also will be referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being, whether plurality and unity, or likeness and unlikeness are the primary differences of being, or some others; for let these be assumed as having been investigated.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἀναγωγὴν πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἓν γίγνεσθαι.
And it makes no difference whether the reference of being is to being or to unity.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἄλλο δʼ ἐστίν, ἀντιστρέφει γε· τό τε γὰρ ἓν καὶ ὄν πως, τό τε ὂν ἕν. —ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης θεωρῆσαι, λέγεται δʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν κατὰ στέρησιν—καίτοι γʼ ἔνια ἀπορήσειέ τις ἂν πῶς λέγεται κατὰ στέρησιν, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, καθάπερ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου—περὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν στέρησιν δεῖ τιθέναι μὴ τοῦ ὅλου λόγου, τοῦ τελευταίου δὲ εἴδους· οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ὁ δίκαιος καθʼ ἕξιν τινὰ πειθαρχικὸς τοῖς νόμοις, οὐ πάντως ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου στερούμενος λόγου, περὶ δὲ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ἐκλείπων πῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ ἡ στέρησις ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. —καθάπερ δʼ ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται (περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τοὐναντίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, τῶν μὲν ἐφʼ ἓν τῶν δʼ ἐπὶ δύο τῶν δʼ ἐπὶ τρία, καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τούτων ᾗ ποσά ἐστι καὶ συνεχῆ, καὶ οὐ καθʼ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖ, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα θέσεις σκοπεῖ καὶ τὰ ταύταις ὑπάρχοντα, τῶν δὲ τὰς συμμετρίας καὶ ἀσυμμετρίας, τῶν δὲ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ὅμως μίαν πάντων καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τίθεμεν ἐπιστήμην τὴν γεωμετρικήν), τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸ ὄν.
For even if they are not the same but different, they at least convert; for unity is also in a way being, and being is unity. —And since it belongs to one and the same science to investigate all contraries, and each of them is spoken of according to privation —although some might puzzle how they are spoken of according to privation, when there is some intermediate between them, as in the case of the unjust and the just— yet in all such cases we must posit the privation to be not of the whole definition, but of the ultimate species; for example, if the just man is, according to some state, obedient to the laws, the unjust man will not altogether be deprived of the whole definition, but will be failing in some way in respect of obedience to the laws, and in this way privation will belong to him; and the same manner applies to the rest. —And just as the mathematician makes his investigation concerning things by abstraction (for after stripping away all sensible things he investigates them, such as weight and lightness and hardness and their contrary, and further heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only quantity and the continuous, some in one dimension, some in two, some in three, and investigates the affections of these qua quantities and continuous, and does not investigate them in any other respect, and of some he considers their positions relative to one another and what belongs to these, and of others their commensurabilities and incommensurabilities, and of others their ratios, yet we posit one and the same science of all of them, namely geometry), in the very same manner it is with being.
τὰ γὰρ τούτῳ συμβεβηκότα καθʼ ὅσον ἐστὶν ὄν, καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις αὐτοῦ ᾗ ὄν, οὐκ ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ἢ φιλοσοφίας θεωρῆσαι.
For to investigate the accidents of this insofar as it is being, and its contrarieties qua being, belongs to no other science than philosophy.
τῇ φυσικῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ᾗ ὄντα, μᾶλλον δʼ ᾗ κινήσεως μετέχει, τὴν θεωρίαν τις ἀπονείμειεν ἄν· ἥ γε μὴν διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ σοφιστικὴ τῶν συμβεβηκότων μέν εἰσι τοῖς οὖσιν, οὐχ ᾗ δʼ ὄντα οὐδὲ περὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ καθʼ ὅσον ὄν ἐστιν· ὥστε λείπεται τὸν φιλοσόφον, καθʼ ὅσον ὄντʼ ἐστίν, εἶναι περὶ τὰ λεχθέντα θεωρητικόν.
For to physics one would assign the investigation of things not qua being, but rather insofar as they participate in motion; while dialectic and sophistry are indeed concerned with the accidents of existing things, but not qua being, nor about being itself insofar as it is being; so that it remains for the philosopher to be the investigator of the things mentioned, insofar as they are beings.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τό τε ὂν ἅπαν καθʼ ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, καὶ τἀναντία τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (εἰς τὰς πρώτας γὰρ ἐναντιώσεις καὶ διαφορὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἀνάγεται), τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα δυνατὸν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, διαλύοιτʼ ἂν ἡ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἀπορία λεχθεῖσα, λέγω δʼ ἐν ᾗ διηπορεῖτο πῶς ἔσται πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων τῷ γένει μία τις ἐπιστήμη.
And since all being is spoken of in many ways but with reference to some one and common thing, and contraries in the same manner (for they are referred to the primary contrarieties and differences of being), and since such things can fall under one science, the puzzle mentioned at the beginning would be resolved, I mean that in which it was puzzled how there can be some one science when there are many things different in genus.