§11.2ἔτι πότερον δεῖ τιθέναι τι παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τούτων ἡ ζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη;
Further, must we posit something besides particulars or not, but is the science we are seeking of these?
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄπειρα·
But these are infinite.
τά γε μὴν παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα γένη ἢ εἴδη ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ οὐδετέρου τούτων ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη.
On the other hand, what are besides particulars are genera or species, but the science now being sought is of neither of these.
διότι γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο, εἴρηται.
For the reason why this is impossible has been stated.
καὶ γὰρ ὅλως ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερον δεῖ τινὰ ὑπολαβεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι χωριστὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς δεῦρο, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν.
Indeed, in general, it is a puzzle whether we ought to suppose that there is some substance separable from sensible substances and those here, or not, but that these are the things that exist, and that wisdom is about these.
ζητεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐοίκαμεν ἄλλην τινά, καὶ τὸ προκείμενον τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἡμῖν, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἰδεῖν εἴ τι χωριστὸν καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μηδενὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπάρχον.
For we seem to be seeking some other, and this is our proposed task, I mean to see if there is something separable by itself and belonging to none of the sensible things.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία, παρὰ ποίας τῶν αἰσθητῶν δεῖ τιθέναι ταύτην εἶναι;
Further, if besides sensible substances there is some other substance, besides which of the sensible things must we posit this to exist?
τί γὰρ μᾶλλον παρὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ τοὺς ἵππους ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων θήσει τις αὐτὴν ἢ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ὅλως;
For why should one posit it besides men rather than horses or other animals, or indeed inanimate things in general?
τό γε μὴν ἴσας ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς καὶ φθαρταῖς οὐσίαις ἀϊδίους ἑτέρας κατασκευάζειν ἐκτὸς τῶν εὐλόγων δόξειεν ἂν πίπτειν.
On the other hand, to construct other eternal substances equal in number to sensible and perishable substances would seem to fall outside of what is reasonable.
εἰ δὲ μὴ χωριστὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἀρχή, τίνα ἄν τις ἄλλην θείη μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης;
But if the principle now being sought is not separable from bodies, what other could one posit more than matter?
αὕτη γε μὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, δυνάμει δʼ ἔστιν.
Yet this is not in actuality, but is in potentiality.
μᾶλλόν τʼ ἂν ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα ταύτης δόξειεν εἶναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή· τοῦτο δὲ φθαρτόν, ὥσθʼ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀΐδιος οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ καθʼ αὑτήν.
And the species and form would seem to be a more principal principle than this; but this is perishable, so that in general there is no eternal substance separable and by itself.
ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον· ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ ζητεῖται σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστάτων ὡς οὖσά τις ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐσία τοιαύτη· πῶς γὰρ ἔσται τάξις μή τινος ὄντος ἀϊδίου καὶ χωριστοῦ καὶ μένοντος;
But this is absurd; for it seems and is sought by almost the most refined thinkers as if there were some such principle and substance; for how will there be order if there is not something eternal and separable and remaining?
ἔτι δʼ εἴπερ ἔστι τις οὐσία καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν οἵαν νῦν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ αὕτη μία πάντων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀϊδίων τε καὶ φθαρτῶν, ἀπορίαν ἔχει διὰ τί ποτε τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς οὔσης τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀΐδια τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἀΐδια (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄτοπον)·
Further, if indeed there is some substance and principle of such a nature as we are now seeking, and this is one and the same for all things, both eternal and perishable, it is a puzzle why on earth, since the same principle exists, some of the things under the principle are eternal and others are not (for this is absurd).
εἰ δʼ ἄλλη μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν φθαρτῶν ἄλλη δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων, εἰ μὲν ἀΐδιος καὶ ἡ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ὁμοίως ἀπορήσομεν (διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἀϊδίου τῆς ἀρχῆς οὔσης καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀΐδια; )· φθαρτῆς δʼ οὔσης ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ γίγνεται ταύτης κἀκείνης ἑτέρα, καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν.
But if there is one principle of perishable things and another of eternal things, if indeed the one of perishable things is also eternal, we shall be equally puzzled (for why, since the principle is eternal, are not the things under the principle also eternal?); but if it is perishable, there comes to be some other principle of this, and another of that, and this will go on to infinity.
εἰ δʼ αὖ τις τὰς δοκούσας μάλιστʼ ἀρχὰς ἀκινήτους εἶναι, τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, θήσει, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μὴ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν σημαίνει, πῶς ἔσονται χωρισταὶ καὶ καθʼ αὑτάς;
But on the other hand, if one posits those things which are most thought to be motionless principles, namely being and unity, first of the two, if each of them does not signify a 'this' and a substance, how will they be separable and by themselves?
τοιαύτας δὲ ζητοῦμεν τὰς ἀϊδίους τε καὶ πρώτας ἀρχάς.
Yet such are the eternal and primary principles we are seeking.
εἴ γε μὴν τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν δηλοῖ, πάντʼ ἐστὶν οὐσίαι τὰ ὄντα· κατὰ πάντων γὰρ τὸ ὂν κατηγορεῖται (κατʼ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ τὸ ἕν)· οὐσίαν δʼ εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ψεῦδος.
But if each of them does reveal a 'this' and a substance, all existing things are substances; for being is predicated of all things (and of some, unity also); but for all existing things to be substances is false.
ἔτι δὲ τοῖς τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν τὸ ἓν λέγουσι καὶ τοῦτʼ οὐσίαν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῆς ὕλης τὸν ἀριθμὸν γεννῶσι πρῶτον καὶ τοῦτον οὐσίαν φάσκουσιν εἶναι, πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι;
Further, for those who say that unity is the primary principle and that this is a substance, and from unity and matter generate number first and say that this is a substance, how is it possible for what is said to be true?
τὴν γὰρ δυάδα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστον ἀριθμῶν τῶν συνθέτων πῶς ἓν δεῖ νοῆσαι;
For how must we conceive the dyad and each of the other composite numbers as one?
περὶ τούτου γὰρ οὔτε λέγουσιν οὐδὲν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν.
For concerning this they say nothing, nor is it easy to say.
εἴ γε μὴν γραμμὰς ἢ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (λέγω δὲ ἐπιφανείας τὰς πρώτας) θήσει τις ἀρχάς, ταῦτά γʼ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι χωρισταί, τομαὶ δὲ καὶ διαιρέσεις αἱ μὲν ἐπιφανειῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων (αἱ δὲ στιγμαὶ γραμμῶν), ἔτι δὲ πέρατα τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ χωριστὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν.
But if one posits lines or what are adjacent to these (I mean primary surfaces) as principles, these at any rate are not separable substances, but sections and divisions, some of surfaces, others of bodies (and points of lines), and further, limits of these same things; and all these exist in others and none is separable.
ἔτι πῶς οὐσίαν ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ στιγμῆς;
Further, how must we suppose there to be a substance of unity and a point?
οὐσίας μὲν γὰρ πάσης γένεσις ἔστι, στιγμῆς δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν· διαίρεσις γὰρ ἡ στιγμή.
For of every substance there is a generation, but of a point there is not; for a point is a division.
παρέχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ τὸ πᾶσαν μὲν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιουδί, τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν μὴ τῶν καθόλου εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τόδε τι καὶ χωριστόν, ὥστʼ εἰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι;
And it also presents a difficulty that all science is of universals and of the 'such', but substance is not of universals, but is rather a 'this' and separable, so that if there is science concerning principles, how must we suppose the principle to be a substance?
ἔτι πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ἢ οὔ (λέγω δὲ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ μετὰ ταύτης);
Further, is there something besides the concrete whole or not (I mean the matter and what is with this)?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή, τά γε ἐν ὕλῃ φθαρτὰ πάντα· εἰ δʼ ἔστι τι, τὸ εἶδος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ μορφή· τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐπὶ τίνων ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οὔ, χαλεπὸν ἀφορίσαι· ἐπʼ ἐνίων γὰρ δῆλον οὐκ ὂν χωριστὸν τὸ εἶδος, οἷον οἰκίας.
For if not, all things in matter are perishable; but if there is something, it would be the species and the form; but on which things this exists and on which it does not, is difficult to determine; for on some it is clear that the species is not separable, as in the case of a house.
ἔτι πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἴδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ αἱ αὐταί;
Further, are the principles the same in species or in number?
εἰ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἕν, πάντʼ ἔσται ταὐτά.
For if they are one in number, all things will be the same.