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Aristotle · Metaphysics §11.1

Puzzles on the Scope of Wisdom and Principles

Passage 109 of 159 · Greek

Summary

The text presents a series of puzzles (aporiae) concerning the scope of "wisdom" as a science of principles and substances, questioning whether it deals with demonstrative principles, Forms, mathematical intermediates, or the universal concepts of "being" and "unity."

§11.1ὅτι μὲν ἡ σοφία περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐν οἷς διηπόρηται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις πότερον μίαν ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ πολλάς·
That wisdom is a certain science concerning principles is clear from the first books in which we went through the difficulties against what has been said by others concerning principles; but one might raise the question whether we ought to suppose wisdom to be one science or many.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν, μία γʼ ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δʼ ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ἐναντίαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ μία, ποίας δεῖ θεῖναι ταύτας;
For if one, one science is always of contraries, but the principles are not contraries; and if not one, what kind of sciences must these be posited to be?
ἔτι τὰς ἀποδεικτικὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων;
Further, is it the task of one or of several sciences to contemplate the demonstrative principles?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μιᾶς, τί μᾶλλον ταύτης ἢ ὁποιασοῦν;
For if of one, why of this rather than of any other whatsoever?
εἰ δὲ πλειόνων, ποίας δεῖ ταύτας τιθέναι;
And if of several, what kind of sciences must these be posited to be?
ἔτι πότερον πασῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ἢ οὔ;
Further, is it of all substances or not?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ πασῶν, ποίων χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι· εἰ δὲ πασῶν μία, ἄδηλον πῶς ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι.
For if not of all, it is difficult to render of what kind they are; and if one science is of all, it is unclear how it is possible for the same science to be of several different substances.
ἔτι πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον ἢ καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα;
Further, is it about substances alone or also about their accidents?
εἰ γὰρ περί γε τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, περὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ δʼ ἑτέρα, τίς ἑκατέρα καὶ ποτέρα σοφία;
For if there is demonstration of accidents, there is none of substances; and if they are different, what is each of them, and which of the two is wisdom?
ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδεικτική, σοφία ἡ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· ᾗ δὲ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν.
For insofar as it is demonstrative, the science concerning accidents is wisdom; but insofar as it is about primary things, it is that of substances.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην θετέον· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δʼ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ ταῖς οὖσιν ἐν κινήσει· καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον κινεῖ—τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ τέλος—τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κινῆσαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις)· ὅλως δʼ ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερόν ποτε περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ, περὶ δέ τινας ἑτέρας.
But neither must we posit the science we are seeking to be about the causes mentioned in the Physics; for it is not about the final cause (for such is the good, and this belongs to things practicable and to things in motion; and this is what primarily moves—for such is the end—but that which primarily moves is not among things motionless); and in general, it is a puzzle whether the science now sought is about sensible substances or not, but about some other kind.
εἰ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλας, ἢ περὶ τὰ εἴδη εἴη ἂν ἢ περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά.
For if it is about others, it would be either about the Forms or about mathematical objects.
τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον (ὅμως δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει, κἂν εἶναί τις αὐτὰ θῇ, διὰ τί ποτʼ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη· λέγω δʼ ὅτι τὰ μαθηματικὰ μὲν μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασι καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἷον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο, τρίτος δʼ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδʼ ἵππος παρʼ αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθʼ ἕκαστον· εἰ δʼ αὖ μὴ ἔστιν ὡς λέγουσι, περὶ ποῖα θετέον πραγματεύεσθαι τὸν μαθηματικόν;
Now that the Forms do not exist is clear (yet it is a puzzle, even if one posits that they exist, why on earth it is not the case that, just as in the case of mathematical objects, so also is it in the case of other things of which there are Forms; I mean that they posit mathematical objects as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third kind of thing besides the Forms and the things here, but there is no third man or horse besides the Form itself and the particulars; but on the other hand, if they are not as they say, with what kind of things must we posit the mathematician to be concerned?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ τὰ δεῦρο· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέν ἐστιν οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ζητοῦσι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν)· οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη (χωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐθέν)· ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν· φθαρταὶ γάρ.
For surely not with the things here; for none of these is such as the mathematical sciences investigate); nor indeed is the science now sought about mathematical objects (for none of them is separable); nor indeed is it about sensible substances; for they are perishable.
ὅλως δʼ ἀπορήσειέ τις ἂν ποίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὸ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλης.
And in general, one might raise the question to which science it belongs to discuss the difficulties concerning the matter of mathematical objects.
οὔτε γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ πᾶσαν εἶναι πραγματείαν, οὐδὲ μὴν τῆς σκοπούσης περὶ ἀποδείξεώς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης· περὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖται.
For it does not belong to physics, because the entire business of the physicist is about things which contain in themselves a principle of motion and rest; nor indeed to the science which contemplates demonstration and science; for it is about this very genus that it makes its inquiry.
λείπεται τοίνυν τὴν προκειμένην φιλοσοφίαν περὶ αὐτῶν τὴν σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι.
It remains, therefore, that the philosophy now before us should make the inquiry about them.
διαπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις εἰ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰ καλούμενα ὑπό τινων στοιχεῖα· ταῦτα δὲ πάντες ἐνυπάρχοντα τοῖς συνθέτοις τιθέασιν.
And one might raise the question whether we ought to posit the science we are seeking as being about the principles which are called by some 'elements'; and these all people posit as being inherent in composite things.
μᾶλλον δʼ ἂν δόξειε τῶν καθόλου δεῖν εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην· πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὥστʼ εἴη ἂν οὕτω τῶν πρώτων γενῶν.
But it would seem rather that the science we are seeking must be of universals; for every definition and every science is of universals and not of the lowest terms, so that in this way it would be of the primary genera.
ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑποληφθείη περιέχειν τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖς ἐοικέναι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρῶτα τῇ φύσει· φθαρέντων γὰρ αὐτῶν συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ λοιπά· πᾶν γὰρ ὂν καὶ ἕν.
And these would be being and unity; for these would be most thought to contain all beings and to be most like principles because they are primary by nature; for if they are destroyed, the remaining things are co-destroyed with them; for everything is being and one.
ᾗ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν εἰ θήσει τις αὐτὰ γένη, διαφορὰ δʼ οὐδεμία τοῦ γένους μετέχει, ταύτῃ δʼ οὐκ ἂν δόξειε δεῖν αὐτὰ τιθέναι γένη οὐδʼ ἀρχάς.
But insofar as, if one posits them as genera, it is necessary that their differences should participate in them, but no difference participates in the genus, in this respect it would seem that we ought not to posit them as genera nor as principles.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ τὸ ἁπλούστερον τοῦ ἧττον τοιούτου, τὰ δʼ ἔσχατα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἁπλούστερα τῶν γενῶν (ἄτομα γάρ, τὰ γένη δʼ εἰς εἴδη πλείω καὶ διαφέροντα διαιρεῖται), μᾶλλον ἂν ἀρχὴ δόξειεν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν.
Further, if the simpler is more a principle than what is less so, and the lowest terms of those derived from the genus are simpler than the genera (for they are indivisible, whereas the genera are divided into several and different species), the species would seem to be more a principle than the genera.
ᾗ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ εἴδη, τὰ γένη ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔοικε μᾶλλον· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν.
But insofar as the species are co-destroyed with the genera, the genera are more like principles; for that which co-destroys is a principle.
τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχοντα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἕτερα.
These, then, and other such things are what present difficulties.

Notes

  1. 1059a18ἐκ τῶν πρώτων — Meaning "from the first [books/writings]." This refers to the fifteen puzzles (aporiae) introduced in Book Beta (Book 3) of the *Metaphysics*, indicating that Chapters 1 and 2 of Book Kappa (Book 11) serve as a summary or abridged version of the discussions in Book Beta.
  2. 1059a24ἔτι τὰς ἀποδεικτικὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων; — The impersonal `ἔστι` is omitted, and the genitives `μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων` function as possessive genitives (or genitive of characteristic), meaning "is it [the task] of one [science] or of several?"
  3. 1059b32ᾗ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν — The relative adverb `ᾗ` means "insofar as" or "in respect of that." It introduces an accusative-and-infinitive construction (`ἀνάγκη [ἐστὶ] τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν μετέχειν`), pointing out the absurdity that if being and unity are posited as genera, their differentiating characteristics ("differences") would have to participate (`μετέχειν`) in those genera, which violates the logical rule that a difference does not participate in its genus.
  4. 1059b38ᾗ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ εἴδη — The verb `συναναιρέω` (in the passive: "to be co-destroyed") is directly connected to Aristotle's definition of a principle (where the destruction of one entails the destruction of the other, but not vice versa). The dative `τοῖς γένεσι` is a dative of accompaniment, meaning "along with the genera."

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §11.1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:11.1

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