Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Great Ethics §2.16.1-2.16.3

The Appropriate Number of Friends and Natural Limits

Passage 70 of 71 · Greek

Summary

The author discusses the optimal number of friends to acquire, arguing that they should be neither too many nor too few, but rather a moderate number, considering human nature's limited capacity for affection and the sorrow that arises from others' misfortunes.

§2.16.1πότερον δὲ πολλοὺς κτητέον φίλους ἢ ὀλίγους;
Should one acquire many friends or few?
οὔτε δὴ πολλοὺς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, οὔτʼ ὀλίγους δεῖ [ἀεί].
Simply to speak, they should neither be many, nor [always] few.
πολλῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἔργον ἐφʼ ἕκαστον μερίσαι τὸ φιλεῖν.
For if they are many, it is a task to divide the loving to each one.
ἐφʼ ἁπάντων γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαδυνατεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις ἀσθενὴς οὖσα πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι.
For in all other things as well, our nature, being weak, fails in power to reach far.
οὔτε γὰρ τῇ ὄψει ἐπὶ πολὺ ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν πλέον ἀποστήσῃς τοῦ συμμέτρου, ἐλλείπει διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως, οὔτʼ ἐπʼ ἀκοῆς, οὔτʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἁπάντων.
For neither do we see far with our sight, but if you remove it further than what is proportionate, it falls short because of the weakness of nature; nor is it otherwise with hearing, nor with all the other things likewise.
§2.16.2ἐλλείπ των οὖν τῷ φιλεῖν διʼ ἀδυναμίαν καὶ ἐγκλήματʼ ἄν τις ἔχοι δικαίως, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φίλος, μὴ φιλῶν γε ἀλλʼ τῷ γε λόγῳ· ἧ δὲ φιλία οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται.
Therefore, one who falls short in loving because of inability would justly incur accusations, and would not be a friend, since he does not love except in word; but friendship does not wish this.
§2.16.3ἔτι ἂν ὦσιν πολλοί, οὐκ ἔστιν παύσασθπι λυπούμενον· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων εἰκὸς ἀεὶ περὶ ἕνα γέ τινα συμβαίνειν τι ἀτύχημα, ὧν γινομένων ἀναγκαῖον λυπεῖσθαι.
Furthermore, if they are many, it is not possible to cease grieving; for since they are many, it is likely that some misfortune is always happening to at least someone, and when these things occur, it is necessary to grieve.
οὔτʼ αὖ πάλιν ὀλίγους, ἕνα ἢ δύο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτρους τῷ καιρῷ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὁρμ πρὸς τὸ φιλεῖν.
Nor, on the other hand, should they be too few, one or two, but proportionate to the occasion and to one's own impulse toward loving.

Notes

  1. §2.16.1ἔργον ἐφʼ ἕκαστον μερίσαι τὸ φιλεῖν — The noun 'ἔργον' functions here as a predicate meaning 'a difficult task' or 'something impossible,' with the infinitive phrase 'μερίσαι' acting as its real subject. The prepositional phrase 'ἐφʼ ἕκαστον' depends on 'μερίσαι,' meaning 'to distribute (the loving) to each individual.'
  2. §2.16.2ἐλλείπων οὖν τῷ φιλεῖν — The subject of the present participle 'ἐλλείπων' (the person trying to have many friends, or a generic subject) is omitted. The dative 'τῷ φιλεῖν' is a dative of respect ('in respect to loving'). The entire participial phrase carries a conditional force ('if one should fall short in...').
  3. §2.16.2μὴ φιλῶν γε ἀλλʼ ἢ τῷ λόγῳ — The conjunction 'ἀλλʼ ἤ' means 'except' or 'other than.' Here it limits the negative participle 'μὴ φιλῶν' (not loving in reality), creating a restrictive expression: 'not loving except in word only.'
  4. §2.16.3οὐκ ἔστιν παύσασθαι λυπούμενον — The impersonal 'οὐκ ἔστιν' means 'it is not possible.' The verb 'παύομαι' (to cease) takes a participle as its complement; here it is paired with 'λυπούμενον' (present participle, masculine accusative singular representing a generic subject) to mean 'to cease grieving' or 'to be free from grief.'

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §2.16.1-2.16.3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:2.16.1-2.16.3

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