§2.15.1ἐχόμενον δʼ ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ αὐταρκείας εἰπεῖν καὶ τοῦ αὐτάρκους, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης προσδεήσεται φιλίας, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αὐτάρκης ἔσται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο.
Next, it would be to speak about self-sufficiency and the self-sufficient person, whether the self-sufficient person will additionally need friendship, or not, but will himself be self-sufficient for himself also in this respect.
λέγουσι γὰρ τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταί· “ὅταν δʼ ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων; ”
ὅθεν καὶ ἡ ἀπορία γίγνεται, πότερον ὁ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἔχων καὶ ὢν αὐτάρκης προσδεήσεται φίλου;
For even the poets say such things: "When the divinity gives well, what need of friends?" From where also the difficulty arises, whether the one who has all goods and is self-sufficient will additionally need a friend?
ἢ τότε καὶ μάλιστα;
Or then most of all?
τίνα γὰρ εὖ ποιήσει, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ συμβιώσεται;
For to whom will he do good, or with whom will he live?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ μόνος γε διάξει.
For surely he will not spend his life alone.
§2.15.2εἰ τοίνυν τούτων δεήσεται, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ φιλίας, προσδέοιτʼ ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.
Therefore, if he will need these things, and these are not possible without friendship, the self-sufficient person would additionally need friendship.
§2.15.3ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εἰωθυῖα ὁμοιότης λαμβάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτʼ ἐκεῖ ὀρθῶς οὔτʼ ἂν ἐνταῦθα εἴη χρήσιμος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ὁ θεός ἐστιν αὐτάρκης καὶ μηδενὸς δεῖται, διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐδʼ ἡμεῖς οὐδενὸς δεησόμεθα.
So the similarity accustomed to be taken from God in arguments would neither be correct there nor useful here; for it is not the case that if God is self-sufficient and needs nothing, because of this we too shall need nothing.
§2.15.4ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις λόγος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ λεγόμενος.
For there is indeed some such argument spoken of about God.
ἐπεὶ γάρ, φησί, πάντα ἔχει τἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς καί ἐστιν αὐτάρκης τί ποιήσει;
"For since," he says, "God has all goods and is self-sufficient, what will he do?
οὐ γὰρ καθευδήσει.
For surely he will not sleep.
θεάσεται δή τι, φησίν· τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον καὶ οἰκειότατον τί οὖν θεάσεται;
He will indeed contemplate something," he says; "for this is most beautiful and most appropriate.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι θεάοεται, βέλτιον θεώσεταί τι αὑτοῦ.
What then will he contemplate?
ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἄτοπον, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄλλο τι εἶναι βέλτιον.
For if he contemplates something else, he will contemplate something better than himself.
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἂρα θεάσετα ἀλλʼ ἄτοπον·
But this is absurd, for there to be something else better than God.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος [ὃς] ἂν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκοπῆται, ὡς ἀναισθήτῳ ἐπιτιμῶμεν.
Therefore, he will contemplate himself.
ἄτοπος οὖν, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς ἔσται αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν θεώμενος.
But this is absurd; for even a human being, if he should observe himself, we censure him as insensible.
§2.15.5τί μὲν οὖν ὁ θεὸς θεάσεται, ἀφείσθω· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς αὐταρκείας οὐ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν σκέψιν ποιούμεθα, ἀλλʼ ἀνθρωπίνης, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης δεήσεται φιλίας ἢ οὔ;
Therefore, God would be absurd," he says, "contemplating himself." Therefore, what God will contemplate, let it be dismissed; but we are making our inquiry not about the self-sufficiency of God, but about human self-sufficiency, whether the self-sufficient person will need friendship or not.
εἰ δή τις ἐπὶ τὸν φίλον ἐπιβλέψας ἴδοι τί ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖάς τις ὁ φίλος, * * τοιοῦτος οἷος ἕτερος εἶναι ἐγώ, ἄν γε καὶ σφόδρα φίλον ποιήσῃς, ὥσπερ τὸ λεγόμενον “ἄλλος οὗτος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος φίλος ἐγώ. §2.15.6” ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστι καὶ χαλεπώτατον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν σοφῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν, τὸ γνῶναι αὑτόν, καὶ ἥδιστον (τὸ γὰρ αὑτὸν εἰδέναι ἡδύ), αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν αὑτοὺς ἐξ αὑτῶν οὐ δυνάμεθα θεάσασθαι (ὅτι δʼ αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς οὐ δυνάμεθα, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ λανῦάνομεν ταὐτὰ ποιοῦντες· §2.15.7τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται δι᾿ εὔνοιαν διὰ πάθος· πολλοῖς δὲ ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐπισκοτεῖ πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς)· ὥσπερ οὖν ὅταν θέλωμεν αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν τὸ πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον ἐμβλέψαντες εἴδομεν, ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν αὐτο αὑτοὺς βουληθῶμεν γνῶναι, εἰς τὸν φίλον ἰδόντες γνωρίσαιμεν ἄν· ἔστι γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ἐγώ.
If indeed someone, having looked upon a friend, should see what he is and of what sort the friend is, [he is] such as to be another self, if at least you make him very much a friend, just like the saying: "This other Heracles, another friend is myself." "Since, then, it is both most difficult, just as some of the wise have said, to know oneself, and most pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant), we indeed are not able to contemplate ourselves from ourselves (and that we are not able to do so ourselves is clear from those things for which we censure others, while we ourselves do not notice that we are doing the same things; and this happens through goodwill or through passion; and for many of us these things darken the way to judging correctly); just as, therefore, when we ourselves wish to see our own face, we see it by looking into a mirror, in the same way also when we wish to know ourselves, we would know ourselves by looking at a friend; for the friend is, as we say, another self.
§2.15.8εἰ οὖν ἡδὺ μὲν τὸ αὑτὸν εἰδέναι, τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ἄνευ ἄλλου φίλου, δέοιτʼ ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνωρίζειν. §2.15.9— ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἴπερ ἐστὶν καλόν, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχοντα τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθά, τίνα εὖ ποιήσε;
If, therefore, it is pleasant to know oneself, and this is not possible to know without another friend, the self-sufficient person would need friendship in order to know himself." — And furthermore, even if it is noble, as indeed it is, to do good when one has the goods from fortune, to whom will he do good?
μετὰ τίνος δὲ συμβιώσετωι;
And with whom will he live?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ μόνος γε διάξει· τὸ γὰρ συμβιοῦν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.
For surely he will not spend his life alone; for living together is pleasant and necessary.
εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέγεται εἶναι ἄνευ φιλίας, προσδέοιτʼ ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.
If, therefore, these things are noble and pleasant and necessary, and these are not possible to be without friendship, the self-sufficient person would additionally need friendship.