§2.12.1τῶν δὲ φιλιῶν ἁπασῶν τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων μάλιστά πως ἐγγίνεται τὸ φιλεῖν ἐν τῇ συγγενιῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν.
Of all these friendships that have been mentioned, loving arises most of all in kinship, and especially in that of a father toward a son.
καὶ διὰ τί ποτε ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν μᾶλλον φιλεῖ ἢ ὁ υἱὸς τὸν πατέρα;
And why on earth does a father love his son more than a son loves his father?
πότερον οὖν, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς πρός γε τοὺς πολλούς, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πατὴρ εὐεργέτηκέν πως τὸν υἱόν, ὁ δʼ υἱὸς χάριν ὀφείλει τῆς εὐεργεσίας;
Is it then, as some say, speaking correctly at least to the multitude, because the father has benefited the son in some way, whereas the son owes gratitude for the benefit?
§2.12.2αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ αἰτία [καὶ] ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλίᾳ δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὁρῶμεν ἔχον, οὕτω πως ἔχει καὶ ἐνταῦθα.
Now, this cause would seem to belong to friendship based on utility; but just as we see to be the case in the sciences, so it is in some way here too.
§2.12.3λέγω δʼ οἷον [ἐστιν] ἔστι μὲν ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τε καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τέλος, οἷον τῷ αὐλητῇ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος (τὸ γὰρ αὐλεῖν καὶ τέλος αὐτῷ ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια), ἀλλʼ οὐ τῇ οἰκοδομικῇ (καὶ γὰρ ἕτερον τέλος παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν)· §2.12.4ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φιλία ἐνέργειά τις, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν ἄλλο τέλος παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ φιλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτό.
What I mean is like this: there are some things of which the end and the activity are the same, and there is no other end besides the activity, as for the flute-player the activity and the end are the same (for piping is for him both the end and the activity), but not for the art of building (for there is another end besides the activity); friendship, then, is a certain activity, and there is no other end besides the activity of loving, but this very thing.
ὁ μὲν οὖν πατὴρ ἐνεργεῖ πως ἀεὶ μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸ αὑτοῦ τι εἶναι ποίημα τὸν υἱόν.
The father, then, always actively loves in some way more, because the son is his own product.
τοῦτο δʼ ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν· πάντες γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν αὐτοὶ ποιήσωσιν, πρὸς τοῦτό πως καὶ εὖνοι εἰσίν.
And we see this to be the case in other things too; for all people are in some way well-disposed toward what they themselves have made.
§2.12.5ὁ οὖν πατὴρ εὐνοεῖ πως πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ὄντα ποίημα, τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀγόμενος· διὸ μᾶλλον φιλεῖ ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν ἢ ὁ υἱὸς τὸν πατέρα.
The father, then, is well-disposed to the son as being his own product, led by memory and hope; therefore, the father loves the son more than the son loves the father.
§2.12.6δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν τῶν λεγομένων καὶ δοκουσῶν ἐπισκέψασθαι εἰ εἰσὶν φιλίαι.
And we must also examine with respect to the other friendships that are spoken of and seem to exist, whether they are friendships.
οἷον ἡ εὔνοια φιλία δοκεῖ.
For instance, goodwill seems to be friendship.
§2.12.7ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν εἷναι ἡ εὔνοια φιλία (πολλοῖς γὰρ πολλάκις ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαί τι ὑπέρ τινος ἀγαθὸν εὖνοι γινόμεθα· ἆῤ οὖν ἤδη καὶ φίλοι;
Simply speaking, then, goodwill would not seem to be friendship (for we often become well-disposed toward many people either from seeing them or from hearing something good about them; are we then already friends too?
ἢοὔ;
Or not?
οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἦν Δαρείῳ εὔνους ἐν Πέρσαις ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἴσως ἦν, εὐθέως καὶ φιλία ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς Δαρεῖον)· §2.12.8ἀλλʼ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἄν ποτε φιλίας ἡ εὔνοια δόξειεν εἶναι, γένοιτο δʼ ἂν ἡ εὔνοια φιλία, εἰ προσλάβοι βούλησιν τοῦ τἀγαθὰ δυνατὸς ὢν πρᾶξαι πράττειν ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν ἐστιν εὔνους.
For if someone was well-disposed to Darius when he was in Persia, as perhaps someone was, it does not straightway follow that there was also friendship for him toward Darius); but goodwill would seem to be sometimes the beginning of friendship, and goodwill would become friendship if it should acquire the wish to do good things to the one to whom one is well-disposed, being capable of doing so.
§2.12.9— ἔστιν δʼ ἡ εὔνοια τοῦ ἤθους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος· οὐδεὶς γὰρ λέγεται εὔνους οἴνῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡδέων, ἀλλʼ ἄν τις ᾖ τὸ ᾖθος σπουδαῖος, πρὸς τοῦτον ἡ εὔνοια.
And goodwill belongs to character and is toward character; for no one is said to be well-disposed to wine or to any other of the inanimate things that are good or pleasant, but if someone is excellent in character, goodwill is toward him.
§2.12.10— οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ χωρὶς τῆς φιλίας ἡ εὔνοια, ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· διὸ δοκεῖ φιλία εἶναι.
And goodwill is not separate from friendship, but is in the same area; therefore, it seems to be friendship.
§2.12.11ἡ δʼ ὁμόνοιά ἐστιν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ φιλίᾳ, ἐὰν τὴν ὁμόνοιαν λάβῃς τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην.
Concord, on the other hand, is close to friendship, if you take concord as it is properly spoken of.
εἰ γάρ τις Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμοίως ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἅ κἀκείνῳ, ἆρά γε οὗτος Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμονοεῖ;
For if someone supposes in the same way as Empedocles, and the same things seem to him to be elements as to Empedocles, does he then agree with Empedocles?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ἐπεὶ περί τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
Since about any other such matter.
§2.12.12πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐχ ᾗ νοοῦσι ταὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἅμα τῷ ταὐτὸν νοεῖν προαίρεσιν ἔχουσιν περὶ ἃ νοοῦσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτά.
For first, concord is not in intellectual matters but in practical matters, and in these, not insofar as they think the same thing, but insofar as, along with thinking the same thing, they have a choice toward these things about which they think.
εἰ γὰρ ἐννοοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι ἄρχειν, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν αὑτὸν ὃ δʼ αὑτόν, ἆρά γε ἤδη ὁμονοοῦσιν;
For if both think of ruling, but the one of himself and the other of himself, do they then already agree?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ἀλλʼ εἰ κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἄρχειν κἀκεῖνος ἐμέ, οὕτως ἤδη ὁμονοοῦμεν.
But if I wish myself to rule and he wishes me to rule, in this way we already agree.
§2.12.13ἔστι δὴ ὁμονοεῖν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς μετὰ βουλήσεως ταὐτοῦ.
To agree, then, is to have a wish for the same thing in practical matters.
περὶ ἄρχοντος ἄρα κατάστασιν ἐν πρακτοῖς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ κυρίως λεγομένη.
Concord properly so called, therefore, is about the establishment of the same ruler in practical matters.