§1.21.1ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεία καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τοιοῦτος·
Therefore, courage and the courageous person are of this kind.
σωφροσύνη δʼ ἐστὶν μεσότης ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς.
On the other hand, temperance is a mean between licentiousness and insensibility regarding pleasures.
ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἁπλῶς ἅποσα ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἡ βελτίστη, ἡ δὲ βελτίστη ἕξις τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, βέλτιστον δὲ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας τὸ μιέσον· κατʼ ἀμφότερα γάρ εἰσι ψεκτοί, καὶ καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ κατʼ ἔνδειαν.
For temperance, and simply every virtue, is the best state, and the best state is of the best thing, and the mean is best in relation to excess and deficiency; for in both ways people are blameworthy, both in excess and in deficiency.
ὥστε εἴπερ τὸ μέσον βέλτιστον, ἡ σωφροσύνη μεσότης τις ἂν εἴη ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας.
So if the mean is best, temperance would be a certain mean between licentiousness and insensibility.
§1.21.2μεσότης οὖν ἂν εἴη τούτων·
Therefore, it would be a mean between these.
ἔστιν δὲ ἡ σωφροσύνη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς περὶ πάντα.
And temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, but not all of them, nor those concerned with everything.
οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἥδεται θεωρῶν γραφὴν ἢ ἀνδριάντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δὴ οὗτος ἀκόλαστος, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ ἀκοῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὀσφρήσεως· ἀλλʼ ἐν ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ ἁρὴν καὶ γεῦσιν.
For it is not the case that if someone enjoys looking at a painting or a statue, or some other of such things, he is immediately licentious, and similarly neither is it concerned with hearing nor with smell; but it is in the pleasures concerned with touch and taste.
§1.21.3οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ταύτας ἀνὴρ σώφρων ἔσται 〈ὁ〉 οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε μηδʼ ὑπὸ μιᾶς τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν μηθὲν πάσχειν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀναίσθητος), ἀλλʼ ἤδη ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος, ὥστε εἰς ὑπερβολὴν αὐτῶν ἀπολαύων πάντα τἆλλα ποιεῖσθαι πάρεργα, καὶ αὐτόν γε τὸν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκεν καὶ μὴ ἄλλου πράττοντα σώφρονα✶✶.
Nor indeed concerning these will he be a temperate man who is so disposed as not to be affected at all by even one of such pleasures (for such a person is insensible), but rather he who is affected but not led away, so as not to enjoy them to excess and make everything else secondary, and indeed him who already does so for the sake of the noble itself and for no other reason, we call temperate.
§1.21.4ὅστις γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀπέχεται ἢ διὰ φόβον ἢ διʼ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ σώφρων.
For whoever abstains from the excess of such pleasures either through fear or through some other of such things is not temperate.
οὐδὲ γὰρ τἆλλα ζῷα λέγομεν εἶναι σώφρονα ἔξω ἀνθρώπου, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς λόγον, ᾧ δοκιμάζοντα τὸ καλὸν αἱροῦνται.
For neither do we say that other animals are temperate, except for man, because of there not being in them reason by which they examine and choose the noble.
πᾶσα γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐστίν.
For every virtue is of the noble and directed toward the noble.
ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἐν ἁφῇ καὶ γεύσει γινομένας.
So temperance would be concerned with pleasures and pains, and indeed those occurring in touch and taste.