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Aristotle · Great Ethics §1.20.1-1.20.12

Definition of True Courage and Examination of False Forms

Passage 22 of 71 · Greek

Summary

The text defines the appropriate objects of courage regarding human fears and confidence, systematically dismissing various false forms of courage based on experience, ignorance, passion, civic shame, or hope, and identifies true courage as facing imminent, life-threatening danger for the sake of the noble in accordance with reason.

§1.20.1✶✶ ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία περὶ θάρρη καὶ φόβους, σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ ποίους φόβους καὶ θάρρη.
✶✶ Since then courage is concerned with confidence and fears, we must consider what kind of fears and confidence they are.
ἦρʼ οὖν εἰ μέν τις φοβεῖται μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὗτος δειλός, εἰ δέ τις θαρρεῖ περὶ ταῦτα, ἀνδρεῖος;
Is it then the case that if someone fears losing his property, he is cowardly, and if someone is confident about these things, he is courageous?
ἢ οὔ;
Or is it not?
ὁμοίως δʼ εἴ τις φοβεῖται νόσον ἢ θαρρεῖ, οὔτε δειλὸν φατέον εἶναι τὸν φοβούμενον οὔτʼ ἀνδρεῖον τὸν μὴ φοβούμενον.
Similarly, if someone fears illness or is confident, we must say neither that the one who fears is cowardly, nor that the one who does not fear is courageous.
οὐκ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φόβοις καὶ θάρρεσίν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία.
Therefore courage is not in such fears and confidence.
§1.20.2ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἷον εἰ μή τις φοβεῖσται βροντὰς ἢ ἀστραπὰς ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον φοβερῶν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος ἀλλὰ μαινόμενός τις.
Yet indeed, neither is it in such things; for instance, if someone does not fear thunder or lightning, or any other of the things that are terrifying beyond human measure, he is not courageous but rather some madman.
ἐν φόβοις ἄρα καὶ θάρρεσίν ἐστιν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τοῖς κατʼ ἀνθρώπους· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες, ἐν τούτοις ὁ ὢν θαρραλέος, οὗτος ἀνδρεῖος.
Therefore, the courageous person is concerned with fears and confidence that are according to human standards; I mean, for example, the things that many or all people fear—he who is confident in these is courageous.
§1.20.3τούτωρντοίνυν διωρισμένων σκεππτέον ἂνεἴη, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ πολλά εἰσιν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὁ ποῖος ἀνδρεῖος.
These things having been defined, then, we must consider what kind of courageous person he is, since people are courageous in many ways.
ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ κατʼ ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται.
For there is someone who is courageous through experience, such as soldiers.
οὗτοι γὰρ σἴδσι διʼ ἐμπειρίαν ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ ἢ ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἀδύνατόν τι παθεῖν.
For these know through experience that in such a place, or at such a time, or in such a condition, it is impossible to suffer anything.
ὁ δὲ ταῦτα εἰδὼς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὑπομένων τοὺς πολεμίους οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοςʼ ἐὰν γὰρ τούτων μηθὲν ὑπάρχῃ, οὐχ ὑπομένει.
And he who knows these things and because of them withstands the enemy is not courageous; for if none of these conditions is present, he does not withstand.
§1.20.4διὸ τοὺς διʼ ἐμπειρίαν οὐ φατέον ἀνδρείους.
Therefore, those who are courageous through experience must not be called courageous.
οὐδὲ Σωκράτης δὴ ὀρθῶς ἕεμεν ἐπιστήμην φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
Nor indeed did Socrates speak correctly when he claimed that courage is knowledge.
ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐξ ἔθους τὴν ἐμπειρίαν λαβοῦσα ἐπιστήμη γίνεται· τοὺς δὲ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένοντας οὔ φαμεν, οὐδʼ ἐροῦσιν ἀνδρείους αὐτοὺς εἶναι·
For knowledge becomes knowledge by receiving experience from habit; but those who withstand through experience, we do not say are courageous, nor will people say so.
οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.
Therefore, courage would not be knowledge.
§1.20.5— πάλιν δʼ αὖ εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς ἐμπειρίας· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι τῶν ἐκβησομένων οὐ φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν.
And on the other hand, there are those who are courageous from the opposite of experience; for those who are inexperienced in what will turn out do not fear because of their inexperience.
οὐδὲ δὴ οὐδὲ τούτους φατέον ἀνδρείους.
Nor indeed must we say that these are courageous.
§1.20.6— εἰσὶν δʼ αὗ ἄλλοι δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι εἶναι διὰ τὰ πάθη, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες ἢ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες.
And again, there are others who seem to be courageous because of their passions, such as those who are in love or those who are inspired.
οὐδὲ δὴ τούτους φατέονἀνδρείους εἶναι· ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφαιρεθῇ, οὐκέτι εἰσὶν ἀνδρεῖοι, δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνδρεῖον.
Nor indeed must we say that these are courageous; for if their passion is taken away, they are no longer courageous, whereas the courageous person must always be courageous.
§1.20.7διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ θηρί οἷον τοὺς σῦς οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι ἀνδρείους διὰ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πληγέντες λυπηθῶσιν, οὐδὲ δεῖ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον διὰ [τὸ] πάθος εἶναι ἀνδρεῖον. —
Therefore, neither would anyone call wild beasts, such as wild boars, courageous because they defend themselves when they are struck and feel pain, nor must the courageous person be courageous because of passion.
§1.20.8πάλιν ἔστιν ἄλλη ἀνδρεία πολιτικὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι, οἷον εἰ διʼ αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖοι εἶναι.
Again, there is another courage which seems to be civic, as when because of shame before their fellow citizens they withstand dangers and seem to be courageous.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· καὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρος πεποίηκε τὸν Ἕκτορα λέγοντα ῾῾ Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει, διὸ οἴται δεῖν μάχεσθαι.
And a sign of this is that Homer has made Hector say: "Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach upon me," which is why he thinks he must fight.
οὐδὲ δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην φατέον εἶναι· ὁ γὰραὐτὸς ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ τούτων διορισμὸς ἁρμόσει.
Nor indeed must this kind be said to be courage; for the same definition will apply to each of these.
οὗ γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένου μὴ διαμένει ἡ ἀνδρεία, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἀνδρεῖας· ἂν οὖν τὴν αἰσχύνην περιέλω διʼ ἥν ἦν ἀνδρεῖος, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀνδρεῖος
For that, upon the removal of which courage does not remain, would no longer be courage; if then I take away the shame because of which he was courageous, he will no longer be courageous.
§1.20.9—ἔτι καὶἄλλως εἰσὶν ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οἱ διʼ ἐλπίδα καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀγαθοῦ.
Furthermore, in another way also, there are those who seem to be courageous because of hope and expectation of good.
οὐδὲ δὴ τούτους φατέον εἶναι ἀνδρείους, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρείους λέγειν ἄτοπον φαίνεται.
Nor indeed must we say that these are courageous, since to call such people and in such circumstances courageous seems strange.
οὐδένα οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρεῖον θετέον εἶναι· τὸν [ὁ]ποῖρν οὖν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τίς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος σκεπτέον.
Therefore, none of these must be established as courageous; we must then consider what kind of courage exists and who the courageous person is.
§1.20.10ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὁ διὰ μηθὲν τῶν προςιρημένων ἀνδρεῖος ὤν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νομίζειν αὐτὸ εἶναι καλόν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶν κἂν παρ τις κἂν μὴ παρῇ.
To speak simply, he is courageous who is so not because of any of the aforementioned reasons, but because of believing it to be noble, and doing this whether anyone is present or not.
οὐδὲδὴ παντελῶς ἄνευ πάθουςκαὶ ὁρμῆς έγγίγνεται ἡ ἀνδρεία.
Nor indeed does courage arise entirely without passion and impulse.
δεῖ δὲ τὴν ὁρμὴν γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὸ καλόν.
But the impulse must proceed from reason for the sake of the noble.
ὁ δὴ ὁρμῶν διὰ λόγον ἕνεκεν τοῦ καλοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἄφοβος ὢν περὶ ταῦτα, οὗτος ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία περὶ ταῦτα.
He, then, who because of reason and for the sake of the noble impels himself to run risks, being fearless about these things, is courageous, and courage is concerned with these.
§1.20.11ἄφοβος δὲ οὐχ ὅταν οὕτω συμπέσῃ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ ὥστε ὅλως μὴ φοβεῖσθαι.
But being fearless does not mean, when it happens to the courageous person, that he does not fear at all.
ὁμὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος, ᾧ ὅλως μηθέν ἐστι φοβερόν· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ 〈ἂν〉 ὁ λίθος εἴη καὶ τἆλλα ἄψυχα ἀνδρεῖα· ἀλλὰ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι μέν, ὑπομένειν δέ εἰ γὰρ αὖ μὴ φοβούμενος ὑπομένει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνδρεῖος.
For such a person is not courageous, for whom nothing at all is terrifying; for in this way a stone and other inanimate things would be courageous; but he must fear, yet withstand; for if, on the other hand, he withstands without fearing, he would not be courageous.
§1.20.12— ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπάνω διειλόμεθα, περὶ φόβους καὶ κινδύνους οὐ πάντας ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀναιρετικοὺς τῆς οὐσίας.
And furthermore, just as we distinguished above, it is concerned not with all fears and dangers, but with those that are destructive of existence.
— ἔτι δὲ οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ τυχόντι καὶ παντὶ χρόνῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐν ᾧ οἱ φόβοι καὶ οἱ κίνδυνοι πλησίον εἰσίν.
And further, not at any random and all times, but when the fears and dangers are near.
εἰ γάρ τις τὸν εἰς δέκατον ἔτος κίνδυνον μὴ φοβεῖται, οὔπω ἀνδρεῖος· ἔνιοι γὰρ θαρροῦσιν διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον γένωνται, ἀποθνήσκουσιν τῷ δέει.
For if someone does not fear a danger that is ten years away, he is not yet courageous; for some are confident because it is far off, but if they get near, they die of fear.

Notes

  1. 1.20.1μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ — A `μή` clause introduced by the verb of fearing `φοβεῖται`, utilizing the present subjunctive. It expresses the fear that an objective event might occur ("fears lest he lose...").
  2. 1.20.8οὗ γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένου — The relative pronoun `οὗ` (neuter singular genitive, referring to the motivating factor) forms a genitive absolute construction with the participle `ἀφαιρουμένου` (present passive genitive). It functions with a conditional force ("if this is removed").
  3. 1.20.11〈ἂν〉 ὁ λίθος εἴη — The optative `εἴη` accompanied by `ἂν` (inserted by textual emendation) forms a potential optative. It indicates the potential consequence ("a stone would be courageous"), where the hypothetical condition ("if one did not fear anything at all") is implied from the context.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §1.20.1-1.20.12. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:1.20.1-1.20.12

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