§3Ἴσως δ’ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εὐλόγως, ἆρ’ ἔστιν οὖ ἄφθαρτον ἔσται τὸ φθαρτόν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω, οὗ μή ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον.
Perhaps one might reasonably raise the difficulty whether there is a place where that which is destructible will be indestructible, like fire in the upper region, where there is no contrary to it.
Φθείρεται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς ἐναντίοις κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τῷ ἐκεῖνα φθείρεσθαι· ἀναιρεῖται γὰρ τἀναντία ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων·
For things that possess contraries are destroyed accidentally, by the destruction of those contraries; for contraries are destroyed by one another.
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ’ οὐθὲν τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐναντίων φθείρεται, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς ὑποκειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν.
But none of the contraries in the substances is destroyed accidentally, because substance is not predicated of any underlying subject.
Ὥσθ’ ᾧ μή ἐστιν ἐναντίον καὶ ὅπου μή ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη φθαρῆναι· τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ φθεροῦν, εἴπερ ὑπ’ ἐναντίων μὲν φθείρεσθαι συμβαίνει μόνων, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα;
So, for that which has no contrary, and where there is no contrary, it would be impossible to be destroyed; for what will be the destroying agent, if indeed destruction happens only by contraries, and this is not present, either at all or in that place?
Ἢ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι τῇ δ’ οὔ·
Or is this true in one way and not in another?
ἀδύνατον γὰρ τῷ ὕλην ἔχοντι μὴ ὑπάρχειν πως τὸ ἐναντίον.
For it is impossible for that which has matter not to have a contrary in some way.
Πάντῃ μὲν γὰρ ἐνεῖναι τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ εὐθὺ ἐνδέχεται, πᾶν δ’ εἶναι ἀδύνατον ἢ θερμὸν ἢ εὐθὺ ἢ λευκόν· ἔσται γὰρ τὰ πάθη κεχωρισμένα.
For while it is possible for the hot or the straight to be present everywhere, it is impossible for everything to be hot, or straight, or white; for then attributes would exist in separation.
Εἰ οὖν, ὅταν ἅμα ᾖ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικόν, ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει, ἀδύνατον μὴ μεταβάλλειν.
If, then, whenever the active and the passive are together, the one always acts and the other is acted upon, it is impossible for them not to change.
Ἔτι καὶ εἰ ἀνάγκη περίττωμα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ περίττωμα ἐναντίον· ἐξ ἐναντίου γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ μεταβολή, τὸ δὲ περίττωμα ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ προτέρου.
Furthermore, if it is necessary to produce residue, and the residue is a contrary; for change is always from a contrary, and the residue is the remnant of the prior state.
Εἰ δὲ πᾶν ἐξελαύνει τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναντίον, κἂν ἐνταῦθ’ ἄφθαρτον ἂν εἴη.
But if it drives out everything that is actually contrary, would it even in that place be indestructible?
Ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος φθείρεται.
Or is it not so, but it is destroyed by the surrounding environment?
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ δὲ μή, ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ὅτι ἔνεστί τι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναντίον, καὶ περίττωμα γίνεται.
Now, if this is sufficient, it is clear from what has been said; if not, we must assume that there is something actually contrary in it, and a residue is produced.
Διὸ ἡ ἐλάττων φλὸξ κατακάεται ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ ἣν ἐκείνη ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἀναλίσκει τὸν καπνόν, ταύτην ἡ πολλὴ φλὸξ ταχύ.
Therefore, a smaller flame is consumed by a large one accidentally, because the large flame quickly consumes the fuel—namely, the smoke—which the smaller one consumes over a long time.
Διὸ πάντα ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει ἐστί, καὶ γίνεται ἢ φθείρεται.
Therefore, all things are always in motion, and are either generated or destroyed.
Τὸ δὲ περιέχον ἢ συμπράττει ἢ ἀντιπράττει.
And the surrounding environment either cooperates or counteracts.
Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μετατιθέμενα πολυχρονιώτερα μὲν γίνεται καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερα τῆς φύσεως, ἀΐδια δ’ οὐδαμοῦ, ὅσοις ἐναντία ἐστίν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἐναντίον ἔχει.
And for this reason, when they are transferred, they become longer-lived or shorter-lived than their natural state, but never eternal, in the case of all things that have contraries; for matter immediately possesses the contrary.
Ὥστ’ εἰ μὲν τοῦ ποῦ, κατὰ τόπον μεταβάλλει, εἰ δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ, κατ’ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν· εἰ δὲ πάθους, ἀλλοιοῦται.
Thus, if the change is of 'where,' it changes in respect of place; if of quantity, in respect of growth and decay; if of affection, it is altered.
§4Ἔστι δ’ οὔτε τὰ μέγιστα ἀφθαρτότερα (ἵππος γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βραχυβιώτερον) οὔτε τὰ μικρά (ἐπέτεια γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐντόμων) οὔτε τὰ φυτὰ ὅλως τῶν ζῴων (ἐπέτεια γὰρ ἔνια τῶν φυτῶν) οὔτε τὰ ἔναιμα (μέλιττα γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερον ἐνίων ἐναίμων) οὔτε τὰ ἄναιμα (τὰ γὰρ μαλάκια ἐπέτεια μέν, ἄναιμα δέ) οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ (καὶ γὰρ φυτὰ ἐπέτειά ἐστι καὶ ζῷα πεζά) οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ βραχύβια καὶ τὰ ὀστρακηρὰ καὶ τὰ μαλάκια.
And neither are the largest things more indestructible (for a horse is shorter-lived than a man), nor are the small ones (for most insects are annual), nor are plants as a whole more so than animals (for some plants are annual), nor are the red-blooded animals (for a bee is longer-lived than some red-blooded animals), nor are the bloodless ones (for molluscs are annual, yet bloodless), nor are those on land (for there are annual plants and land animals), nor are those in the sea; for there too the testaceans and the molluscs are short-lived.
Ὅλως δὲ τὰ μακροβιώτατα ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστίν, οἷον ὁ φοῖνιξ· εἶτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀναίμοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις.
But as a whole, the longest-lived things are among plants, such as the date-palm; next, among red-blooded animals rather than bloodless ones, and among land animals rather than aquatic ones.
Ὥστε καὶ συνδυασθέντων ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις καὶ πεζοῖς τὰ μακροβιώτατα τῶν ζῴων ἐστίν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐλέφας.
Consequently, when these are combined, the longest-lived of animals are among the red-blooded and land animals, such as man and elephant.
Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μείζω ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ εἰπεῖν τῶν ἐλαττόνων μακροβιώτερα· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβέβηκε τοῖς μακροβιωτάτοις μέγεθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
And indeed, generally speaking, larger things are longer-lived than smaller ones; for size also belongs to the other longest-lived things, just as it does to those mentioned.