§1## ΠΕΡΙ ΜΑΚΡΟΒΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΒΡΑΧΥΒΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ.
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τῶν ζῴων τὰ δὲ βραχύβια, καὶ περὶ ζωῆς ὅλως μήκους καὶ βραχύτητος ἐπισκεπτέον τὰς αἰτίας.
## ON LONGEVITY AND SHORTNESS OF LIFE As to why some animals are long-lived and others short-lived, and concerning the length and shortness of life in general, we must investigate the causes.
Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἀναγκαία πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτῶν.
The necessary starting-point for our inquiry is to begin by raising difficulties concerning them.
Οὐ γάρ ἐστι δῆλον πότερον ἕτερον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τὰ δὲ βραχύβια· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν· τὰ μὲν ἐπέτειον τὰ δὲ πολυχρόνιον ἔχει τὴν ζωήν.
For it is not clear whether the cause of some being long-lived and others short-lived is the same or different for all animals and plants; for among plants too, some have an annual life, while others live for a long time.
Ἔτι δὲ πότερον ταὐτὰ μακρόβια καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὑγιεινὰ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων, ἢ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες, ἢ κατ’ ἐνίας μὲν νόσους ἐπαλλάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς βραχυβίοις, κατ’ ἐνίας δ’ οὐδὲν κωλύει νοσώδεις εἶναι μακροβίους ὄντας.
Furthermore, are the long-lived and the naturally healthy the same among things constituted by nature, or is shortness of life distinct from tendency to disease; or do naturally diseased bodies overlap with the short-lived in respect of certain diseases, while in respect of others there is nothing to prevent those who are diseased from being long-lived?
Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου λεκτέον ὕστερον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῇ φυσικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τὰ δὲ βραχύβια, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, θεωρητέον.
Now, concerning sleep and waking we have spoken before; concerning life and death we must speak later, and similarly concerning disease and health, so far as falls within the scope of natural philosophy; but at present, as said before, we must investigate the cause of some being long-lived and others short-lived.
Ἔστι δ’ ἔχοντα τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ὅλα τε πρὸς ὅλα γένη, καὶ τῶν ὑφ’ ἓν εἶδος ἕτερα πρὸς ἕτερα.
This difference is found both between whole genera as compared with other whole genera, and between some members as compared with others under one same species.
Λέγω δὲ κατὰ γένος μὲν διαφέρειν οἷον ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἵππον (μακροβιώτερον γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἢ τὸ τῶν ἵππων), κατ’ εἶδος δ’ ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν μακρόβιοι οἱ δὲ βραχύβιοι ἕτεροι καθ’ ἑτέρους τόπους διεστῶτες· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τῶν ἐθνῶν μακροβιώτερα, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς βραχυβιώτερα.
I mean by difference in genus, for instance, man compared with horse (for the genus of men is longer-lived than that of horses), and by difference in species, man compared with man; for some men are long-lived and others short-lived, separated in different regions; for the nations in hot regions are longer-lived, while those in cold regions are shorter-lived.
Καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον οἰκούντων διαφέρουσιν ὁμοίως τινὲς ταύτην πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν διαφοράν.
And among those who inhabit the same region, some similarly differ from one another in this respect.
§2Δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τί τὸ εὔφθαρτον ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι καὶ τί τὸ οὐκ εὔφθαρτον.
We must, then, grasp what is easily destructible and what is not easily destructible among things constituted by nature.
Πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, οὐκ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, τυγχάνει γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτια ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐκ τούτων ὄντα καὶ συνεστῶτα μετέχειν τῆς τούτων φύσεως εὔλογον, ὅσα μὴ συνθέσει ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστίν, οἷον οἰκία.
For fire, water, and things akin to them, not possessing the same power, happen to be causes of generation and destruction to one another; so that it is reasonable that each of the other things, being composed of and constituted by these, should participate in their nature, except such as are made by the composition of many things, like a house.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος λόγος· εἰσὶ γὰρ ἴδιαι φθοραὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἷον ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ καὶ νόσῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ φθείρεται καὶ μὴ φθειρομένων τῶν δεκτικῶν ἀλλὰ σωζομένων, οἷον ἀγνοίας μὲν φθορὰ ἀνάμνησις καὶ μάθησις, ἐπιστήμης δὲ λήθη καὶ ἀπάτη.
Now, concerning other things there is a different account; for there are specific destructions for many existing things, such as knowledge, health, and disease; for these are destroyed even when their recipients are not destroyed but preserved, as, for instance, the destruction of ignorance is recollection and learning, and that of knowledge is forgetfulness and error.
Κατὰ σημβεβηκὸς δ’ ἀκολουθοῦσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἱ τῶν ἄλλων φθοραί· φθειρομένων γὰρ τῶν ζῴων φθείρεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἡ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
But accidentally, the destructions of these other things follow upon those of natural things; for when animals are destroyed, the knowledge and the health in the animals are also destroyed.
Διὸ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς συλλογίσαιτ’ ἄν τις ἐκ τούτων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι μὴ φύσει ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι, εἴη ἄν τις αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλη φθορὰ παρὰ τὴν φθορὰν ἣν φθείρεται φθειρομένου τοῦ σώματος.
Therefore, one might also reason concerning the soul from these facts; for if the soul exists in the body not by nature but in the same way as knowledge is in the soul, there would be some other destruction of it besides that destruction by which it is destroyed when the body is destroyed.
Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ οὐ φαίνεται τοιαύτη οὖσα, ἄλλως ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίαν.
Since, then, the soul does not appear to be of this nature, its association with the body must be of a different kind.