§9#2Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτερα, εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάντα εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
These and other such are the absurdities that result, if indeed for every affirmation and negation, whether of universals spoken of universally or of particulars, it is necessary for one of the opposites to be true and the other false, and that nothing is a matter of chance among the things that come to be, but all things are and come to be of necessity.
Ὥστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι ἂν οὔτε πραγματεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται τοδί, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται τοδί.
So that we would have no need to deliberate or to take trouble, thinking that if we do this, that will be, but if we do not do this, it will not be.
Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσεσθαι ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν τότε.
For there is nothing to prevent one person from saying ten thousand years ago that this will be, and another from denying it, so that of necessity whichever of them it was true to say at that time will be.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον·
But indeed, neither does this make any difference, whether any people uttered the contradiction or did not utter it; for it is clear that things are so, even if one person did not affirm something and another deny it.
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει τὰ πράγματα, κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδ᾿ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ.
For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or not be, nor more so ten thousand years ago than at any other time.
Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων ἀεὶ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι.
Consequently, if in the whole of time things were so that one or the other was true, it was necessary for this to happen, and each of the things that have happened was always so that it happened of necessity.
Ὅ τε γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι· καὶ τὸ γινομένον ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.
For that which someone truly said would be, cannot fail to happen; and of that which happens, it was always true to say that it would be.
Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα — ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως· ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.
If indeed these things are impossible—for we see that there is a beginning of what is to be both from deliberating and from doing something, and that in general in things that are not always actual there is the potential to be and not to be likewise; in which cases both are possible, both being and not being, and consequently both coming to be and not coming to be.
Καὶ πολλὰ ἡμῖν δῆλά ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον ὅτι τουτὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθῆναι καὶ οὐ διατμηθήσεται, ἀλλ᾿ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται.
And many things are obvious to us as being so, for example, that this cloak is capable of being cut up and yet will not be cut up, but will be worn out first.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴγε μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι.
In like manner, its not being cut up is also possible; for its being worn out first would not have belonged to it, unless its not being cut up were possible.
Ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι κατὰ δύναμιν λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην.
Consequently, this is so also in the case of other comings-to-be, as many as are spoken of according to this kind of potentiality.
Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾿ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχε, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθής, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.
It is clear, therefore, that not all things are or come to be of necessity, but some are a matter of chance, and the affirmation is no more true than the negation, while others are rather one way and for the most part, yet it is possible for the other to happen too, and the first not to.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾗ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μὴν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι.
Now, that what is is when it is, and what is not is not when it is not, is necessary; however, it is not necessary either for everything that is to be, or for everything that is not not to be.
Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
For it is not the same for everything that is to be of necessity when it is, and for it to be of necessity simply.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.
In like manner also in the case of what is not.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
And the same account holds also in the case of the contradiction.
Εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσεσθαί γε ἢ μή· οὐ μέντοι διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον.
To be or not to be is necessary for everything, and that it will be or will not be; but it is not necessary to say one of them, dividing them.
Λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἔσεσθαί γε αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μέντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον.
I mean, for example, it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or not, but it is not necessary that a sea-battle take place tomorrow, nor that it not take place; but that it take place or not take place is necessary.
Ὤστ᾿ ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα, δῆλον ὅτι ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχε καὶ τἀναντία ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἀντίφασιν.
And so, since statements are true in the same way as the things they are about, it is clear that wherever things are so as to be a matter of chance and capable of opposites, the contradiction must be likewise.
Ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ οὖσιν ἢ μὴ ἀεὶ μὴ οὖσιν.
This is what happens in the case of things that are not always or are not always not.
Τούτων γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν θάτερον μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μέντοι τόδε ἢ τόδε ἀλλ᾿ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχε, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ.
For in these cases, it is necessary for one part of the contradiction to be true or false, but not this one or that one, but as it may chance, and one may be more true, yet not thereby true or false.
Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων μὲν δυνατῶν δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
So that it is clear that it is not necessary for every affirmation and negation of opposites for one to be true and the other false; for it is not the same in the case of things that are not but are capable of being or not being, as it is in the case of things that are, but it is as has been said.