§9#1Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ γενομένων ἀνάγκη τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθόλου ὡς καθόλου ἀεὶ τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου μὴ καθόλου λεχθέντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων.
Now, in the case of things that are and that have come to be, it is necessary for the affirmation or the negation to be true or false; and always one is true and the other false in the case of universals spoken of universally, and also in the case of particulars, as has been said; but in the case of universals not spoken of universally, this is not necessary, and about these also we have spoken.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως.
But in the case of particulars and of what is to be, it is not likewise.
Εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ ὁ μὲν φήσει ἔσεσθαί τι ὁ δὲ μὴ φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν, εἰ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.
For if every affirmation and negation is true or false, it is also necessary for everything to belong or not to belong, so that if one person says that something will be and another says that this same thing will not be, it is clear that one of them must of necessity be speaking the truth, if every affirmation and negation is true or false.
Ἄμφω γὰρ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
For both will not belong at the same time in such cases.
Εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν ἢ ὅτι οὐ λευκόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκόν, καὶ εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκόν, ἀληθὲς ἦν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι· καὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ψεύδεται, καὶ εἰ ψεύδεται, οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἢ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἢ ψευδῆ.
For if it is true to say that a thing is white or that it is not white, it is necessary for it to be white or not white, and if it is white or not white, it was true to affirm or deny it; and if it does not belong, one speaks falsely, and if one speaks falsely, it does not belong, so that it is necessary for either the affirmation or the negation to be true or false.
Οὐδὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔθ᾿ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντα καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν.
Therefore, nothing either is or comes to be by chance or as a matter of chance, nor will it be or not be, but all things are of necessity and not as it may chance.
Ἢ γὰρ ὁ φὰς ἀληθεύσει ἢ ὁ ἀποφάς.
For either the one who affirms or the one who denies will speak the truth.
Ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο ἢ οὐκ ἐγίνετο· τὸ γὰρ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἕξει.
For otherwise it would come to be or not come to be in a like manner; for that which is a matter of chance is no more thus than not thus, nor will it be so.
Ἔτι εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν νῦν, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν πρότερον ὅτι ἔσται λευκόν, ὥστε ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὁτιοῦν τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται.
Furthermore, if a thing is white now, it was true to say previously that it would be white, so that it was always true to say of any of the things that have come to be that it is or will be.
Εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεσθαι.
But if it was always true to say that it is or will be, it is not possible for this not to be or not to be about to be.
Ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι· ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι.
And that which cannot not happen, cannot fail to happen; and that which cannot fail to happen, must of necessity happen.
Ἅπαντα οὖν τὰ ἐσόμενα ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι.
Therefore, all things that are to be must of necessity happen.
Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τύχης ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
Consequently, nothing will be a matter of chance or by chance; for if it is by chance, it is not of necessity.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ὡς οὐδέτερόν γε ἀληθὲς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε οὐκ ἔσται.
But indeed, neither is it possible to say that neither is true, for example, that it neither will be nor will not be.
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης τῆς καταφάσεως ψευδοῦς ἡ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἀληθής, καὶ ταύτης ψευδοῦς οὔσης τὴν κατάφασιν συμβαίνει μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι.
For in the first place, if the affirmation is false, the negation is not true, and if the negation is false, it turns out that the affirmation is not true.
Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν καὶ μέγα, δεῖ ἄμφω ὑπάρχειν.
And in addition to this, if it is true to say that a thing is white and large, both must belong to it.
Εἰ δὲ ὑπάρξει εἰς αὔριον, ὑπάρξει εἰς αὔριον.
And if they will belong tomorrow, they will belong tomorrow.
Εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔσται μήτε μὴ ἔσται αὔριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὁπότερ᾿ ἔτυχεν, οἷον ναυμαχία· δέοι γὰρ ἂν μήτε γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον μήτε μὴ γενέσθαι.
But if it will neither be nor not be tomorrow, there would be no "matter of chance", for example, a sea-battle; for it would be necessary that a sea-battle neither take place tomorrow nor not take place.