§14#1Πότερον δὲ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἡ κατάφασις τῇ ἀποφάσει ἢ ἡ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῷ λόγῳ ὁ λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, ἢ τὸ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, οἷον ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος — οὐκ ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος — Καλλίας ἄδικός ἐστι·
Whether affirmation is contrary to negation, or affirmation to affirmation; and the statement to the statement which says 'every man is just' to 'no man is just', or 'every man is just' to 'every man is unjust'—as, for example, 'Callias is just' — 'Callias is not just' — 'Callias is unjust'.
ποτέρα δὴ ἐναντία τούτων;
Which of these is indeed contrary?
εἰ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐναντία δόξα ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῇ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καταφάσεων ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν.
For if things in vocal speech follow those in thought, and there the contrary belief is that of the contrary (for example, that the belief 'every man is unjust' is contrary to 'every man is just'), then on the level of affirmations in vocal speech it must also hold similarly.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐκεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα ἐναντία ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἡ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει ἔσται ἐναντία, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ εἰρημένη ἀπόφασις.
But if there the belief of the contrary is not contrary, neither will affirmation be contrary to affirmation, but the mentioned negation.
Ὥστε σκεπτέον ποία δόξα ἀληθὴς ψευδεῖ δόξῃ ἐναντία, πότερον ἡ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἡ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι δοξάζουσα.
Consequently, one must examine what kind of true belief is contrary to a false belief, whether it is that of the negation or that which believes the contrary to be.
Λέγω δὲ ὧδε. Ἔστι τις δόξα ἀληθὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἄλλη δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ψευδής, ἑτέρα δὲ ὅτι κακόν.
I mean this: there is a certain true belief of the good that it is good, and another false one that it is not good, and another that it is bad.
Ποτέρα δὴ τούτων ἐναντία τῇ ἀληθεῖ;
Which of these, then, is contrary to the true one?
καὶ εἰ ἔστι μία, καθ᾿ ὁποτέραν ἡ ἐναντία;
And if there is one, according to which of the two is it contrary?
τὸ μὲν δὴ τούτῳ οἴεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, ψεῦδος· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὅτι κακὸν ἡ αὐτὴ ἴσως καὶ ἀληθὴς ἔσται, εἴτε πλείους εἴτε μία ἐστίν.
To think that contrary beliefs are defined by this, by being of contraries, is false; for the belief of the good that it is good and of the bad that it is bad will perhaps be the same and true, whether they are more than one or one.
Ἐναντία δὲ ταῦτα.
And these are contraries.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῷ ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐναντίως.
But they are not contraries by being of contraries, but rather by being in a contrary manner.
Εἰ δὴ ἔστι μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν δόξα, ἄλλη δ᾿ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο τι ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει οὐδ᾿ οἷόν τε ὑπάρξαι, τῶν μὲν δὴ ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν θετέον, οὔτε ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον δοξάζουσιν οὔθ᾿ ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον (ἄπειροι γὰρ ἀμφότεραι, καὶ ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν δοξάζουσι τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον), ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ὅσαις ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπάτη.
If, then, there is a belief of the good that it is good, and another that it is not good, and there is something else which does not belong nor is possible to belong; among the other beliefs none is to be posited, neither those which believe that what does not belong belongs, nor those which believe that what belongs does not belong (for both are infinite, both those which believe that what does not belong belongs, and those which believe that what belongs does not belong), but rather those in which there is deception.
Αὗται δέ εἰσιν ἐξ ὧν αἱ γενέσεις.
And these are those from which generations arise.
Ἐκ των ἀντικειμένων δὲ αἱ γενέσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπάται.
And generations are from opposites, hence deceptions too.
Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (συμβέβηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὐ κακῷ εἶναι), μᾶλλον δὲ ἑκάστου ἀληθὴς ἡ καθ᾿ ἑαυτό, καὶ ψευδής, εἴπερ καὶ ἀληθής.
If, therefore, the good is both good and not bad, and the one in itself, the other accidentally (for it is accidental to it to be not bad), and the belief in itself of each is more true, and the false one is also so, if indeed there is also a true one.
Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχοντος ψευδής, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
Thus, the belief that the good is not good is a false belief of that which belongs in itself, while the belief that it is bad is of that which belongs accidentally.
Ὥστε μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ψευδὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα.
Consequently, the belief of the negation of the good would be more false than the belief of the contrary.
Διέψευσται δὲ μάλιστα περὶ ἕκαστον ὁ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχων δόξαν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν πλεῖστον διαφερόντων περὶ τὸ αὐτό.
And he who has the contrary belief is most deceived about each thing; for contraries are among things that differ most about the same thing.