§2.5#15.
5.
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἔτι καὶ ὧδε θεωρήσωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
Yet indeed let us investigate them further in this way too.
εἰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ὕλη, ὥσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ ἐνίοις, ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἓν ἢ δύο εἶναι ταῦτα ἢ πλείω.
For if there is a matter of natural bodies, as indeed it seems to some, water and air and such things, it is necessary for these to be either one or two or more.
ἓν μὲν δὴ πάντα οὐχ οἷόν τε, οἷον ἀέρα πάντα ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ γῆν, εἴπερ ἡ μεταβολὴ εἰς τἀναντία.
Now indeed for all to be one is impossible, such as all being air or water or fire or earth, if indeed change is into contraries.
εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἀήρ, εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, ἀλλοίωσις ἔσται ἀλλ᾿ οὐ γένεσις.
For if it were air, on the one hand, if it persists, there will be alteration but not generation.
ἅμα δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὥστε ὕδωρ εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀέρα ἢ ἄλλ᾿ ὁτιοῦν, ἔσται δή τις ἐναντίωσις καὶ διαφορὰ ἧς ἕξει τι θάτερον μόριον τὸ πῦρ οἷον θερμότητα.
And at the same time, neither does it seem so, so as for water to be at the same time also air or anything else, for there will indeed be some contrariety and difference of which one part the fire will have, for instance hotness.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔσται τό γε πῦρ ἀὴρ θερμός· ἀλλοίωσίς τε γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.
But indeed fire at least will not be hot air; for such a thing is alteration, and it does not so appear.
ἅμα δὲ πάλιν εἰ ἔσται ἐκ πυρὸς ἀήρ, τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβάλλοντος ἔσται.
And at the same time again, if air is to be generated from fire, it will be by the hot changing into its contrary.
ὑπάρξει ἄρα τῷ ἀέρι τοῦτο, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἀὴρ ψυχρόν τι.
Therefore this will belong to air, and air will be something cold.
ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὸ πῦρ ἀέρα θερμὸν εἶναι· ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἔσται.
So that it is impossible for fire to be hot air; for at the same time the same thing will be hot and cold.
ἄλλο τι ἄῤ ἀμφότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὕλη κοινή.
Therefore both will be some other identical thing, and there will be some other common matter.
Ὁ δ᾿ αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ ἁπάντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν τούτων ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα.
And the same argument applies to all, namely that there is not one of these from which all things are.
οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἀέρος μὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἔσται γὰρ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο μετ᾿ ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων· ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέποτε, ὥσπερ φασί τινες τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον.
Yet indeed neither is it any other thing besides these, such as something intermediate between air and water or between air and fire, thicker than air and fire, but thinner than the others; for that intermediate will be air and fire with contrariety; but one of the contraries is a privation; so that it is never possible for that to exist in isolation, as some say of the infinite and the encompassing.
ὁμοίως ἄρα ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἢ οὐδέν.
Therefore, it is likewise with any of these or none.
Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αἰσθητόν γε πρότερον τούτων, ταῦτα ἂν εἴη πάντα.
If, then, there is nothing perceptible prior to these, these would be all.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἢ ἀεὶ μένοντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἢ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἢ ἅπαντα, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ᾿ οὔ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων ἔγραψεν.
It is necessary, therefore, either that they always remain and are unchangeable into one another, or that they change, and either all of them, or some do and others do not, just as Plato wrote in the Timaeus.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄλληλα, δέδεικται πρότερον· ὅτι δ᾿ οὐχ ὁμοίως ταχέως ἄλλο ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχοντα σύμβολον θᾶττον γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δ᾿ οὐκ ἔχοντα βραδύτερον.
That they must indeed change into one another has been shown previously; and that one is not generated from another with equal speed has been said previously, because those having a symbol are generated from one another faster, while those not having one are slower.
εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἡ ἐναντιότης μία ἐστὶ καθ᾿ ἣν μεταβάλλουσιν, ἀνάγκη δύο εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ μέσον ἀναίσθητος οὖσα καὶ ἀχώριστος.
If, then, the contrariety according to which they change is one, it is necessary for them to be two; for the matter is the intermediate, being imperceptible and inseparable.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω ὁρᾶται ὄντα, δύο ἂν εἶεν αἱ ἐλάχισται.
But since they are seen to be more, the minimum number of contrarieties would be two.
δύο δ᾿ ὄντων οὐχ οἷόν τε τρία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα, ὥσπερ φαίνεται· τοσαῦται γὰρ αἱ συζυγίαι· ἓξ γὰρ οὐσῶν τὰς δύο ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐναντίας εἶναι ἀλλήλαις.
And if there are two, it is not possible for them to be three, but four, just as appears; for so many are the couplings; for of the six that exist, it is impossible for two to occur because of their being contrary to one another.