§1.7#17.
7.
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς, παρειλήφαμεν δὲ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον ὑπεναντίους ἀλλήλοις λόγους.
We must speak next about acting and being acted upon, and we have inherited from our predecessors arguments that are contrary to one another.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτό γε ὁμονοητικῶς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές ἐστι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου (πάντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ὁμοίοις), τὰ δ᾿ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ διάφορα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἰς ἄλληλα πέφυκεν.
For most of them agree in saying this at least, that the like is entirely unaffected by the like, because neither is any more active or passive than the other (for all the same things belong likewise to likes), but that unlikes and different things are by nature capable of acting and being acted upon by one another.
καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τὸ ἔλαττον πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος φθείρηται, διὰ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τοῦτό φασι πάσχειν· ἐναντίον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ.
For indeed, they say that when a smaller fire is destroyed by a larger one, it suffers this because of contrariety; for the much is contrary to the few.
Δημόκριτος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰδίως ἔλεξε μόνος· φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερα ὄντα ποιῇ τι εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ᾗ ἕτερα ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ ταὐτόν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς.
But Democritus alone spoke in a peculiar way contrary to the others; for he says that the active and the passive are the same and like; for it is not possible for things that are other and different to be acted upon by one another, but even if, being other, they do something to one another, this happens to them not insofar as they are other, but insofar as some identical thing belongs to them, in this respect.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ᾿ ἐστίν, ἐοίκασι δὲ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες ὑπεναντία φαίνεσθαι λέγειν.
Now these are the things that are said, but those who speak in this way seem to say contrary things.
αἴτίον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιολογίας ὅτι δέον ὅλον τι θεωρῆσαι μέρος τι τυγχάνουσι λέγοντες ἑκάτεροι·
And the cause of this contradiction is that, whereas they ought to have considered some whole, both sides happen to speak only of a part.
τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ πάντῃ πάντως ἀδιάφορον εὔλογον μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου μηδέν (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον θάτερον ἔσται ποιητικὸν ἢ θάτερον;
For that the like, and what is in every way and altogether indifferent, should suffer nothing from the like is reasonable (for why should one be more active than the other?
εἴ τε¹ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τι πάσχειν δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾿ αὐτοῦ· καίτοι τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἄφθαρτον οὔτε ἀκίνητον, εἴπερ τὸ ὅμοιον ᾖ ὅμοιον ποιητικόν, αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτὸ κινήσει πᾶν)· τό τε παντελῶς ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδαμῇ ταὐτὸν ὡσαύτως.
And if it is possible for something to be acted upon by the like, it would also be [acted upon] by itself; yet if this were so, there would be nothing either imperishable or unmoved, if the like qua like is active, for everything would move itself); and likewise for that which is entirely other and in no way the same.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πάθοι λευκότης ὑπὸ γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμὴ ὑπὸ λευκότητος, πλὴν εἰ μή που κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ συμβέβηκε λευκὴν ἢ μέλαιναν εἶναι τὴν γραμμήν· οὐκ ἐξίστησι γὰρ ἄλληλα τῆς φύσεως ὅσα μήτ᾿ ἐναντία μήτ᾿ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἐστίν.
For whiteness would suffer nothing from a line, nor a line from whiteness, except perhaps by accident, as for example if it happens that the line is white or black; for things that are neither contraries nor [derived] from contraries do not displace one another from their nature.
ἀλλ᾿ ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσ χειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ᾿ εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον (πέφυκε γὰρ σῶμα μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος, χυμὸς δ᾿ ὑπὸ χυμοῦ, χρῶμα δ᾿ ὑπὸ χρώματος πάσχειν, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ὁμογενὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς.
But since it is not just any chance thing that is by nature capable of being acted upon and acting, but only as many as are either contraries or have contrariety, it is necessary that both the active and the passive be like and the same in genus, but unlike and contrary in species (for by nature body is acted upon by body, flavor by flavor, and color by color, and in general that which is of the same genus by that which is of the same genus.
τούτου δ᾿ αἴτιον ὅτι τἀναντία ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει πάντα, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων), ὥστ᾿ ἀνάγκη πῶς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτὰ τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, πῶς δ᾿ ἕτερα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις.
And the cause of this is that contraries are all in the same genus, and contraries act and are acted upon by one another), so that it is necessary that the active and the passive be in a way the same, and in a way other and unlike one another.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τῷ μὲν γένει ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοια τῷ δ᾿ εἴδει ἀνόμοια, τοιαῦτα δὲ τἀναντία, φανερὸν ὅτι παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ τά τ᾿ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ· καὶ γὰρ ὅλως φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἐν τούτοις.
And since both the passive and the active are the same and like in genus, but unlike in species, and such are contraries, it is clear that contraries and the intermediates are passive and active in relation to one another; for indeed, in general, destruction and generation are among these.