§1.66.
6.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον δεῖ περὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων εἰπεῖν, εἴτ᾿ ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ πότερον ἀΐδιον ἕκαστον ἢ γίνεταί πως, καὶ εἰ γίνεται, πότερον ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίνεται πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἤ τι πρῶτον ἓν αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη δὴ πρότερον εἰπεῖν περὶ ὧν ἀδιορίστως λέγεται νῦν.
Since we must first speak of matter and the so-called elements, whether they exist or not, and whether each is eternal or comes to be in some way, and if it comes to be, whether all come to be from one another in the same way, or whether there is some one primary thing among them, it is necessary to speak beforehand about those things which are now spoken of without definition.
πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τὰ στοιχεῖα γεννῶντες καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων διακρίσει χρῶνται καὶ συγκρίσει καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
For all those who generate the elements and those who [generate] the things from the elements make use of association and dissociation, and of acting and being acted upon.
ἔστι δ᾿ ἡ σύγκρισις μίξις· πῶς δὲ μίγνυσθαι λέγομεν. οὐ διώρισται σαφῶς.
And association is mixture; but how we say "to be mixed" has not been clearly defined.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυνατόν, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ποιοῦντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος·
Yet neither is it possible to be altered, nor to be dissociated and associated, if nothing acts and nothing is acted upon.
καὶ γὰρ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες γεννῶσι τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὴν ποίησιν, καὶ τοῦτ᾿ ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἦν ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
For indeed, those who make the elements more than one generate by acting and being acted upon by one another, and for those [who generate them] from one, it is necessary to speak of action; and Diogenes says this correctly, that if all things were not from one, there would be no acting and being acted upon by one another, as for example the hot being cooled and this in turn being warmed; for it is not heat and cold that change into one another, but clearly the underlying subject.
ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν.
So that in those things in which there is acting and being acted upon, it is necessary that their underlying nature be one.
τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντ᾿ εἶναι τοιαῦτα φάσκειν οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν.
To say, then, that all things are of this sort is not true, but [it is true] in those things in which there is [acting and being acted upon] by one another.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καὶ περὶ μίξεως θεωρητέον, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς· οὔτε γὰρ ποιεῖν ταῦτα καὶ πάσχειν δύνάται κυρίως ἃ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅψασθαι ἀλλήλων, οὔτε μὴ ἁψάμενά πως ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι πρῶτον.
But indeed, if we must consider acting and being acted upon, and mixture, we must also [consider] contact; for neither can those things act and be acted upon in the strict sense which are not able to touch one another, nor is it possible for them to be mixed in the first place without having touched in some way.
ὥστε περὶ τριῶν τούτων διοριστέον, τί ἁφὴ καὶ τί μίξις καὶ τί ποίησις.
So that we must define concerning these three, what contact is, what mixture is, and what action is.
Ἀρχὴν δὲ λάβωμεν τήνδε.
Let us take this as a starting point.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ὅσοις ἐστὶ μίξις, εἶναι ταῦτ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἁπτικά· κἂν εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει κυρίως, καὶ τούτοις ὡσαύτως.
For of existing things, for as many as there is mixture, it is necessary that these be capable of touching one another; and if one thing acts and another is acted upon in the strict sense, it is likewise for these.
διὸ πρῶτον λεκτέον περὶ ἁφῆς.
Therefore, we must speak first about contact.
σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τὰ δὲ θάτερα ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τῶν προτέρων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς.
Now, almost as each of the other names is spoken of in many ways, and some homonymously, others from the others and from the prior ones, so it is also with contact.
ὅμως δὲ τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔχουσι θέσιν.
Nevertheless, that which is spoken of in the strict sense belongs to things that have position.
θέσις δ᾿ οἷσπερ καὶ τόπος· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ὁμοίως ἀποδοτέον ἁρὴν καὶ τόπον, εἴτ᾿ ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἴτ᾿ ἄλλον τρόπον.
And position belongs to those things to which place also belongs; for indeed, to mathematical objects we must likewise attribute contact and place, whether each of them is separate or exists in some other way.
εἰ οὗν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ διωρίσθη πρότερον, τὸ ἅπτεσθι τὸ τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχειν ἅμα, ταῦτα ἂν ἅπτοιτο ἀλλήλων ὅσα διωρισμένα μεγέθη καὶ θέσιν ἔχοντα ἄμα ἔχει τὰ ἔσχατα.
If then, as was defined before, touching is to have the extremities together, those things would touch one another which, being distinct magnitudes and having position, have their extremities together.
ἐπεὶ δὲ θέσις μὲν ὅσοις καὶ τόπος ὑπάρχει, τόπου δὲ διαφορὰ πρώτη τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἅπαντα τὰ ἀλλήλων ἁπτόμενα βάρος ἂν ἔχοι ἢ κουφότητα, ἢ ἄμφω ἢ θάτερον.
And since position belongs to as many things as place also belongs, and the primary difference of place is above and below and such of the opposites, all things that touch one another would have weight or lightness, or both or one of the two.
τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικά· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα ἅπτεσθαι πέφυκεν ἀλλήλων, ὧν διῃρημένων μεγεθῶν ἅμα τὰ ἔσχατά ἐστιν, ὄντων κινητικῶν καὶ κινητῶν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων.
And such things are passive and active; so that it is clear that those things are by nature capable of touching one another which, being divided magnitudes, have their extremities together, and are capable of moving and being moved by one another.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν οὐχ ὁμοίως κινεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀνάγκη κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, τὸ δ᾿ ἀκίνητον ὄν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐροῦμεν ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν τί φασι καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν κινεῖν.
But since the mover does not move the moved in the same way, but the one must itself be moved while moving, and the other being unmoved, it is clear that we shall say likewise also of the active; for indeed, they say that the mover does something and that the active moves.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαφέρει γε καὶ δεῖ διορίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀντιθήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι, τοῦτο δ᾿ οἷς ἡ κίνησις πάθος, πάθος δὲ καθ᾿ ὅσον ἀλλοιοῦται μόνον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ θερμόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ κινεῖν ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐστίν.
Nevertheless, they do differ and we must define them; for it is not possible for every mover to act, if we are to oppose the active to the passive, and this belongs to those things for which the motion is a passion, and passion is only insofar as it is altered, as for example the white and the hot; but moving is of wider extension than acting.
ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ οὖν φανερόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὰ κινοῦντα τῶν κινητῶν ἅπτοιτ᾿ ἄν, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς οὔ.
At any rate, this is clear, that there is a way in which movers would touch the moved, and there is a way in which they would not.
ἀλλ᾿ ὁ διορισμὸς τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι καθόλου μὲν ὁ τῶν θέσιν ἐχόντων καὶ τοῦ μὲν κινητικοῦ τοῦ δὲ κινητοῦ, πρὸς ἄλληλα δέ, κινητικοῦ καὶ κινητοῦ ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.
But the definition of touching in general is that of things which have position, and of which one is capable of moving and the other capable of being moved, and in relation to one another, of the mover and the moved in which acting and being acted upon belong.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἁπτομένου ἁπτόμενον· καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδών, ὅσοις ἀνάγκη καὶ φαίνεται τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἅπτεσθαι ἁπτομένου· ἔστι δ᾿, ὡς ἐνίοτέ φαμεν, τὸ κινοῦν ἅπτεσθσι μόνον τοῦ κινουμένου, τὸ δ᾿ ἁπτόμενον μὴ ἅπτεσθαι ἀπτομένου· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν κινούμενα τὰ ὁμογενῆ, ἀνάγκη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἁπτομένου ἅπτεσθαι.
Now, for the most part, that which touches is in contact with that which touches it; for indeed almost all things in our way move while being moved, in whose case it is necessary and appears that that which touches touches that which touches it; but there is a way, as we sometimes say, that the mover only touches the moved, and that which is touched does not touch that which touches it; but because things of the same kind move while being moved, it seems to be necessary that what touches touches what touches it.
ὥστε εἴ τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἂν ἅπτοιτο τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐδέν· φαμὲν γὰρ ἐνίοτε τὸν λυποῦντα ἅπτεσθαι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνου.
So that if something moves while being unmoved, that would touch the moved, but nothing of the latter [would touch] the former; for we sometimes say that the one who grieves us touches us, but not we him.
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁφῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
Let contact in physical things, then, be defined in this way.