§1.3#2Ἔχει δ᾿ ἀπορίαν ἱκανὴν καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ συνείρειν τὴν γένεσιν, εἴπερ τὸ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν μηδέν ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὶ οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποῦ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
There is also a sufficient difficulty as to what is the cause of the continuity of generation, if indeed that which perishes departs into non-being, and non-being is nothing—for non-being is neither a 'this' nor a quality nor a quantity nor a place.
εἴπερ οὖν ἀεί τι τῶν ὄντων ἀπέρχεται, διὰ τί ποτ᾿ οὐκ ἀνήλωται πάλαι καὶ φροῦδον τὸ πᾶν, εἴ γε πεπερασμένον ἦν ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τῶν γινομένων ἕκαστον;
If, then, some of the things that are is always departing, why in the world has the whole not been used up long ago and vanished, if indeed that from which each of the things that come to be comes to be was finite?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, οὐχ ὑπολείπει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον.
For it is surely not because that from which it comes to be is infinite that it does not fail; for this is impossible.
κατ᾿ ἐνέργειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄπειρον, δυνάμει δ᾿ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὥστ᾿ ἔδει ταύτην εἶναι μόνην τὴν μὴ ὑπολείπουσαν τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἀεὶ ἔλαττον· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο οὐχ ὁρῶμεν.
For in actuality nothing is infinite, but only potentially by way of division, so that this [infinity by division] alone ought to be that which does not fail, by something always coming to be smaller; but in fact we do not see this.
Ἆῥ οὖν διὰ τὸ τὴν τοῦδε φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦδε γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθορὰν ἄπαυστον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν;
Is it, then, because the destruction of this is the generation of another, and the generation of this is the destruction of another, that change is necessarily unceasing?
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν ὁμοίως περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι πᾶσιν ἱκανὴν αἰτίαν.
Concerning, then, there being generation and destruction in like manner for each of the things that are, this must be thought to be a sufficient cause for all.
διὰ τί δέ ποτε τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὰ δ᾿ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, πάλιν σκεπτέον, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι γένεσις μὲν τουδὶ φθορὰ δὲ τουδί, καὶ φθορὰ μὲν τοδὶ γένεσις δὲ τουδί· ζητεῖ γάρ τινα τοῦτο λόγον.
But why in the world some things are said to come to be and perish unqualifiedly, and others not unqualifiedly, must be considered again, if indeed the same thing is the generation of this and the destruction of that, and the destruction of this and the generation of that; for this requires some explanation.
λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι φθείρεται νῦν ἀπλῶς, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοδί· καὶ αὕτη μὲν γένεσις ἁπλῶς, αὕτη δὲ φθορά.
For we say that it now perishes unqualifiedly, and not merely as this; and this is unqualified generation, and that is unqualified destruction.
τοδὶ δὲ γίνεται μέν τι, γίνεται δ᾿ ἀπλῶς οὔ· φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν μανθάνοντα γίνεσθαι μὲν ἐπιστήμονα, γίνεσθαι δ᾿ ἀπλῶς οὔ.
But this [particular thing] comes to be something, but does not come to be unqualifiedly; for we say that the learner comes to be knowledgeable, but does not come to be unqualifiedly.
Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις διορίζομεν λέγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει τὰ δ᾿ οὔ, διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζητούμενον· διαφέρει γὰρ εἰς ἃ μεταβάλλει τὸ μεταβάλλον·
Just as, then, we often define by saying that some things signify a 'this' and others do not, it is because of this that the object of inquiry occurs; for it makes a difference into what the changing thing changes.
οἷον ἴσως ἡ μὲν εἰς πῦρ ὀδὸς γένεσις μὲν ἁπλῆ, φθορὰ δὲ τινός ἐστιν, οἶον γῆς, ἡ δὲ γῆς γένεσις τὶς γένεσις, γένεσις δ᾿ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, φθορὰ δ᾿ ἀπλῶς, οἶον πυρός, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο τὸ ἂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι φάσκων, πῦρ καὶ γῆν.
For example, perhaps the way to fire is unqualified generation, but is the destruction of something, such as earth, whereas the generation of earth is a particular generation, but not unqualified generation, and is unqualified destruction, such as of fire—just as Parmenides speaks, claiming that the two things, fire and earth, are being and non-being.
τὸ δὴ ταῦτα ἢ τοιαῦθ᾿ ἕτερα ὑποτίθεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόπον ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
Indeed, to posit these or other such things makes no difference; for we are seeking the manner, and not the underlying subject.
ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπλῶς ὀδὸς φθορὰ ἁπλῆ, ἡ δ᾿ εἰς τὸ ἁπλῶς ὅν γένεσις ἀπλῆ.
Therefore, the way to unqualified non-being is unqualified destruction, and the way to unqualified being is unqualified generation.
οἷς οὖν διώρισται εἴτε πυρὶ καὶ γῇ εἴτε ἄλλοις τισί,. τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν.
In those things, then, by which it is defined, whether by fire and earth or some other things, one of these will be being and the other non-being.
ἔνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον τούτῳ διοίσει τὸ ἀπλῶς τι γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τοῦ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἄλλον δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ ὁποία τις ἂν ᾗ·
In one way, then, to come to be and perish unqualifiedly will differ in this from not doing so unqualifiedly, but in another way by the matter being of what sort it may be.
ἧς μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ τόδε τι σημαίνουσι, μᾶλλον οὐσία, ἦς δὲ στέρησιν, μὴ ὂν, οἷον τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κατηγορία τις καὶ εἶδος, ἡ δὲ ψυχρότης στέρησις· διαφέρουσι δὲ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ταύταις ταῖς διαφοραῖς.
For that [matter] of which the differences signify more of a 'this' is more of a substance, while that of which they signify privation is non-being—for example, heat is a certain category and form, while cold is a privation; and earth and fire differ also by these differences.
Δοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πολλοῖς τῷ αἰσθητῷ καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῷ διαφέρειν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς αἰσθητὴν μεταβάλλῃ ὕλην, γίνεσθαί φασιν, ὅταν δ᾿ εἰς ἀφανῆ, φθείρεσθαι·
But it seems rather to most people to differ by the sensible and the non-sensible; for when it changes into sensible matter, they say it comes to be, but when into invisible, they say it perishes.
τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῷ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ὄν, τὸ δ᾿ ἄγνωστον μὴ ὄν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης ἔχει δύναμιν.
For they define being and non-being by perceiving and not perceiving, just as that which is knowable is being, and the unknowable is non-being; for perception has the power of knowledge.
καθάπερ οὖν αὐτοὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ ζῆν καὶ εἷναι νομίζουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα, τρόπον τινὰ διώκοντες τἀληθές, αὐτὸ δὲ λέγοντες οὐκ ἀληθές.
Just as, then, they themselves think that they live and are by perceiving or by having the power to do so, so also with things, in a way pursuing the truth, though not speaking the truth itself.
συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δόξαν καὶ κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν ἄλλως τὸ γίνεσθαί τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι· πνεῦμα γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἧττόν ἐστιν (διὸ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα ἁπλῶς τῇ εἰς ταῦτα μεταβολῇ φθείρεσθαι λέγουσιν, γίνεσθαι δ᾿ ὅταν εἰς ἁπτὸν καὶ εἰς γῆν μεταβάλλῃ), κατὰ δ᾿ ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον τόδε τι καὶ εἶδος ταῦτα τῆς γῆς.
It happens, then, that to come to be unqualifiedly and to perish occur differently according to opinion and according to truth; for breath and air are less in terms of perception (wherefore they say that things perishing unqualifiedly perish by the change into these, and come to be when they change into the tangible and into earth), but in truth these are more of a 'this' and form than earth is.