§1.3#13.
3.
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, πρῶτον θεωρητέον πότερον ἔστι τι γινόμενον ἀπλῶς καὶ φθειρόμενον, ἢ κυρίως μὲν οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δ᾿ ἔκ τινος καὶ τί, λέγω δ᾿ οἷον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιαῖνον καὶ κάμνον ἐξ ὑηισςινονυοε, ἢ μικρὸν ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μέγα ἐκ μικροῦ, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
These matters having been defined, we must first consider whether there is anything that comes to be and perishes unqualifiedly, or whether in the strict sense nothing does, but it is always from something and into something—I mean, for example, a healthy thing from a sick one, and a sick one from a healthy one, or a small thing from a large one, and a large one from a small one, and all other things in this manner.
εἰ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἔσται γένεσις, ἁπλῶς ἄν γίνοιτο ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὥστ᾿ ἀληθὲς ἄν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τισὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
For if there is to be unqualified generation, it would come to be unqualifiedly from non-being, so that it would be true to say that non-being belongs to some things.
τὶς μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἐκ μὴ ὄντος τινός, οἷον ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ ἢ μὴ καλοῦ, ἡ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἐξ ἀπλῶς μὴ ὄντος.
For a particular generation is from a particular non-being, as from non-white or non-beautiful, but unqualified generation is from unqualified non-being.
Τὸ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον σημαίνει καθ᾿ ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν τοῦ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ πάντα περιέχον.
Now "unqualifiedly" means either the first thing under each category of being, or the universal and all-embracing.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐσίας ἔσται γένεσις ἐκ μὴ οὐσίας.
If, then, it means the first, there will be generation of substance from non-substance.
ᾧ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει οὐσία μηδὲ τόδε, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμία κατηγοριῶν, οἷον εὔτε ποιὸν εὔτε ποσὸν οὕτε τὸ ποῦ· χωριστὰ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν.
But for that to which substance does not belong, nor a "this," it is clear that none of the other categories belongs either— for example, neither quality, nor quantity, nor place; for then attributes would be separated from substances.
εἰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὅλως, ἀπόφασις ἔσται καθόλου πάντων, ὥστε ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον.
But if it means non-being altogether, it will be the universal negation of all things, so that what comes to be must necessarily come to be from nothing.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις τε διηπόρηται καὶ διώρισται τοῖς λόγοις ἐπὶ πλεῖον· συντόμως δὲ καὶ νῦν λεκτέον, ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἀπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί·
Concerning these matters, difficulties have been raised and defined more fully in other works; yet now also we must state briefly that, in one way, something comes to be unqualifiedly from non-being, but in another way, always from being.
τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἀνάγκη προϋπάρχειν λεγόμενον ἀμφοτέρως.
For that which is potentially being, but in actuality non-being, must pre-exist, being spoken of in both ways.
ὃ δὲ καὶ τούτων διωρισμένων ἔχει θαυμαστὴν ἀπορίαν, πάλιν ἐπαναποδιστέον, πῶς ἔστιν ἁπλῆ γένεσις, εἴτ᾿ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος οὖσα εἶτε καί πως ἄλλως.
But we must turn back again to that which, even when these are defined, possesses a wonderful difficulty: how unqualified generation is, whether from what is potentially being or in some other way.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἄρ᾿ ἔστιν οὐσίας γένεσις καὶ τοῦ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ τοιοῦδε καὶ τοσοῦδε καὶ ποῦ (τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ φθορᾶς).
For one might raise the difficulty whether there is generation of substance and of a "this," but not of a quality, quantity, or place (and in the same manner also concerning destruction).
εἰ γάρ τι γίνεται, δῆλον ὡς ἔσται δυνάμει τις οὐσία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ´ οὔ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ γένεσις ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἣν ἀνάγκη μεταβάλλειν τὸ φθειρόμενον.
For if something comes to be, it is clear that there will be some substance potentially but not in actuality, from which the generation will be, and into which that which perishes must change.
πότερον οὖν ὑπάρξει τι τούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐντελεχείᾳ;
Will there then belong to this any of the other categories in actuality?
λέγω δ᾿ οἷον ἆρ᾿ ἔσται ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποῦ τὸ δυνάμει μόνον τόδε καὶ ὄν, ἀπλῶς δὲ μὴ τόδε μηδ᾿ ὄν;
I mean, for example, will that which is potentially only a "this" and a being, but unqualifiedly is neither a "this" nor a being, be a quantity, a quality, or a place?
εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνάμει, χωριστόν τε συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ οὕτως ὄν, καὶ ἔτι, ὃ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προϋπάρχοντος·
For if it is nothing but all are potentially, it follows that what is not in this way is separable, and further, what the first philosophers continued to fear most of all, namely, coming to be from nothing pre-existing.
εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ οὐσίαν οὐχ ὑπάρξει, τῶν δ᾿ ἄλλων τι τῶν εἰρημένων, ἔσται, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, χωριστά τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν.
But if being a "this" or a substance will not belong to it, but some of the other mentioned categories will, then, as we said, attributes will be separated from substances.
περί τε τούτων οὖν ὅσον ἐνδέχεται πραγματευτέον, καὶ τίς αἰτία τοῦ γένεσιν ἀεί εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἀπλῆν καὶ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.
Concerning these, therefore, we must investigate as much as possible, and also what is the cause of generation being continuous, both unqualified and partial.
Οὔσης δ᾿ αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φαμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ἄλης, τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν λεκτέον.
There being one cause as that from which we say the principle of motion is, and one as matter, we must state this latter kind of cause.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον ἀεί.
For concerning the former, it has been said before in the discussions on motion that there is one unmoved for all time, and another always moved.
τούτων δὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀκινήτου ἀρχῆς τῆς ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας διελεῖν ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔργον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι τἆλλα κινοῦντος ὕστερον ἀποδοτέον, τί τοιοῦτον τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα λεγομένων αἴτιόν ἐστιν.
Of these, to distinguish concerning the unmoved principle belongs to another and prior philosophy; but concerning that which, by reason of moving continuously, moves other things, we must render later what kind of cause among particulars this is.
νῦν δὲ τὴν ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει τιθεμένην αἰτίαν εἴπωμεν, δι᾿ ἣν ἀεὶ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις οὐχ ὑπολείπει τὴν φύσιν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως τοῦτο γένοιτο δῆλον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀπορηθέντος, πῶς ποτὲ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.
But now let us state the cause placed under the form of matter, by reason of which destruction and generation never fail nature; for at the same time this might perhaps become clear, and also concerning the present difficulty, how we must ever speak about unqualified destruction and generation.