§1.1#2οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους ἀρχὰς ποιοῦντες μιᾶς ἀδύνατον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.
Nevertheless, from what those who posit more than one principle say, it is impossible to be altered.
τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καθ᾿ ἅ φαμεν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, διαφοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων εἰσίν, λέγω δ᾿ οἶον θερμὸν ψυχρόν, λευκὸν μέλαν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, μαλακὸν σκληρὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ φησὶν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς “ἠέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερμὸν ἀπάντῃ, ὄμβρον δ᾿ ἐν πᾶσιν δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε,” ὁμοίως δὲ διορίζει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
For the affections, according to which we say this happens, are differences of the elements—I mean, for example, hot and cold, white and black, dry and wet, soft and hard, and each of the others, just as Empedocles also says, "the sun is white to see and hot everywhere, and rain in all things is dark and freezing," and similarly he distinguishes for the rest as well.
ὥστ᾿ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἐκ πυρὸς γενέσθαι ὕδωρ μηδ᾿ ἐξ ὕδατος γῆν, οὐδ᾿ ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν ἔσται οὐδὲν οὐδ᾿ ἐκ μαλακοῦ σκληρόν· ὁ δ᾿ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
So that, if it is not possible for water to come to be from fire nor earth from water, neither will there be anything coming to be black from white, nor hard from soft; and the same argument applies to the others as well.
τοῦτο δ᾿ ἦν ἀλλοίωσις.
And this was alteration.
ᾖ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι μίαν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποθετέον ὕλην, ἄν τε μεταβάλλῃ κατὰ τόπον, ἄν τε κατ᾿ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, ἄν τε κατ᾿ ἀλλοίωσιν.
Whereby it is also clear that one must always assume one matter for contraries, whether it changes in respect of place, or in respect of growth and decrease, or in respect of alteration.
ἔτι δ᾿ ὁμοίως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν· εἴτε γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον |ἓν στοιχεῖον καὶ μία ἡ πάντων ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολήν, κἄν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕν, ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις.
Further, it is similarly necessary for this and alteration to exist together; for if there is alteration, the underlying subject is also one element and the matter of all things that have change into one another is one, and even if the underlying subject is one, there is alteration.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν ἐναντία λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτός.
Empedocles, therefore, seems to speak in opposition both to the phenomena and to himself.
ἄμα μὲν γὰρ οὔ φησιν ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων, ἅμα δ᾿ ὅταν εἰς ἓν συναγάγῃ τὴν ἅπασαν φύσιν πλὴν τοῦ νείκους, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεσθαι πάλιν ἕκαστον.
For at the same time he says that none of the elements comes to be from another, but all other things from these, and yet, when he brings the entire nature except Strife together into one, each of them comes to be again from the one.
ὥστ᾿ ἐξ ἑνός τινος δῆλον ὅτι διαφοραῖς τισὶ χωριζομένων καὶ πάθεσιν ἐγένετο τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ, καθάπερ λέγει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρόν.
So that it is clear that from some one thing, by being separated by certain differences and affections, there came to be water on the one hand and fire on the other, just as he says that the sun is white and hot, and the earth heavy and hard.
ἀφαιρουμένων οὖν τούτων τῶν διαφορῶν (εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεταὶ γενόμεναί γε) δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ γῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, οὐ τότε μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν, μεταβάλλοντά γε τοῖς πάθεσιν.
Therefore, if these differences are taken away (for they are indeed removable, since they have come to be), it is clear that it is necessary for earth to come to be from water and water from earth, and similarly for each of the others as well, not only then but also now, by changing in their affections.
ἔστι δ᾿ ~ξ ὧν εἴρηκε δυνάμενα προσγίνεσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχομένων ἀλλήλοις ἔτι τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας.
And from what he has said, they are capable of being added and separated again, especially since Strife and Love are still fighting with one another.
διόπερ καὶ τότε ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγεννήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ a i. e. when the elements originally came-to be. ἔτι ὄντα ἕν ἦν τὸ πᾶν.
Therefore, then too they were generated from the one; for surely the whole was not one while it was still fire and earth and water.
ἄδηλον δὲ καὶ πότερον ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν θετέον τὸ ἓν ἢ τὰ πολλά, λέγω δὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτων.
But it is also unclear whether we should posit the one or the many as their principle—I mean fire and earth and their co-ordinates.
ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλη ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλοντα διὰ τὴν κίνησιν γίνονται γῆ καὶ πῦρ, τὸ ἓν στοιχεῖον· ᾗ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ συνθέσεως γίνεται συνιόντων ἐκείνων, ἐκεῖνα δ᾿ ἐκ διαλύσεως, στοιχειωδέστερα ἐκεῖνα καὶ πρότερα τὴν φύσιν.
For insofar as it underlies as matter, from which by changing through movement earth and fire come to be, the one is the element; but insofar as this [the one] comes to be from composition by their coming together, and those [the many] from dissolution, those are more elementary and prior by nature.