§1.1#11.
1.
Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φύσει γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὁμοίως κατὰ πάντων, τάς τε αἰτίας διαιρετέον καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, τί ἑκάτερον, καὶ πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποληπτέον φύσιν εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ γενέσεως, ἢ χωρίς, ὥσπερ διώρισται καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.
Concerning coming-to-be and passing-away of things which come to be and pass away by nature, similarly for all of them, we must distinguish their causes and their definitions, and further concerning growth and alteration, what each is, and whether we should suppose the nature of alteration and coming-to-be to be the same, or separate, just as they are distinguished by their names.
Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν τὴν καλουμένην ἁπλῆν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἕτερον ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ γένεσιν.
Now, of the ancients, some say that so-called simple coming-to-be is alteration, while others say that alteration and coming-to-be are different.
ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννῶσιν, τούτοις μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν φάναι καὶ τὸ κυρίως γινόμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ὅσοι δὲ πλείω τὴν ὅλην ἑνὸς τιθέασιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δὲ ἕτερον.
For as many as say that the whole is one and generate all things from one, for these it is necessary to say that coming-to-be is alteration and that what comes to be in the strict sense is altered; but as many as posit more than one as the whole, such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus, for these they are different.
καίτοι Ἀναξαγόρας γε τὴν οἰκείαν φωνὴν ἠγνόησεν· λέγει γοῦν ὡς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ταὐτὸν καθέστηκε τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.
And yet Anaxagoras at least was ignorant of his own utterance; at any rate, he says that coming-to-be and passing-away are the same as being altered.
πολλὰ δὲ λέγει τὰ στοιχεῖα, καθάπερ καὶ ἕτεροι.
But he says that the elements are many, just as others do.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ τέτταρα, τὰ δὲ πάντα μετὰ τῶν κινούντων ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ἄπειρα καὶ Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος.
For Empedocles says that the bodily elements are four, and all together with the moving principles are six in number, while Anaxagoras says they are infinite, as do Leucippus and Democritus.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν καὶ σάρκα καὶ μυελόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἑκάστου συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν· Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ἐκ σωμάτων ἀδιαιρέτων τἆλλα συγκεῖσθαί φασι, ταῦτα δ᾿ ἄπειρα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὰς μορφάς, αὐτὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ διαφέρειν τούτοις ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶ καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει τούτων.
For the former posits the homoeomerous parts as elements, such as bone and flesh and marrow, and of the others of which each part is synonymous with the whole; whereas Democritus and Leucippus say that the other things are composed of indivisible bodies, and these are infinite both in multitude and in shapes, and they differ from one another by those things of which they consist, and by their position and order.
ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα· ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν, οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα· πανσπερμίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων.
And those around Anaxagoras appear to speak in opposition to those around Empedocles; for the latter says that fire, water, air, and earth are four elements and are simpler than flesh, bone, and such homoeomerous parts, whereas the former say that these [homoeomerous parts] are simple and elements, but earth, fire, water, and air are composite; for they are a collection of seeds of these.
Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα κατασκευάζουσιν ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀλλοίωσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ μένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν (τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀλλοιοῦσθαί φαμεν)· τοῖς δὲ τὰ γένη πλείω ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν τῆς γενέσεως· συνιόντων γὰρ καὶ διαλυομένων ἡ γένεσις συμβαίνει καὶ ἡ φθορά.
Therefore, for those who construct all things from one, it is necessary to say that coming-to-be and passing-away are alteration; for the underlying subject always remains the same and one (and we say that such a thing is altered); but for those who make the kinds more than one, alteration differs from coming-to-be; for coming-to-be and passing-away happen by coming together and dissolving.
διὸ λέγει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι “φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων. ” ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποθέσει οὕτω φάναι, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι λέγουσι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ τούτοις τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι μέν τι φάναι παρὰ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀδύνατον μέντοι κατὰ τὰ ὑπ᾿ ἐκείνων λεγόμενα.
Therefore, Empedocles also speaks in this manner, that "there is no nature of anything, but only mixture and exchange of what has been mixed." That their argument, therefore, is appropriate to their hypothesis to speak in this way, is clear, and that they speak in this manner; but it is necessary for these people also to say that alteration is something other than coming-to-be, though it is impossible according to what is said by them.
τοῦτο δ᾿ ὅτι λέγομεν ὀρθῶς, ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν.
And that we speak correctly in this, is easy to see.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ἠρεμούσης τῆς οὐσίας ἐν αὐτῇ μεταβολὴν κατὰ μέγεθος, τὴν καλουμένην αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν.
For just as we see, while the substance remains at rest, a change in it according to magnitude, the so-called growth and decrease, so also we see alteration.