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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §8.5

Friendship as Activity and State: The Role of Living Together

Passage 89 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle distinguishes between friendship in activity (actually living together) and friendship as a state of character, arguing that living together is essential for true friendship. He also contrasts loving as a feeling with friendship as a state, showing that the mutual exchange of equal wishes and pleasure is fully realized only in the friendship of the good.

§8.5ὥσπερ δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἳ μὲν καθʼ ἕξιν οἳ δὲ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δʼ ἔχουσιν ὥστʼ ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
Just as in the case of the virtues some are called good in respect of state and others in respect of activity, so it is also in the case of friendship; for those who live together enjoy each other and provide good things to each other, while those who are asleep or separated by distance do not indeed act, but are in such a state as to act in a friendly way; for distance does not dissolve friendship absolutely, but only its activity.
ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται " πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν. " οὐ φαίνονται δʼ οὔθʼ οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθʼ οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος.
But if the absence becomes long, it seems also to bring about forgetfulness of the friendship; whence it has been said: "Many indeed a friendship has silence dissolved." And neither old people nor sour people seem to be friendly; for there is little pleasure in them, and no one can spend his days with what is painful or not pleasant; for nature seems above all to avoid what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant.
οἱ δʼ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις.
But those who approve of each other, yet do not live together, seem more like well-wishers than friends.
οὐδὲνγὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν ʽὡ̓φελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκεἰ·
For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together; (for those in need aim at utility, but even the blessed aim at spending their days together; for it is least of all fitting for these to be solitary).
συνδιάγειν δὲ μετʼ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
But to pass time together with each other is not possible for those who are not pleasant or who do not enjoy the same things, which comradeship seems to possess.
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δʼ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ διʼ ἄμφω ταῦτα.
Most of all, then, friendship is that of the good, as has been said many times; for that which is absolutely good or pleasant seems to be lovable and choice-worthy, and to each person that which is such to himself; and the good man is so to the good man for both of these reasons.
ἔοικε δʼ ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφʼ ἕξεως· καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἕξιν.
And loving seems like a feeling, but friendship like a state; for loving is no less directed toward inanimate things, but mutual loving is with choice, and choice is from a state; and they wish good things to those they love for their sake, not in accordance with a feeling but in accordance with a state.
καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος.
And in loving their friend they love what is good for themselves; for the good man, in becoming a friend, becomes a good to the one to whom he is a friend.
ἑκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχει.
Each, therefore, both loves what is good for himself and makes an equal return in wish and in pleasure; for it is said "friendship is equality," and these things belong most of all to the friendship of the good.

Notes

  1. 1157b10ὥστʼ ἐνεργεῖν — The construction of the conjunction ὥστε with the infinitive (ἐνεργεῖν). Here, it expresses the result or degree showing that those who are asleep or separated by distance, though not active (οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν), are in a state (οὕτως ἔχουσιν) such as to be capable of acting in a friendly manner.
  2. 1157b21μονώταις — The case of the subject (or predicate) of the infinitive εἶναι. Although it could normally be in the accusative (μονώτας) as an accusative-with-infinitive construction, it is here attracted into the dative (μονώταις) to agree with the demonstrative pronoun τούτοις which is governed in the dative by the impersonal verb προσήκει.
  3. 1157b27διʼ ἄμφω ταῦτα — Ellipsis in the sentence. We must supply the predicate adjectives from the preceding sentence, "lovable and choice-worthy" (φιλητὸν καὶ αἱρετόν), to understand: "and the good man is [lovable and choice-worthy] to the good man for both of these reasons" (namely, goodness and pleasantness).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §8.5. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:8.5

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