§8.4αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκατέρῳ παρʼ ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν.
This friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of time and in all other respects, and in all ways the same and similar things arise for each from the other, which is what ought to belong to friends.
ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις.
And that which is because of pleasure has a resemblance to this; for the good are also pleasant to each other.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί.
And similarly also that which is because of utility; for the good are also such to each other.
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρʼ ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ.
And most of all, friendships remain in these cases too, when the same thing arises from each other, for instance, pleasure, and not only in this way but also from the same source, as in the case of witty people, and not as between lover and beloved.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὃ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δʼ οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)·
For these do not find pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved, the other in being courted by the lover; and when their youth fades, sometimes the friendship also fades (for to the one, the sight of the other is no longer pleasant, and to the other, the courting does not occur).
πολλοὶ δʼ αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες.
Many, on the other hand, do remain friends, if from intimacy they have come to cherish each other's characters, being of similar character.
οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν.
But those who in their amorous relations do not exchange pleasure but utility are both less friends and less stable.
οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς.
And those who are friends because of utility dissolve their friendship along with the advantage; for they were not friends of each other but of the profit.
διʼ ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, διʼ αὑτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο.
Therefore, because of pleasure and because of utility, it is possible for even bad people to be friends with each other, and for decent people to be friends with bad people, and for one who is neither to be friends with any sort of person; but because of themselves, it is clear that only the good can be friends; for bad people do not enjoy each other, unless some benefit arises.
καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου·
And only the friendship of the good is immune to slander; for it is not easy for anyone to believe what is said about someone who has been tested by oneself over a long time.
καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτʼ ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται.
And trust is found in these friendships, along with the conviction that they would never do wrong, and all the other things that are deemed worthy in true friendship.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι.
But in the other friendships nothing prevents such things from occurring.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς διʼ ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθʼ ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν.
For since people call those who are friends because of utility "friends"—just as states do (for alliances between states seem to arise for the sake of utility)—and also those who cherish each other because of pleasure—just as children do—perhaps we too ought to call such people friends, but say that there are more species of friendship than one, and first and in the primary sense the friendship of the good insofar as they are good, and the remaining species by way of resemblance; for they are friends in respect of some good and some similarity, since even the pleasant is a good to those who love pleasure.
οὐ πάνυ δʼ αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
But these friendships do not very much combine, nor do the same people become friends because of utility and because of pleasure; for accidental things do not very much couple together.
εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι διʼ ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ διʼ αὑτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.
Since, then, friendship has been divided into these species, bad people will be friends because of pleasure or utility, being similar in this respect, while the good will be friends because of themselves, namely, insofar as they are good.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις.
These, then, are friends absolutely, while those are friends accidentally and by resembling these.