§8.1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἕποιτʼ ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετʼ ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δʼ ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον.
After these things, it would follow to discuss friendship; for it is a certain virtue or accompanied by virtue, and furthermore, it is most necessary for life.
ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτʼ ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα·
For without friends no one would choose to live, even if he had all other goods.
καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστʼ εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους;
For to those who are rich and possess offices and power, there seems to be the greatest need of friends; for what is the benefit of such prosperity if beneficence is taken away, which is directed especially toward friends and is most praiseworthy?
ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτʼ ἄνευ φίλων;
Or how could it be guarded and preserved without friends?
ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα.
For the greater it is, the more precarious it is.
ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους.
And in poverty and other misfortunes, people think friends are the only refuge.
καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως διʼ ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τʼ ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν τε δύʼ ἐρχομένω· "
καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.
And for the young, to keep them from error, and for the elderly, for care and to help what is lacking in their activity because of weakness, and for those in their prime, for noble actions: "Two going together..." for they are more capable of both thinking and acting.
φύσει τʼ ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν.
And it seems to exist by nature in the parent toward the offspring and in the offspring toward the parent, not only in humans but also in birds and most animals, and in those of the same nation toward one another, and especially in humans, whence we praise those who are lovers of humans.
ἴδοι δʼ ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.
One may see even in travel how near and dear every human is to another human.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστʼ ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν·
And friendship seems to hold states together, and lawmakers care more for it than for justice; for concord seems to be something similar to friendship, and they aim at this most of all, and they expel faction, which is enmity, most of all.
καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δʼ ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.
And if people are friends, there is no need of justice, but if they are just, they still need friendship, and the most just of things seems to be friendly.
οὐ μόνον δʼ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι εἶναι· καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
And it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who are lovers of friends, and having many friends is thought to be one of the noble things; and further, people think that the same men are both good men and friends.
διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα.
But there are not a few disputes about it.
οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἳ δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι.
For some define it as a certain similarity and that similar people are friends, whence they say "like to like," and "jackdaw to jackdaw," and suchlike; while others, on the contrary, say that all such people are "potters" to one another.
καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατʼ ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτʼ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω.
And about these very matters they seek deeper and more physical explanations, Euripides claiming that "the parched earth loves the rain, and the majestic heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth," and Heraclitus that "the opposing agrees, and from differing things comes the fairest harmony, and all things come into being by strife"; while others, and especially Empedocles, maintain the opposite of these, that "like desires like." Let the physical difficulties indeed be dismissed (for they are not proper to the present inquiry); but those which are human and belong to characters and feelings, these let us examine, for instance, whether friendship arises among all people, or whether it is impossible for bad people to be friends, and whether there is one species of friendship or more.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δʼ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
For those who think there is only one species because it admits of "more" and "less" have relied on an insufficient sign; for things that differ in species also admit of "more" and "less." But about these things we have spoken before.
§8.2τάχα δʼ ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ.
Perhaps these things would become clear once the object of love is known.
δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δʼ ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι διʼ οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη.
For it seems that not everything is loved, but only the lovable, and this is either the good, the pleasant, or the useful; and the useful would seem to be that through which some good or pleasure arises, so that the lovable would be both the good and the pleasant as ends.
πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν;
Do people then love the good, or what is good for themselves?
διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα.
For these sometimes disagree.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
And similarly also about the pleasant.
δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δʼ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον.
And it seems that each loves what is good for himself, and that while the good is lovable absolutely, for each individual it is what is good for that individual; and each loves not what is actually good for him, but what appears so.
διοίσει δʼ οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον.
But this will make no difference; for the lovable will then be the apparent good.
τριῶν δʼ ὄντων διʼ ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
Now there being three grounds on which people love, in the case of love for inanimate things it is not called friendship; for there is no mutual loving, nor wishing of good to it (for it is perhaps ridiculous to wish good to wine, but if at all, one wishes it to be preserved so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend, they say we ought to wish goods for his own sake.
τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ παρʼ ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι.
And those who wish goods in this way they call well-wishing, if the same does not also come from the other; for they say well-wishing when reciprocal is friendship.
ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν;
Or should we add "not unrecognized"?
πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον.
For many are well-wishing to those whom they have not seen, but whom they suppose to be decent or useful; and one of those might feel this same thing toward him.
εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς;
These, then, indeed appear to be well-wishing to one another; but how could one call them friends when they are unrecognized as to how they feel toward each other?
δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας διʼ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.
Therefore, they must wish well to each other and wish goods not unrecognized because of one of the mentioned reasons.