§7.14περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλʼ οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
But regarding bodily pleasures, we must inquire for the sake of those who say that some pleasures are indeed highly desirable, such as noble ones, but not bodily pleasures and those with which the self-indulgent person is concerned.
διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί;
Why, then, are the opposite pains bad?
κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον.
For a good is opposite to an evil.
ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;
Or are the necessary pleasures good in this way, that what is not bad is good?
ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί;
Or are they good up to a certain point?
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δʼ ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς.
For in the case of those states and movements of which there is no excess of the better, there is no excess of pleasure either; but of those of which there is, there is also an excess of pleasure.
ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ.
And there is an excess of bodily goods, and the bad person is bad by pursuing the excess, but not the necessary pleasures; for all enjoy both savors and wines and sexual relations in some way, but not as they ought.
ἐναντίως δʼ ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλʼ ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλʼ ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
But it is the opposite with pain; for they do not avoid its excess, but pain altogether; for pain is not opposite to the excess of pleasure except to the person who pursues that excess.
ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι.
And since we must not only tell the truth but also the cause of the falsehood (for this contributes to belief; for when it appears reasonable why what is not true appears true, it makes us believe the truth more); therefore we must explain why bodily pleasures appear more desirable.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν.
First, then, indeed, because they drive out pain; and because of the excesses of pain, as if it were a cure, people pursue excessive pleasure and bodily pleasure in general.
σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.
And cures become intense (which is why they are pursued) because they appear so by contrast with their opposite.
καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἳ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις (ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ διʼ ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἳ δʼ ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι· αἳ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι.
And pleasure is thought not to be excellent indeed for these two reasons, as has been said: because some are actions of a bad nature (either from birth, like that of a beast, or by habit, like those of bad humans), while others are cures of a lack, and it is better to be in a state than to be becoming it; while others happen to belong to states being completed; therefore they are excellent only accidentally.
ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν.
Further, they are pursued because of their intensity by those who are unable to enjoy other pleasures; at any rate, they prepare certain thirsts for themselves.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον.
Now when these are harmless, it is not blameworthy, but when they are harmful, it is bad.
οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφʼ οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.
For they have no other things in which to rejoice, and a neutral state is painful to many because of their nature.
ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλʼ ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν.
For the animal is always laboring, as even the natural philosophers testify, claiming that seeing and hearing are painful; but we are already used to them, as they say.
ὁμοίως δʼ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης.
Similarly, indeed, in youth, because of growth, they are in a state like those who are drunk, and youth is pleasant.
οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν· ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τʼ ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται.
And those of a melancholic nature always need a cure; for their body is continually being bitten because of its temperament, and they are always in intense desire; but pleasure drives out pain, both the opposite pleasure and any random one if it is strong; and for these reasons they become self-indulgent and bad.
αἱ δʼ ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
But pleasures without pain do not have an excess; and these are of the things pleasant by nature and not accidentally.
λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δʼ ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως.
And by accidentally pleasant I mean things that cure; for because it happens that the person is cured while the remaining healthy part is active in some way, for this reason it seems to be pleasant; but pleasant by nature are those things which produce the action of such a nature.
οὐκ ἀεὶ δʼ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δʼ ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθʼ ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται.
But the same thing is not always pleasant because our nature is not simple, but there is also something else in us, in so far as we are corruptible, so that if one part acts, this is contrary to nature for the other nature, but when they are equalized, what is done seems neither painful nor pleasant; since if anyone's nature were simple, the same action would always be most pleasant.
διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει.
Therefore, God always enjoys one and a simple pleasure; for there is an activity not only of movement but also of immobility, and pleasure is more in rest than in movement.
μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδʼ ἐπιεικής.
But change in all things is sweet, according to the poet, because of some badness; for just as the bad person is easily changeable, so also is the nature that needs change; for it is neither simple nor excellent.
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.
Now regarding self-control and lack of self-control, and regarding pleasure and pain, they have been discussed, and what each is, and how some of them are good and others bad; and what remains is to speak also about friendship.