§5.2ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν.
But we are seeking the justice that is a part of virtue; for there is such a justice, as we say.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος.
Similarly also concerning the injustice that is partial.
σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δʼ οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι διʼ ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατʼ οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατʼ ἀδικίαν.
And a sign that it exists is this: for in active manifestation of the other vices a man acts unjustly indeed, but does not grab more than his share, as for instance he who throws away his shield through cowardice, or speaks harshly through bad temper, or fails to help with money through illiberality; but when he grabs more, he often does so in accordance with none of these vices, nor indeed in accordance with all of them, but in accordance with a certain wickedness (for we blame him) and in accordance with injustice.
ἔστιν ἄρʼ ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
There is, therefore, another injustice which is a part of the whole, and a certain unjust thing which is a part of the whole unjust thing which is contrary to the law.
ἔτι εἰ ὃ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὃ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δʼ οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν.
Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at his own cost and loss through lust, the latter would seem to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, while the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; it is clear, then, that this is because of his making gain.
ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπʼ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπʼ ὀργήν· εἰ δʼ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπʼ οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπʼ ἀδικίαν.
Again, while all other unjust acts are always referred to some particular vice, for instance, if a man commits adultery, to self-indulgence; if he deserts his comrade in arms, to cowardice; if he strikes, to anger; yet if he makes a gain, it is referred to no other vice than injustice.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλʼ ἣ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ διʼ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἣ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
So that it is clear that there is another injustice, partial, beside the whole injustice, which is synonymous with it, because its definition is in the same genus; for both have their power in relation to another, but the one is concerned with honor or money or safety, or whatever single name we might have to encompass all these, and is due to the pleasure that comes from gain, while the other is concerned with all the things with which the good man is concerned.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία τις, ληπτέον.
That there are, then, more than one kind of justice, and that there is another besides whole virtue, is clear; what it is, and of what sort, must be grasped.
διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον.
Now the unjust has been defined as both the unlawful and the unequal, and the just as both the lawful and the equal.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν.
Under the unlawful, then, is the previously mentioned injustice.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλʼ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δʼ ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.
But since the unequal and the unlawful are not the same, but different as part to whole (for everything unequal is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is unequal), so also the unjust and injustice [under discussion] are not the same as those [general ones] but different from them, the former as parts and the latter as wholes; for this injustice is a part of the whole injustice, and similarly this justice is a part of that justice.
ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως.
So that we must speak also about partial justice and about partial injustice, and in the same way about the just and the unjust.
ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἣ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἣ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω.
The justice and injustice, then, that are co-extensive with whole virtue—the one being the practice of whole virtue towards another, and the other of vice—may be set aside.
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος.
And it is clear how the just and the unjust corresponding to these are to be defined; for almost the majority of lawful acts are those commanded from the standpoint of whole virtue; for the law commands us to live in accordance with each virtue and forbids us to live in accordance with each vice.
τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.
And the things that produce whole virtue are those among lawful acts which are legislated concerning education for the common good.
περὶ δὲ τῆς καθʼ ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθʼ ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τʼ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.
But concerning individual education, by which a man is simply good, whether it belongs to political science or to another science must be defined later; for it is perhaps not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen of any state.
τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατʼ αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο·
Of partial justice and of the just corresponding to it, one species is that which is in the distributions of honor or money or the other things that can be divided among those who share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one person to have an unequal or an equal share compared with another), and another species is that which plays a corrective part in transactions.
τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος), τῶν δʼ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.
Of this latter there are two parts; for of transactions some are voluntary and others involuntary: voluntary are such as selling, buying, lending, pledging, using, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary); and of the involuntary, some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticing away of slaves, assassination, false witness; and others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, death, robbery with violence, mutilation, abusive language, contumelious treatment.