§5.1#2ἔστι δʼ ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.
And he is unequal; for this encompasses and is common.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια·
Since the lawless man was unjust and the law-abiding man just, it is clear that all law-abiding things are in a way just.
τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν.
For the things defined by the legislative art are law-abiding, and we say that each of these is just.
οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις ἢ κατʼ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον·
And the laws pronounce on all matters, aiming either at the common benefit of all, or at that of the best, or of those in authority, or in some other such way.
ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.
So that, in one way, we call those things just which produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political community.
προστάττει δʼ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδʼ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δʼ ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δʼ ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος.
And the law commands us to do the deeds of the brave man, such as not leaving one's post, nor fleeing, nor throwing away one's weapons; and those of the temperate man, such as not committing adultery, nor behaving insolently; and those of the gentle man, such as not striking, nor speaking evil; and similarly with respect to the other virtues and vices, commanding some things and forbidding others—rightly if the law has been established rightly, but worse if it has been haphazardly framed.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον.
This justice, then, is complete virtue, but not simply, but in relation to another.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθʼ ἕσπερος οὔθʼ ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν
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ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσʼ ἀρετὴ ἔνι
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καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν.
And for this reason, justice often seems to be the greatest of the virtues, and neither the evening star nor the morning star is so wonderful; and in proverb we say, 'In justice is all virtue summed up.' And it is complete virtue in the highest degree, because it is the actualization of complete virtue.
τελεία δʼ ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ μόνον καθʼ αὑτόν·
And it is complete because he who possesses it can practice virtue towards another, and not only by himself.
πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν.
For many are able to practice virtue in their own private affairs, but in affairs relating to another they are unable.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.
And for this reason, the saying of Bias is held to be good, that 'office will reveal the man'; for the ruler is already in relation to another and in a community.
διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ.
And for this same reason, justice alone of the virtues seems to be 'another's good,' because it is in relation to another; for it does what is advantageous to another, whether to a ruler or a partner.
κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δʼ οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.
Worst, then, is he who practices wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and best is not he who practices virtue towards himself, but towards another; for this is a difficult task.
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλʼ ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλʼ ὅλη κακία.
This justice, then, is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but the whole of vice.
τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
What the difference is between virtue and this justice is clear from what has been said.
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δʼ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλʼ ᾗ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.
For they are the same, but their essence (to einai) is not the same; rather, insofar as it is in relation to another, it is justice, but insofar as it is simply a state of such a kind, it is virtue.