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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §3.9

Courage as Enduring Pain and Its Pleasant End

Passage 34 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Courage is primarily concerned with enduring painful terrors like death and wounds rather than with confidence; although its end is pleasant, it is obscured by surrounding pains. A highly virtuous and happy person feels more pain at the prospect of death because they lose the greatest goods, yet they choose the noble end of war nonetheless.

§3.9περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά·
Courage, being concerned with feelings of confidence and fear, is not concerned with both alike, but rather with things that are terrifying.
ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθʼ ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
For he who is undisturbed in these and holds the right attitude towards them is more courageous than he who is so in things that inspire confidence.
τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται.
Hence, as has been said, people are called courageous by enduring painful things.
διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι.
Therefore courage is also painful, and is justly praised; for it is more difficult to endure painful things than to abstain from pleasant things.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δʼ ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτʼ εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.
Yet it would seem that the end at which courage aims is pleasant, but is obscured by the surrounding circumstances, just as happens also in gymnastic contests; for to boxers the end for which they fight, the crown and the honors, is pleasant, but to be beaten is painful, seeing they are made of flesh, and grievous, as is all the labor; but because these painful elements are many, the end, being small, seems to have nothing pleasant about it.
εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.
If, then, the case of courage is also like this, death and wounds will be painful to the courageous man and against his will, but he will endure them because it is noble to do so, or because it is disgraceful not to.
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο.
And the more he possesses virtue in its entirety and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best worth living for such a man, and he is knowingly deprived of the greatest goods, and this is painful.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντʼ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται.
But he is none the less courageous, and perhaps even more so, because he chooses the nobility of war instead of those goods.
οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφʼ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
Indeed, it is not the case for all virtues that their active exercise is pleasant, except in so far as one attains the end.
στρατιώτας δʼ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δʼ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
But there is perhaps nothing to prevent those who are not of this character, but are less courageous and have no other good, from being the best soldiers; for these are ready to face dangers, and they barter their lives for small gains.
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δʼ ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
Let this, then, suffice for our account of courage; what it is, it is not difficult to grasp in outline from what has been said.

Notes

  1. 1117a32τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν — The dative neuter article `τῷ` nominalizes the infinitive `ὑπομένειν` (which takes the accusative `τὰ λυπηρὰ` as its object) and functions here as a dative of cause or means ("by enduring / because of enduring painful things").
  2. 1117b2ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δʼ ἀφανίζεσθαι — The passive infinitive `ἀφανίζεσθαι` (with `τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος` as its subject) is accompanied by `ὑπό` with the genitive `τῶν κύκλῳ` indicating agency or cause. `τῶν κύκλῳ` (literally "things around") refers to the surrounding or attendant painful circumstances (such as death or wounds) of courageous actions.
  3. 1117b9ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν — A correlative construction introduced by the dative of measure of difference `ὅσῳ` ("by how much"), forming a general conditional-relative clause with the generalizing particle `ἄν` and the subjunctives `ἔχῃ` and `ᾖ`. It correlates with the future indicative `λυπήσεται` in the main clause, expressing a general truth: "the more... the more...".

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §3.9. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:3.9

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