§3.5#2οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δʼ οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.
So too for the unjust and the intemperate person, at the beginning it was open to them not to become such, and therefore they are so voluntarily; but once they have become so, it is no longer possible for them not to be so.
οὐ μόνον δʼ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ διʼ ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν.
And not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but in some people those of the body are as well, which indeed we censure; for no one censures those who are ugly by nature, but rather those who are so through lack of exercise and negligence.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δʼ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι.
Similarly also concerning illness and infirmity; for no one would reproach a person blind by nature or from disease or from a blow, but would rather pity him; but everyone would censure someone who is so from drunkenness or other intemperance.
τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν οὔ.
Of the vices concerning the body, then, those that are up to us are censured, while those not up to us are not.
εἰ δʼ οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν.
And if this is so, in the other cases as well, those of the vices that are censured would be up to us.
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλʼ ὁποῖός ποθʼ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
But if someone should say that everyone aims at the apparent good, and that they are not masters of their appearance, but rather, of whatever character each person is, of such a character does the end appear to him: on the one hand, if each person is somehow the cause of his own state, he will also somehow be himself the cause of his appearance; on the other hand, if not, no one is the cause of his own wrong-doing, but one does these things through ignorance of the end, thinking that through these means the best will be theirs; and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen, but one must be born with a sort of sight, as it were, by which to judge well and choose what is truly good, and he is of good natural disposition in whom this is well fashioned by nature.
τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρʼ ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.
For that which is greatest and most noble, and which is not possible to receive or learn from another, but which one will keep just as it was born, to have this well and nobly fashioned by nature would be the perfect and true good natural disposition.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον;
If indeed these things are true, why will virtue be any more voluntary than vice?
ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε.
For to both alike, the good and the bad person, the end appears and is set by nature or in whatever way, and they do the remaining things by referring them to this in whatever way they do so.
εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρʼ αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ διʼ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει.
Whether, then, the end does not appear to each person of a certain character by nature, but there is also something depending on himself, or whether the end is natural, but virtue is voluntary because the serious person does the remaining things voluntarily, vice would be no less voluntary; for the agency of the bad person is likewise present in his actions, even if not in his end.
εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.
If then, as is said, the virtues are voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow co-causes of our states, and by being of a certain character we set the end as being of such a character), the vices would also be voluntary; for it is similar.
κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφʼ ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθʼ αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ.
Generally, then, regarding the virtues we have spoken in outline of their genus, namely that they are mean states and states, and of the things from which they arise, that they are productive of these very things in themselves, and that they are up to us and voluntary, and in such a way as the right reason may prescribe.
οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθʼ ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.
But actions and states are not voluntary in the same way; for of our actions we are masters from the beginning to the end, since we know the particular circumstances, but of our states we are masters of the beginning, while the cumulative progress in each particular step is not noticeable, just as in the case of illnesses; but because it was up to us to use them in this way or not, they are therefore voluntary.
ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δʼ ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν.
Resuming, let us speak about each of the virtues, what they are, what kinds of things they are concerned with, and how; at the same time it will be clear how many they are.
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.
And first about courage.