§3.5#1ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι.
Since the end is an object of wishing, and the means to the end are objects of deliberation and choice, the actions concerning these things would be in accordance with choice and voluntary.
αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα.
And the activities of the virtues are concerned with these things.
ἐφʼ ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία.
Virtue, then, is also up to us, and similarly vice as well.
ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί·
For in those cases where acting is up to us, not acting is also up to us, and where "no" is, "yes" is also.
ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν.
So that if acting, when it is noble, is up to us, not acting, when it is shameful, will also be up to us, and if not acting, when it is noble, is up to us, acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us.
εἰ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι.
And if doing noble and shameful deeds is up to us, and similarly not doing them, and this was what it is to be good and bad, then being decent and base is up to us.
τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδʼ ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δʼ ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον.
But the saying that "no one is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly blessed" seems partly false and partly true; for no one is unwillingly blessed, but wickedness is voluntary.
ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων.
Or else one must dispute what has just been said, and deny that a human being is an origin or begetter of his actions as he is of his children.
εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσια.
And if these things are apparent, and we cannot refer them to any other origins than those within us, then those actions whose origins are in us are themselves also up to us and voluntary.
τούτοις δʼ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφʼ ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν·
This seems to be attested both by individuals in their private lives and by the legislators themselves.
κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες.
For they punish and chastise those who commit wicked deeds, except those who do them under force or through ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible, and they honor those who do noble deeds, as if to encourage the latter and restrain the former.
καίτοι ὅσα μήτʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήθʼ ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.
Yet no one encourages us to do things that are neither up to us nor voluntary, since there is no advantage in being persuaded not to feel heat, or pain, or hunger, or anything else of the sort; for we shall suffer them nonetheless.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δʼ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.
Indeed, they punish someone for ignorance itself, if he seems to be the cause of his ignorance, as in the case of those who are drunk, the penalties are double; for the origin was in him; since he had the power not to get drunk, and this was the cause of his ignorance.
καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα διʼ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.
And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws which they ought to know and which is not difficult, and similarly in other cases where people seem to be ignorant through negligence, on the ground that it was up to them not to be ignorant; for they had the power to take care.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι.
But perhaps he is of such a character as not to take care.
ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
But they themselves are responsible for having become such people by living slackly, and for being unjust or intemperate, the former by doing wrong, the latter by spending their time in drinking-bouts and the like.
αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.
For activities concerning each thing make people of that character.
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες.
This is clear from those who train for any competition or action; for they continue practicing.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.
Now, to be ignorant of the fact that states arise from practicing concerning each thing is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person.
ἔτι δʼ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὂν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.
Moreover, it is irrational to suppose that a person who does wrong does not wish to be unjust, or that one who acts intemperately does not wish to be intemperate.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος.
If anyone, not being ignorant, does those things as a result of which he will become unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily; yet it does not follow that, if he wishes, he will cease to be unjust and be just.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής.
For neither does a sick man become healthy.
καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς.
And if it so happens, he is sick voluntarily, by living intemperately and disobeying his doctors.
τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δʼ οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτʼ αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ.
At that time, then, it was open to him not to be sick, but once he has let the opportunity go, it is no longer so, just as it is no longer possible for someone who has let go of a stone to recover it; yet for all that, the throwing was up to him, for the origin was in him.