§3.4ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ.
On the other hand, it has been said that wishing is for the end; but to some it seems to be for the good, and to others for the apparent good.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δʼ, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δʼ αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλʼ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δʼ ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία.
And it follows for those who say that the object of wishing is the good that what is wished for by the person who does not choose correctly is not an object of wishing (for if it is to be an object of wishing, it must also be good; but it was, as it happened, bad); while for those, on the other hand, who say that the apparent good is the object of wishing, it follows that there is no object of wishing by nature, but rather what seems so to each person; but different things appear to different people, and, as it happens, even contrary things.
εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;
But if these views are not satisfying, should we say that, in an absolute sense and in truth, the object of wishing is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good?
τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δʼ ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα·
For the excellent person, then, it is what is so in truth, while for the base person it is whatever happens to be, just as in the case of bodies, for those in good condition, things that are truly so are healthy, while for those who are sickly, other things are, and similarly with bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and each of the other things.
ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.
For the excellent person judges each thing correctly, and in each case the truth appears to him.
καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν.
For according to each state there are its own beautiful and pleasant things, and the excellent person differs most, perhaps, in seeing the truth in each case, being as it were their standard and measure.
ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται.
But in the case of the many, the deception seems to occur because of pleasure; for it appears to be a good, though it is not.
αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
They choose, therefore, the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.