§3.2διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἕπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.
Having defined the voluntary and the involuntary, the next subject is to discuss choice; for it seems to be most intimately related to virtue, and to judge character even better than actions do.
ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον·
Choice, then, is manifestly voluntary, but is not the same thing, the voluntary having a wider scope.
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δʼ οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δʼ οὔ.
For both children and the other animals share in the voluntary, but not in choice, and actions done on the spur of the moment we call voluntary, but not in accordance with choice.
οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
And those who say that it is appetite or anger or wish or some kind of opinion do not seem to speak correctly.
οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.
For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and anger are.
καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δʼ οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δʼ ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δʼ οὔ.
Also, the incontinent man acts from appetite, but not from choice, while the continent man on the contrary acts from choice, but not from appetite.
καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δʼ ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ.
And appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite.
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δʼ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθʼ ἡδέος.
And appetite has to do with the pleasant and the painful, but choice has to do with neither the painful nor the pleasant.
θυμὸς δʼ ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.
Anger is even less like choice; for actions due to anger seem least of all to be in accordance with choice.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον·
But neither is it wish, indeed, though it seems very close to it.
προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας.
For choice is not of impossible things, and if anyone said he chose them, he would be thought a fool; but wish can be of impossible things, for instance, immortality.
καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς διʼ αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλʼ ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν διʼ αὑτοῦ.
And wish is also about things that could in no way be done by oneself, as that a certain actor or athlete should win; but no one chooses such things, but only what he thinks could be done by his own agency.
ἔτι δʼ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ διʼ ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι.
Further, wish is rather of the end, but choice of the means to the end; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the means by which we shall become healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but to say we choose to be happy is not fitting; for in general choice seems to be about things that are in our power.
οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.
Neither can it be opinion; for opinion is thought to be about everything, and no less about things eternal and impossible than about things in our power; and it is distinguished by being true or false, not by being bad or good, but choice is distinguished rather by these.
ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς.
In general, then, perhaps no one says it is the same as opinion.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ.
But neither is it the same as any particular opinion; for by choosing good or bad things we are of a certain character, which we are not by holding opinions.
καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δʼ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν.
And we choose to take or avoid something of this sort, but we hold opinions as to what a thing is or to whom it is advantageous or how; but we do not hold opinions at all as to taking or avoiding it.
καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς.
And choice is praised rather for being directed to the right object than for being rightly directed, but opinion is praised for being truly held.
καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν·
And we choose what we best know to be good, but we hold opinions about what we do not know at all well.
δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλʼ ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δʼ αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.
And it is not thought that the same people choose best and hold the best opinions, but some hold better opinions, but through vice choose what they ought not.
εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί.
But whether opinion precedes choice or accompanies it is no matter, for we are not considering this, but whether choice is identical with some opinion.
τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν;
What then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things mentioned?
ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δʼ ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν.
It is manifestly voluntary, but not all that is voluntary is choice.
ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;
Is it, then, what has been deliberated on beforehand?
ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.
For choice is accompanied by reason and thought.
ὑποσημαίνειν δʼ ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.
Even its name seems to suggest this, as being what is chosen before other things.