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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §1.10#1

Solon's Dictum and the Stability of Virtuous Happiness

Passage 9 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Taking Solon's saying that one should look to the end of a life as a starting point, this section examines the puzzles regarding the happiness of the dead and the influence of their descendants' fortunes, arguing that happiness depends not on fortune but on stable activities in accordance with virtue.

§1.10#1πότερον οὖν οὐδʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν;
Should we then call no other human being happy either as long as they are alive, but, in accordance with Solon, must one look to the end?
εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ;
And if we must indeed assume this, is a person then actually happy after they have died?
ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;
Or is this at least completely absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is a certain activity?
εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλʼ ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα·
But if we do not call the dead person happy, and Solon too does not mean this, but rather that at that time one might safely congratulate a human being as being finally beyond evils and misfortunes, even this view has some dispute.
δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι.
For there seems to be both something bad and something good for the dead person, if indeed there is also for the living person who is, however, not perceiving it—such as honors and dishonors, and the successes and misfortunes of children and descendants in general.
ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει·
But these things also present a difficulty.
τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατʼ ἀξίαν, τοὺς δʼ ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δʼ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.
For to one who has lived blessedly until old age and died reasonably, it is possible for many changes to happen concerning their descendants, and some of them to be good and obtain the life they deserve, while others are the opposite; and it is clear that they may also stand in all kinds of relations toward their parents depending on their degrees of separation.
ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτʼ ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δʼ ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδʼ ἐπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν.
It would indeed be absurd if the dead person also changed along with them, and became at one time happy and again wretched; yet it is also absurd for the affairs of the descendants not to affect the parents at all, not even for some time.
ἀλλʼ ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου.
But we must return to the earlier difficulty; for perhaps what is now being sought might also be observed from that.
εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτʼ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς;
If indeed one must look to the end and only then congratulate each person, not as being blessed but because they were so before, how is it not absurd that, when they are happy, what actually belongs to them will not be truly predicated of them, because we do not wish to call the living happy on account of the changes, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changeable, while fortunes often turn around for the same people?
δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον.
For it is clear that if we follow fortunes, we shall often call the same person happy and again wretched, exhibiting the happy person as a kind of chameleon and insecurely established.
ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;
Or is following fortunes in no way right?
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαι δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δʼ ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου.
For well-being or its opposite does not lie in these, but though human life stands in need of them, as we said, it is activities in accordance with virtue that are decisive for happiness, and the opposite activities for its opposite.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν.
And the difficulty now discussed also bears witness to this argument.
περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατʼ ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
For stability belongs to none of the human works so much as to activities in accordance with virtue; for these seem to be more permanent even than sciences.

Notes

  1. 10κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν — A reference to Solon's famous maxim "look to the end" (cf. Herodotus, Histories 1.32). Aristotle uses it as a starting point to introduce the puzzle of whether a person can be called happy while still alive.
  2. 12τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν — The dative participle τοῖς λέγουσιν modifies ἡμῖν (us) and is introduced by ἄλλως τε καί ("especially for"). It refers to those, including Aristotle himself, who define happiness as a certain activity.
  3. 18εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ — The construction καί... δέ means "also" or "as well." It reinforces the comparison between the dead and a living person who is, however, not perceiving what is happening to them (e.g., honors or misfortunes of descendants).
  4. 26τοῖς ἀποστήμασι — The dative plural τοῖς ἀποστήμασι (literally, "intervals" or "distances") is used metaphorically to refer to the degrees of genealogical separation (generations) between parents and descendants.
  5. 34οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρότερον ἦν — A contrast between ὡς with a participle (indicating a subjective state or perspective: "not as being blessed now") and ὅτι with an indicative verb (indicating an objective factual reason: "but because he was so before").

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §1.10#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:1.10%231

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