§2.1#2τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἔργου· ὁ δʼ ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δʼ εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.
For encomium is a discourse of the particular function, while praise is of being of such a sort generally, and blessing is of the end.
καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δʼ ἐνίοτε δῆλον ἐκ τούτων, διὰ τί ποτʼ οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν ἥμισυν τοῦ βίου· ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες.
And the question sometimes raised is also clear from these things, namely, why the excellent are no better than the base for half of their life; for all are alike when asleep.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐνέργεια.
And the cause is that sleep is an inactivity of the soul, but not an activity.
διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριόν ἐστι ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δʼ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ.
Wherefore, even if there is any other part of the soul, such as the nutritive, the virtue of this is not a part of the whole virtue, just as that of the body is not; for in sleep the nutritive part acts more, while the sensitive and appetitive parts are incomplete in sleep.
ὅσον δὲ τοῦ πῃ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσι, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πήρωσιν.
But so far as they participate in being moved in some way, the appearances of the excellent are better, unless because of disease or mutilation.
μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
After these things we must consider the soul; for virtue is of the soul, not accidentally.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι· εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν ἑτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόριον.
And since we seek human virtue, let it be assumed that there are two parts of the soul that participate in reason, but that both do not participate in reason in the same way, but one by commanding, and the other by being of such a nature as to obey and listen; and if there is any other part that is irrational in another way, let this part be dismissed.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν οὔτʼ εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτʼ εἰ ἀμερής, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
And it makes no difference whether the soul is divisible or indivisible, though it has different capacities, including those mentioned, just as in a curved line the concave and the convex are inseparable, and the straight and the white; although the straight is not white except accidentally, and is not the essence of the same thing.
ἀφῄρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν.
And any other part of the soul, such as the vegetative, is also excluded.
ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια ἴδια· διὸ οὐδʼ αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι ἀρχὴν καὶ πρᾶξιν, ἄρχει δʼ ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλʼ ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτʼ ἔχειν τὰ μέρη.
For the mentioned parts are peculiar to the human soul; wherefore the virtues of the nutritive and growth-promoting parts are not of a human being; for it is necessary, insofar as one is a human being, that there is reason in them as a principle and action, and reason rules not reason but desire and passions, so it is necessary that the soul has these parts.
καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ᾗ τέλος.
And just as health is composed of the virtues of each part, so also is the virtue of the soul insofar as it is the end.
ἀρετῆς δʼ εἴδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητική.
And there are two species of virtue, the moral and the intellectual.
ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφούς· ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ ἔργον, ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλʼ εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνέργειαι.
For we praise not only the just but also the understanding and the wise; for it was assumed that virtue or the function is praiseworthy, and though these do not act, there are activities of them.
ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱ διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δʼ ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέν, ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποῖός τις τὸ ἦθος, ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός, ἀλλʼ ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ θρασύς.
And since the intellectual virtues are with reason, such belong to that which has reason, which is the commanding part of the soul insofar as it has reason, while the moral virtues belong to the irrational part, which is, however, by nature capable of following that which has reason; for we do not say what sort of character someone has by saying that they are wise or clever, but that they are gentle or bold.
μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἠθικῆς, τί ἐστι, καὶ ποῖα μόρια αὐτῆς (εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνῆκται), καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων.
After these things we must first consider concerning moral virtue, what it is, and what its parts are (for to this the argument has been brought), and through what things it arises.
δεῖ δὴ ζητεῖν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες, ὥστε ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ σαφῶς.
We must then seek, just as in other matters all seek when they have something, so as always to try to grasp through things truly but not clearly said both what is true and clear.
νῦν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν, ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ Κορίσκος ὁ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μελάντατος· τί μὲν γὰρ ἑκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἴσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἑκάτερον αὐτῆς πρὸ ἔργου τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν.
For now we are in a similar state as if we knew about health that it is the best disposition of the body, or about Coriscus that he is the darkest of those in the marketplace; for we do not know what each of these is, but nevertheless, to know what each is, to be in this state is useful.
—ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστου ἀρετῆς, οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφὴ ἀφʼ ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἔτι πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πὼς προσφερομένων, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας.
Let it then be assumed first that the best disposition is produced by the best things, and that the best actions concerning each thing are performed from the virtue of each, as the best exercises and food from which health is produced, and from health they exercise best; further, that every disposition is produced and destroyed by the same things being applied in some way, just as health is by food, exercises, and weather.
ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
And these things are clear from induction.
καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις ἐστίν, ἣ γίνεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφʼ ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πὼς μὲν γίνεται, πὼς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὰ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφʼ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται, πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθησιν.
And virtue, therefore, is such a disposition, which is produced by the best movements concerning the soul, and from which the best actions and passions of the soul are performed, and by the same things is in one way produced and in another destroyed, and its use is directed towards the same things by which it is increased and destroyed, towards which things it disposes in the best way.
σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.
And it is a sign that both virtue and vice are concerned with pleasant and painful things; for punishments, being treatments and produced through contraries, just as in other cases, are through these.