§2.1#1μετὰ δὲ ταῦτʼ ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν περὶ τῶν ἑπομένων λεκτέον.
After this, having taken another principle, we must speak of what follows.
πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἢ ἔνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.
Now, all goods are either external or in the soul, and of these, those in the soul are more desirable, just as we distinguish also in the external discourses; for prudence, virtue, and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to everyone to be the end.
τῶν δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἕξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ δʼ ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.
And of those in the soul, some are states or capacities, and others are activities and movements.
ταῦτα δὴ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἢ ἕξις ἢ δύναμις ἑκάστων, ὅσων ἐστί τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον.
Let these things then be assumed in this way, and concerning virtue, let it be assumed that it is the best disposition, state, or capacity of each of those things which have a certain use or function.
δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ οὕτω τίθεμεν.
This is clear from induction; for we assume it so in all cases.
οἷον ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔργον τι καὶ χρῆσις ἐστίν· καὶ ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις τοῦ ἱματίου ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.
For example, there is a virtue of a cloak; for it has a certain function and use; and the best state of the cloak is its virtue.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλοίου καὶ οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Similarly also of a ship, a house, and other things.
ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς· ἔστι γάρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς.
So also of the soul; for there is a certain function of it.
καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον· καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν. αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐχέτω.
And let the function of the better state be better; and as the states are related to one another, so let the functions arising from them be related to one another.
καὶ τέλος ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον.
And the end of each is its function.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὗ ἕνεκα τἆλλα πάντα.
It is clear, then, from these things that the function is better than the state; for the end is the best as an end; for the end is assumed to be the best and the ultimate thing, for the sake of which all other things exist.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δῆλον· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς.
That the function is better than the state and the disposition is, therefore, clear; but "function" is spoken of in two ways.
τῶν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑγίανσις οὐδʼ ἰάτρευσις, τῶν δʼ ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὅρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία.
For of some things the function is something other than the use, as of building a house and not the act of building, and of medicine health and not the act of making healthy or treating; but of others the use is the function, as of sight the act of seeing, and of mathematical science contemplation.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη, ὧν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως.
So that, of those things whose function is the use, the use must be better than the state.
τούτων δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένων, λέγομεν ὅτι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως.
These things being defined in this manner, we say that the function of the thing and of its virtue is the same, but not in the same way.
οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτέως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα.
For example, the function of shoemaking and of the act of making shoes is a shoe; if then there is a certain virtue of shoemaking and of an excellent shoemaker, its function is an excellent shoe.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And in the same way in other cases.
ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ χρῆσις καὶ ἐγρήγορσις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία.
Furthermore, let the function of the soul be to produce living, and of this the use is waking; for sleep is a kind of inactivity and stillness.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία.
So that since the function of the soul and of its virtue must be one and the same, the function of virtue would be an excellent life.
τοῦτʼ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία.
This, then, is the complete good, which was happiness.
δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἕξεως ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια, ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ βελτίστη ἕξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι.
This is clear from the assumptions (for happiness was the best, and the ends and the best of goods are in the soul, and happiness itself is either a state or an activity), since the activity is better than the disposition, and the best activity is of the best state, and virtue is the best state, the activity of the virtue of the soul is the best.
ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον.
And happiness was also the best.
ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια.
Therefore, happiness is the activity of a good soul.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἣ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἣ δὲ μόριον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατʼ ἀρετὴν τελείαν.
And since happiness was something complete, and there is both a complete and an incomplete life, and virtue likewise (for one is a whole, and the other a part), and the activity of incomplete things is incomplete, happiness would be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue.
ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν.
That we state its genus and definition well is supported by the opinions held by us all.
τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὧν ἕκαστον χρῆσίς ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστικὴ ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρῆται δʼ ὁ ἱππικός) καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθʼ ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντʼ εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον)· ἔτι δʼ οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων· καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ· καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν· ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται;
For acting well and living well are the same as being happy, each of which is a use and activity, namely, life and action (for the practical life is one of use; for the blacksmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it); and that one is not happy for a single day, nor as a child, nor throughout every age (wherefore also the saying of Solon is well, not to call a living man happy, but only when he has reached the end; for nothing incomplete is happy, for it is not a whole); furthermore, praises of virtue are because of its functions, and encomiums are of its functions; and those who win are crowned, but not those who are capable of winning but do not; and judging what sort of person someone is from their functions; further, why is happiness not praised?
ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἆλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς.
Because for the sake of this all other things exist, either by being referred to this or by being parts of it.
διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον.
Wherefore blessing, praise, and encomium are different.