§5#1Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ᾿ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος.
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject; for example, an individual man or an individual horse.
Δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον.
But secondary substances are said to be those species in which the primary substances belong, both these species themselves and their genera; for example, an individual man belongs to the species "man", and the genus of this species is "animal"; therefore these are called secondary substances, namely, both "man" and "animal".
Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα·
It is clear from what has been said that of things said of a subject, it is necessary that both the name and the definition are predicated of the subject; for example, "man" is said of a subject, namely, an individual man, and the name is indeed predicated; for you will predicate "man" of the individual man.
τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται· ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.
And the definition of "man" will also be predicated of the individual man; for the individual man is both man and animal.
Ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται.
Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject.
Τῶν δ᾿ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔθ᾿ ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται), ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ σώματος κατηγορηθήσεται.
But of things that are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject; but in some cases nothing prevents the name from being predicated of the subject at some time, but the definition is impossible; for example, "white", being in a subject, namely, the body, is predicated of the subject (for the body is called "white"), but the definition of "white" will never be predicated of the body.
Τὰ δ᾿ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.
All other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects.
Τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῷον· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως.
This is clear from examining individual cases; for example, "animal" is predicated of "man"; therefore "animal" will also be predicated of the individual man; for if it were predicated of none of the individual men, it would not be predicated of "man" at all.
Πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως.
Again, color is in body; therefore it is also in some individual body; for if it were not in some of the individual bodies, it would not be in body at all.
Ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.
Thus all other things are either said of primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects.
Μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.
Therefore, if the primary substances do not exist, it is impossible for any of the other things to exist.
Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν.
Among secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus; for it is nearer to the primary substance.
Ἑὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἤπερ τὸ γένος, οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον.
For if one were to define what the primary substance is, one would give a more informative and more appropriate definition by giving the species than by giving the genus; for example, in defining the individual man, one would define him more informatively by giving "man" than by giving "animal"; for the former is more peculiar to the individual man, while the latter is more common.
Καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν.
And in defining an individual tree, one will define it more informatively by giving "tree" than by giving "plant".
Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται.
Furthermore, the primary substances are most of all called substances because they underlie all other things and all other things are either predicated of them or are in them.
Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.
Indeed, as the primary substances stand to all other things, so does the species stand to the genus; for the species underlies the genus; for the genera are predicated of the species, but the species do not reciprocally predicate of the genera.
Ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία.
So from these considerations too, the species is more a substance than the genus.
Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσεις κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου τὸν ἵππον.
But of the species themselves, those which are not genera are not at all more a substance than one another; for you will not give a more appropriate definition of the individual man by giving "man" than of the individual horse by giving "horse".
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.
Likewise, among the primary substances, one is not at all more a substance than another; for the individual man is not at all more a substance than the individual ox.
Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων.
It is with good reason that, after the primary substances, only the species and the genera among all other things are called secondary substances; for they alone of the predicates reveal the primary substance.
Τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τῶν δ᾿ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκόν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς.
For if one were to define what the individual man is, by giving the species or the genus, one will define appropriately and make it more informative by giving "man" or "animal"; but whatever else one might give, one will have defined inappropriately, for example, by giving "white" or "runs" or any such thing.
Ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσίαι λέγονται.
So it is with good reason that of all other things, these alone are called substances.
Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ το τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι λέγονται.
Furthermore, the primary substances are most properly called substances because they underlie all other things.
Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται.
And as the primary substances stand to all other things, so do the species and the genera of the primary substances stand to all other remaining things; for of these, all remaining things are predicated.
Τὸν γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς.
For you will say that the individual man is "grammatical"; therefore you will also say that both "man" and "animal" are "grammatical".
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And likewise in other cases.