§3.44 Πότερον δὲ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένα, πόσα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἑπόμενον ἂν εἴη σκοπεῖν.
4 Next, it would be appropriate to consider whether they are finite or infinite, and if finite, how many in number.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπειρα, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, θεωρητέον, καὶ πρῶτον τούς πάντα τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντας, καθάπερ Ἀναξαγόρας.
First, then, we must consider that they are not infinite, as some think, and first of all those who make all the homoeomerous parts elements, like Anaxagoras.
οὐθεὶς γὰρ τῶν οὕτως ἀξιούντων ὀρθῶς λαμβάνει τὸ στοιχεῖον· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μικτῶν σωμάτων εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρούμενα, λέγω δʼ οἷον σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ξύλον καὶ λίθον.
For no one of those who so claim grasps the element correctly; for we see that many even of the composite bodies are divided into homoeomerous parts, I mean, for instance, flesh, bone, wood, and stone.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ τὸ σύνθετον οὐκ ἔστι στοιχεῖον, οὐχ ἅπαν ἔσται τὸ ὁμοιομερὲς στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον εἰς ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.
So that if the composite is not an element, not every homoeomerous part will be an element, but that which is indivisible into other things different in form, as was said before.
ἔτι δʼ οὐδʼ οὕτως λαμβάνοντας τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν ἄπειρα· πάντα γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἀποδοθήσεται καὶ πεπερασμένων ὄντων, ἐάν τις λάβῃ· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ποιήσει, κἂν δύο ἢ τρία μόνον ἢ τοιαῦτα, καθάπερ ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.
And furthermore, not even for those who grasp the element in this way is it necessary to make them infinite; for all the same results will be accounted for even if they are finite, if one assumes them; for it will produce the same, even if there are only two or three or some such number, just as Empedocles also attempts to do.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ ὣς αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει μὴ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν (πρόσωπον γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ προσώπων ποιοῦσιν, οὐδʼ ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐσχηματισμένων οὐθέν), φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῷ βέλτιον πεπερασμένας ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτας ὡς ἐλαχίστας πάντων γε τῶν αὐτῶν μελλόντων δείκνυσθαι, καθάπερ ἀξιοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ πεπερασμένα λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχὰς ἢ τῷ εἴδει ἢ τῷ ποσῷ.
For since even so it turns out for them that they do not make all things out of homoeomerous parts (for they do not make a face out of faces, nor any other of the things shaped by nature), it is clear that it is much better to make the principles finite, and these as few as possible, at least when all the same results are to be demonstrated, just as those in mathematics also claim; for they always assume finite things as principles either in form or in quantity.
ἔτι εἰ σῶμα σώματος ἕτερον λέγεται κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας διαφοράς, αἱ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων διαφοραὶ πεπερασμέναι (διαφέρουσι γὰρ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ταῦτα δὲ πεπέρανται· δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο δειχθῆναι), φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀνάγκη πεπερασμένα εἶναι.
Furthermore, if one body is said to differ from another in respect of its proper differences, and the differences of bodies are finite (for they differ by sensible qualities, and these are finite; though this must be shown), it is clear that the elements also must be finite.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ὡς ἕτεροί τινες λέγουσιν, οἷον Λεύκιππός τε καὶ Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης, εὔλογα τὰ συμβαίνοντα· φασὶ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθη πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα μεγέθει δὲ ἀδιαίρετα, καὶ οὔτʼ ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι οὕτε ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, ἀλλὰ τῇ τούτων συμπλοκῇ καὶ περιπλέξει πάντα γεννᾶσθαι.
Indeed, neither are the consequences reasonable as some others say, for instance Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera; for they say that the primary magnitudes are infinite in number but indivisible in magnitude, and that neither does many come from one nor one from many, but that all things are generated by the entanglement and interlocking of these.
τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ οὗτοι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ σαφῶς δηλοῦσιν, ὅμως τοῦτο βούλονται λέγειν.
For in a way these also make all existing things numbers and out of numbers; for even if they do not clearly show it, nevertheless this is what they wish to say.
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ διαφέρει τὰ σώματα σχήμασιν, ἄπειρα δὲ τὰ σχήματα, ἄπειρα καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ σώματά φασιν εἶναι.
And in addition to these, since bodies differ in shapes, and the shapes are infinite, they say that the simple bodies are also infinite.
ποῖον δὲ καὶ τί ἑκάστου τὸ σχῆμα τῶν στοιχείων, οὐθὲν ἐπιδιώρισαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ πυρὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ἀπέδωκαν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τἆλλα μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι διεῖλον, ὡς οὖσαν αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν οἷον πανσπερμίαν πάντων τῶν στοιχείων.
But what sort and what is the shape of each of the elements, they in no way further determined, but only assigned the sphere to fire; and they distinguished air and water and the rest by largeness and smallness, as though their nature were a sort of universal seed-heap of all elements.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτοις ταὐτὸν ἁμάρτημα τὸ μὴ πεπερασμένας λαβεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐξὸν ἅπαντα ταὐτὰ λέγειν.
First, then, they also commit the same error in not assuming finite principles, when it is possible to say all the same things.
ὅτι δʼ εἰ μὴ ἄπειροι τῶν σωμάτων αἱ διαφοραί, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται τὰ στοιχεῖα ἄπειρα.
And that, if the differences of bodies are not infinite, it is clear that the elements will not be infinite.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνάγκη μάχεσθαι ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἄτομα σώματα λέγοντας, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδόξων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναιρεῖν, περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ χρόνου καὶ κινήσεως.
And in addition to these, those who speak of indivisible bodies are bound to conflict with the mathematical sciences, and to invalidate many of the accepted opinions and sensory appearances, concerning which we have spoken before in the discussion on time and motion.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἀνάγκη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀτόμων ὄντων τῶν στοιχείων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι διαφέρειν ἀέρα καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τʼ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι· ὑπολείψει γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ μέγιστα σώματα ἐκκρινόμενα, φασὶ δʼ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν ἐξ ἀλλήλων.
At the same time, it is also necessary that they say things contrary to themselves; for if the elements are indivisible, it is impossible for air and earth and water to differ in largeness and smallness; for it is not possible for them to generate from one another, since the largest bodies will always fail as they are separated out, and yet they say that water, air, and earth are generated from one another in this way.
ἔτι οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τούτων ὑπόληψιν δόξειεν ἄν ἄπειρα γίγνεσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα διάφερει σχήμασι, τὰ δὲ σχήματα πάντα σύγκειται ἐκ πυραμίδων, τὰ μὲν εὐθύγραμμα ἐξ εὐθυγράμμων, ἡ δὲ σφαῖρα ἐξ ὀκτὼ μορίων.
Furthermore, not even according to their own conception would it seem that the elements become infinite, since bodies differ in shapes, and all shapes are composed of pyramids, the rectilinear ones of rectilinear pyramids, and the sphere of eight parts.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχὰς τῶν σχημάτων.
For there must be some principles of the shapes.
ὥστε εἴτε μία εἴτε δύο εἴτε πλείους, καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα τοσαῦτα ἔσται τὸ πλῆθος.
So whether there is one or two or more, the simple bodies also will be just so many in number.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ ἑκάστῳ μὲν τῶν στοιχείων ἐστί τις οἰκεία κίνησις, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἁπλοῦ σώματος ἁπλῆ, μή εἰσι δʼ αἱ ἀπλαῖ κινήσεις ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ μήτε τὰς ἁπλᾶς φορὰς πλείους εἶναι δυοῖν μήτε τοὺς τόπους ἀπείρους, οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδʼ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖα.
And furthermore, if to each of the elements there belongs a proper motion, and that of a simple body is simple, and if simple motions are not infinite, because neither simple local motions are more than two nor places are infinite, then neither in this way would the elements be infinite.