§2.10Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἁπιόν τι· καὶ τοῦτʼ αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῇ ἁφῇ.
The object of taste is a certain object of touch; and this is the cause of its not being perceived through a foreign body as a medium, for neither does touch perceive in this way.
καὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, τὸ γευστόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ὡς ὕλῃ· τοῦτο δʼ ἁπτόν τι.
And the body in which the juice, the object of taste, resides is in wetness as its matter; and this is a certain object of touch.
διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν ὕδατι ἧμεν, ᾐσθανόμεθ᾿ ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος· οὐκ ἦν δʼ ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μιχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ.
Wherefore, even if we were in water, we would perceive a sweet thing if it were thrown in; but this perception would not be to us through a medium, but by its being mixed with the wet, just as in the case of a drink.
τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ μίγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις.
But color is not seen in this way by being mixed, nor by effluences.
ὡς μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθὲν ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός.
As for a medium, then, there is none; but as color is the visible, so juice is the object of taste.
οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν ἄνευ ὑγρότητος, ἀλλʼ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ ἁλμυρόν· εὔτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης.
And nothing produces a perception of juice without wetness, but it possesses wetness either in actuality or in potentiality, as for instance the salty; for it is both easily dissolved and capable of dissolving the tongue.
ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τε τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἀκουστόν, καὶ μεγάλου ψόφου καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μικρὸς ψόφος ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ ὁ βίαιος), ἀόρατον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἄλλων τὸ ἀδύνατον, τὸ δʼ ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄπουν καὶ τὸ ἀπύρηνον—οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεύστου, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως.
And just as sight is of both the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, and sight also judges this), and furthermore of the excessively bright (for this also is invisible, but in a different way from darkness), and similarly hearing is of sound and silence, of which the one is audible and the other inaudible, and of a loud sound, just as sight is of the bright (for just as a small sound is inaudible, in a certain way so is a loud and violent one), and the invisible is spoken of on the one hand absolutely, just as also in other cases the impossible is, and on the other hand when that which is naturally fitted to have it does not have it or has it poorly, just as the footless and the seedless—so indeed also taste is of both the tasteable and the untasteable, and this is that which has a small or poor juice, or one that is destructive of taste.
δοκεῖ δʼ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ ἄποτον (γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν φαύλη καὶ φθαρτικὴ, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν)· ἔστι δὲ κοινὸν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως τὸ ποτόν.
And the drinkable and undrinkable seem to be a principle (for there is a certain taste of both; but of the one it is poor and destructive, of the other natural); and the drinkable is common to touch and taste.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὑγρὸν τὸ γευστόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι.
Since, then, the object of taste is wet, it is necessary that its sense organ be neither wet in actuality nor incapable of being wetted.
πάσχει γάρ τι ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ, ᾖ γευστόν.
For taste undergoes something by the object of taste, insofar as it is tasteable.
ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑγρανθῆναι τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον.
It is necessary, therefore, for the gustatory sense organ to be wetted, which is capable of being wetted while being preserved, but is not wet.
σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἁφὴ γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου, καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.
And a sign of this is that the tongue perceives neither when it is parched nor when it is excessively wet; for in the latter case, a touch of the first wetness occurs, just as when someone has tasted a strong juice beforehand and then tastes another, and as for example to the sick all things appear bitter because they perceive with the tongue full of such wetness.
τὰ δʼ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία. τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν.
And the kinds of juices, just as in the case of colors, are simple when they are opposites, the sweet and the bitter, and next to the former is the oily, and to the latter the salty; and between these are the pungent, the harsh, the astringent, and the acid; for these seem to be pretty much the differences of juices.
ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, τὸ γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.
So that the gustatory is that which is potentially of such a kind, and the object of taste is that which makes it so in actuality.