§2.2.5Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἡ διὰ τῶν διαιρέσεων ὁδὸς συλλογίζεται, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει τῇ περὶ τὰ σχήματα εἴρηται.
But indeed the path through divisions does not syllogize, as was said in the analysis concerning the figures.
οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἀναάγκη γίνεται τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τωνδὶ ὄντων, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ὁ ἐπάγων ἀποδείκνυσιν.
For nowhere does it become necessary that that thing is, when these are, but just as the one who induces does not demonstrate.
οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρωτᾶν, οὐδὲ τῷ δοῦναι εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐκείνων ὄντων, κἄν μὴ φῇ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος.
For one must not ask for the conclusion, nor have it by its being granted, but it must be necessary when those are, even if the respondent denies it.
ἆρʼ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον ἢ ἄψυχον; εἶτʼ ἔλαβε ζῷον, οὐ συλλελόγισται.
'Is man an animal or inanimate?' Then he took 'animal'; he has not syllogized.
πάλιν ἅπαν ζῷον ἢ πεζὸν ἢ ἔνυδρον· ἔλαβε πεζόν.
Again, 'every animal is either pedestrian or aquatic'; he took 'pedestrian'.
καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὅλον, ζῷον πεζόν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει καὶ τοῦτο.
And that man is the whole, 'pedestrian animal', is not necessary from what has been said, but he assumes this too.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἢ ὀλίγων οὕτω ποιεῖν· τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν. (ἀσυλλόγιστος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ χρῆσις γίνεται τοῖς οὕτω μετιοῦσι καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων συλλογισθῆναι. ) τί γὰρ κωλύει τοῦτο ἀληθὲς μὲν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, μή μέντοι τὸ τί ἐστι μηδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν;
And it makes no difference to do this over many or few steps; for it is the same thing. (Therefore, the use also becomes unsyllogistic for those who proceed in this way, even of those things which admit of being syllogized.) For what prevents this whole from being true of man, yet without making clear 'what it is' nor the 'essence'?
ἔτι τί κωλύει ἢ προσθεῖναί τι ἢ ἀφελεῖν ἢ ὑπερβεβηκέναι τῆς οὐσίας;
Furthermore, what prevents either adding something, or subtracting, or having overstepped the substance?
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παρίεται μέν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ λῦσοι τῷ λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι πάντα, καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς τῇ διαιρέσει ποιεῖν, αἰτούμενον τό πρῶτον, καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν.
These difficulties, then, are let pass; but it is possible to solve them by taking everything in 'what it is', and making the division successively, asking for the first, and leaving nothing out.
τοῦτο δʼ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ ἅπαν εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐμπίπτει καὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπει· ἄτομον γὰρ ἤδη δεῖ εἶναι.
And this is necessary, if everything falls into the division and nothing is lacking; for it must already be an indivisible.
ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ὅμως οὐκ ἔστι, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἄλλον τρόπον γνωρίζειν ποιεῖ.
But nevertheless, it is not a syllogism; but if anything, it makes us know in another way.
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἐπάγων ἴσως ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως δηλοῖ τι.
And this is nothing strange; for indeed the one who induces perhaps does not demonstrate, but nevertheless makes something clear.
συλλογισμὸν δʼ οὐ λέγει ὁ ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως λέγων τὸν ὁρισμόν.
But the one who states the definition from division does not state a syllogism.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμπεράσμασι τοῖς ἄνευ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τις εἴπῃ ὅτι τούτων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι, ἐνδέχεται ἐρωτῆσαι διὰ τί, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαιρετικοῖς ὅροις.
For just as in conclusions without middle terms, if someone says that since these are, this must be, one can ask 'why?', so it is also in divisional terms.
τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; ζῷον θνητόν, ὑπόπουν, δίπουν, ἄπτερον. διὰ τί, παρʼ ἑκάστην πρόσθεσιν;
'What is man?' 'A mortal animal, footed, two-footed, wingless.' 'Why?' at each addition?
ἐρεῖ γάρ, καὶ δείξει τῇ διαιρέσει, ὡς οἴεται, ὅτι πᾶν ἢ θνηπὸν ἢ ἀθάνατον.
For he will say, and show by division, as he thinks, that everything is either mortal or immortal.
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἅπας οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ὥστʼ εἰ καὶ ἀπεδείκνυτο τῇ διαιρέσει, ἀλλʼ ὅ γʼ ὁρισμὸς οὐ συλλογισμός γίνεται.
But such an account as a whole is not a definition, so that even if it were demonstrated by division, yet the definition at least does not become a syllogism.
§2.2.6Ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἔστι καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι τὸ τί ἐστι κατʼ οὐσίαν, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δέ, λαβόντα τὸ μὲν τί ἦν εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἴδιον, ταδὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι μόνα, καὶ ἴδιον τὸ πᾶν;
But is it possible to demonstrate 'what it is' in respect of substance, but from a hypothesis, taking the 'essence' to be that which is peculiar from among the things in 'what it is', and taking these alone to be in 'what it is', and the whole to be peculiar?
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ἐκείνῳ.
For this is the being for that thing.
ἢ πάλιν εἴληφε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ;
Or has he again assumed the 'essence' even in this?
ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεῖξαι.
For it is necessary to show it through the middle term.
ἔτι ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐν συλλογισμῷ λαμβάνεται τί ἐστι τὸ συλλελογίσθαι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅλη ἢ μέρος ἡ πρότασις, ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλἀογισμός), οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δεῖ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦτο τῶν κειμένων εἶναι, καὶ πρός τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰ συλλελόγισται ἢ μή, τοῦτο ἀπαντᾶν ὅτι τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν συλλογισμόςʼ', καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὅτι οὐ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι συλλελόγισται, ὅτι ναί· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔκειτο ἡμῖν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναιʼʼ.
Moreover, just as in a syllogism it is not assumed what it is to have syllogized (for the premise from which the syllogism is formed is always a whole or a part), so neither must the 'essence' be present in the syllogism, but this must be separate from the premises; and if anyone disputes whether one has syllogized or not, one must meet him with 'for this was a syllogism', and to the one who says that the 'essence' has not been syllogized, one must meet him with 'yes, for this was laid down by us as the essence'.
ὥστε ἀνάγκη καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ τί συλλογισμὸς ἢ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι συλλελογίσθαι τι.
So that it is necessary that even without 'what is a syllogism' or 'the essence', something has been syllogized.
Κἄν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὲ δεικνύῃ, οἷον εἰ τὸ κακῷ ἐστὶ τὸ διαιρετῷ εἷναι, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίῳ τὸ τῷ ἐναντίῳ 〈ἐναντίῳ〉 εἶναι, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον· τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον τῷ διαιρετῷ· ἔστιν ἄθρα τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαιρέτῳ εἶναι.
And even if one shows from a hypothesis, as for example if to be bad is to be divisible, and to be opposite is to be opposite to the opposite (for those things which have an opposite), and good is opposite to bad and indivisible to divisible; then to be good is to be indivisible.
καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα λαβὼν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δείκνυσι· λαμβάνει δʼ εἰς τὸ δεῖξαι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
For here too, having assumed the 'essence', he demonstrates; but he assumes it in order to demonstrate the 'essence'.
ἕτερον μέντοιʼʼ. ἔστω· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅτι ἐστὶ τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε· ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτό, μηδὲ οὗ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει.
'But it is different.' Let it be so; for indeed in demonstrations, that this is of that; but not itself, nor that of which there is the same definition, and it converts.
πρός ἀμφοτέρους δέ, τόν τε κατὰ διαίρεσιν δεικνύντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὕτω συλλογισμόν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπόρημα· διὰ τί ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν, ἀλλʼ οὐ ζῷον καὶ πεζόν καὶ δίπουν;
But against both, the one who shows by division and the one who syllogizes in this way, there is the same difficulty: why will man be a 'pedestrian two-footed animal', but not 'animal' and 'pedestrian' and 'two-footed'?
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν λαμβανομένων οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἕν γίνεσθαι τὸ κατηγορούμενον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη μουσικός καὶ γραμματικός.
For from the assumptions there is no necessity that the predicate becomes one, but it is just as if the same man were both musical and grammatical.