§2.2.4Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου διηπορήσθω·
Let these difficulties, then, be raised up to this point.
τοῦ δὲ τί ἐστι πότερον ἔστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ νῦν ὁ λόγος ὑπέθετο;
But is there a syllogism and a demonstration of 'what it is', or is there not, as our argument just now assumed?
ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς τὶ κατὰ τινὸς δείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ μέσου· τὸ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἴδιόν τε, καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται.
For a syllogism shows something of something through a middle term; but 'what it is' is both peculiar to its subject, and is predicated in the category of 'what it is'.
ταῦτα δʼ ἀνάγκτη ἀντιστρέφειν.
And these must necessarily be convertible.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α τοῦ Γ ἴδιον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦ Β καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ Γ, ὥστε πάντα ἀλλήλων.
For if A is peculiar to C, it is clear that it is also peculiar to B, and B to C, so that all are convertible with one another.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ τὸ Α ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει παντὶ τῷ Β, καὶ καθόλου τὸ Β παντὸς τοῦ Τἐν τῷ τί ἐστι λέγεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ Γ λέγεσθαι.
Furthermore, if A belongs to every B in 'what it is', and B is universally said of every C in 'what it is', it is necessary that A also be said of C in 'what it is'.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτω τις λήφεται διπλώσας, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔσται τὸ Α τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Β ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, μὴ καθʼ ὅσων δὲ τὸ Β, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν.
But if one does not take them in this way by doubling them, it will not be necessary that A is predicated of C in 'what it is', even if A is in 'what it is' of B, but B is not in 'what it is' of all the things it is said of.
τὸ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἄμφω ταῦτα ἕξει· ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ τὸ τί ἐστιν.
But 'what it is' will have both of these; therefore, B also will be 'what it is' of C.
εἰ δὴ τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἄμφω ἔχει, ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἔσται πρότερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
If, then, it has both 'what it is' and 'the essence' (what it was to be), the 'essence' will already be present in the middle term.
ὅλως τε, εἰ ἔστι δεῖξαι τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστω τὸ Γ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν, εἴτε ζῷον δίπουν εἴτʼ ἄλλο τι.
In general, if it is possible to show what man is, let C be man, and A be 'what it is', whether 'two-footed animal' or something else.
εἰ τοίνυν συλλογιεῖται, ἀνάγκη κατὰ τοῦ τὸ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι.
If, then, one is to syllogize, A must be predicated of every C.
τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται ἄλλος λόγος μέσος, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.
And there will be another middle definition for this, so that this too will be what man is.
λαμβάνει οὖν ὅ δεῖ δεῖξαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ Βἔσται τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος.
One assumes, therefore, what one has to show; for B too will be what man is.
Δεῖ δʼ ἐν τας δυσὶ προτάσεσι καὶ τοῖς τπρώτοις καὶ ἀμέσοις σκοπεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ φανερόν τὸ λεγόμενον γίνεται.
But one must consider this in the two premises, and indeed in the first and immediate ones; for what is said becomes most clear in this way.
οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν δεικνύντες τί ἐκστι φυχή, ἢ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦνται, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιώσειε φυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ σἴτίον τοῦ ζῆν, τοῦτο δʼ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν αὑτόν κινοῦντα·
Those, then, who show by conversion what soul is, or what man is, or whatever else of existing things, beg the question (ask for what was at the beginning); as if someone should require that soul is that which is to itself the cause of living, and this is a self-moving number.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ αἰτῆσαι τὴν φυχὴν ὅπερ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτόν κινοῦντα, οὕτως ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν.
For it is necessary to assume that soul is just what a self-moving number is, as being the same thing.
οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ τῷ Β καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Γ, ἔσται τῷ Γ τὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἀληθὲς εὐπεῖν ἔσται μόνον·
For it is not because A follows B, and B follows C, that C will have its 'essence'; rather, it will only be true to say so.
οὐδʼ εἰ ἔστι τὸ Α ὅπερ τι καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Β κατηγορεῖται παντός.
Nor is it so even if A is 'what a thing is' and is predicated of every B.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶ ναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (ἀληθές γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῴῳ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον), ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἕν εἶναι.
For 'to be animal' is predicated of 'to be man' (since it is true that every 'to be man' is 'to be animal', just as every man is an animal), but not in such a way as to be one and the same.
ἐὰν μὲν οὖν μὴ οὕτω λάβῃ, οὐ συλλογιεῖται ὅτι τὸ Α ἐστὶ τῷ Γ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐσία· ἐὰν δὲ οὕτω λάβη, πρότερον ἔσται εληφὡς τῷ Γ τί ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
If, therefore, one does not take the premises in this way, one will not syllogize that A is the 'essence' and substance of C; but if one does take them in this way, one will have already assumed what the 'essence' is for C.
ὥστʼ οὐκ ἀποδέδεικται· τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴληφεν.
Therefore, nothing has been demonstrated; for one has taken what was at the beginning.