§2.1.20Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι, εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ ἄνω ἵστανται αἱ κατηγορίαι, δῆλον.
Thus it is clear that the middles cannot be infinite, if the predications stand at the downward and the upward limits.
λέγω δʼ ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.
I mean by upward that which is towards the more universal, and by downward that which is towards the particular.
εἰ γὰρ τοῦ Α κατηγορουμένου κατὰ τοῦ Ζ ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξύ, ἐφʼ ὧν Β, δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχοιτ᾿ ἂν ὥστε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Α ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγορεῖσθαι εἰς ἄπειρον (πρὶν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ ἐλθεῖν, ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξύ) καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ζ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ἄπειρα, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸ Α ἐλθεῖν.
For if, when A is predicated of Z, the middles—which we may call B—are infinite, it is clear that it would be possible that starting from A downwards, one thing is predicated of another to infinity (for before reaching Z, the middles are infinite), and also starting from Z upwards, there would be infinite middles before reaching A.
ὥστʼ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, καὶ τοῦ Α καὶ Ζ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρα εἶναι μεταξύ.
So that if these are impossible, it is also impossible for the middles between A and Z to be infinite.
οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι τὰ μέν ἐστι τῶν Α Β Ζ ἐχόμενα ἀλλήλων ὥστε μὴ εἶναι μεταξύ, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
For even if someone should say that some of A, B, and Z are contiguous to one another so that there is no middle, while others cannot be so taken, it makes no difference.
ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβω τῶν Β, ἔσται πρὸς τὸ Α ἢ πρὸς τὸ Ζ ἢ ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξὺ ἢ οὔ.
For whichever of the B's I take, the middles between it and A, or between it and Z, will either be infinite or not.
ἀφʼ οὗ δὴ πρῶτον ἄπειρα, εἴτʼ εὐθὺς εἴτε μὴ εὐθύς, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· τὰ γὰρ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄπειρά ἐστιν.
And from whichever point they are first infinite, whether immediately or not, makes no difference; for the things after these are infinite.
§2.1.21Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς στερητικῆς ἀποδείξεως ὅτι στήσεται, εἴπερ ἐπὶ τῆς κατηγορικῆς ἵσταται ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα.
It is also clear in the case of privative demonstration that it will stand, if indeed it stands in both directions in the case of affirmative demonstration.
ἔστω γὰρ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον μήτε ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑστάτου εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι (λέγω δʼ ὕστατον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἄλλο, οἷον τὸ Ζ) μήτε ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἐπὶ τὸ ὕστατον (λέγω δὲ πρῶτον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν κατʼ ἄλλου, κατʼ ἐκείνου δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο).
For let it be impossible either to go to infinity upwards from the last (and I mean by the last that which itself belongs to nothing else, but another to it, as Z) or from the first to the last (and I mean by the first that which is itself predicated of another, but nothing else of it).
εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ἔστι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως στήσεται.
If indeed these are so, it will also stand in the case of negation.
τριχῶς γὰρ δείκνυται μὴ ὑπάρχον·
For that a thing does not belong is shown in three ways.
ἢ γὰρ μὲν τὸ Γ, τὸ Β ὑπάρχει παντί, ᾧ δὲ τὸ Β, οὐδενὶ τὸ Α. τοῦ μὲν τοίνυν Β Γ, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου διαστήματος, ἀνάγκη βαδίζειν εἰς ἄμεσα· κατηγορικόν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα.
First, when B belongs to all C, and A belongs to no B. Therefore, as for B-C, and always for the other interval, it is necessary to proceed to immediate intervals; for this interval is affirmative.
τὸ δʼ ἕτερον δῆλον ὅτι εἰ ἄλλῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει προτέρῳ, οἷον· τῷ Δ, τοῦτο δεήσει τῷ Β παντὶ ὑπάρχειν.
As for the other interval, it is clear that if A does not belong to some other prior term, for example D, this D will have to belong to all B.
καὶ εἰ πάλιν ἄλλῳ τοῦ Δ προτέρῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ἐκεῖνο δεήσει τῷ Δ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν.
And if again it does not belong to another prior to D, that term will have to belong to all D.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ἵσταται ὁδός, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ Α στήσεται, καὶ ἔσται τι πρῶτον ᾧ οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
So that, since the path upwards stands, the path towards A will also stand, and there will be some first term to which A does not belong.
Πάλιν εἰ τὸ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ Α, τῷ δὲ Γ μηδενί, τὸ τῶι Γ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει.
Again, if B belongs to all A, but to no C, then A belongs to no C.
πάλιν τοῦτο εἰ δεῖ δεῖξαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἄνω τρόπου δειχθήσεται ἢ διὰ τούτου ἢ τοῦ τρίτου.
If again this must be shown, it is clear that it will be shown either through the upward way, or through this way, or the third.
ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος εἴρηται, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος δειχθήσεται.
The first has been mentioned, and the second will now be shown.
οὕτω δʼ ἂν δεικνύοι, οἶον τὸ Δ τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ Γ οὐδενί, εἰ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τι τῷ Β. καὶ πάλιν εἰ τοῦτο τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρξει, ἄλλο τῷ Δ ὑπάρχει, ὃ τῷ Γ οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
It would show it in this way: for example, D belongs to all B, but to no C, if it is necessary for something to belong to B. And if again this does not belong to C, another term belongs to D which does not belong to C.
οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ τῷ ἀνωτέρω ἵσταται, στήσεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
Therefore, since belonging always stands at the higher term, not belonging will also stand.
Ὁ δὲ τρίτος τρόπος ἦν· εἰ τὸ μὲν τῷ Β παντὶ ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐ παντὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ Γ ᾧ τὸ Α. πάλιν δὲ τοῦτο ἢ διὰ τῶν ἄνω εἰρημένων ἢ ὁμοίως δειχθήσεται.
The third way was: if A belongs to all B, but C does not belong to B, C does not belong to all that A belongs to. And again this will be shown either through the ways mentioned above or in a similar manner.
ἐκείνως μὲν δὴ ἵσταται, εἰ δʼ οὕτω, πάλιν λήψεται τὸ Β τῷ Ε ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ τὸ Γ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχει.
In the former way indeed it stands, but if in this way, it will again be assumed that B belongs to E, to which C does not belong to all.
καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν ὁμοίως.
And this again likewise.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὑπόκειται ἵστασθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, δῆλον ὅτι στήσεται καὶ τὸ Γ οὐχ ὑπάρχον.
And since it is assumed to stand also in the downward direction, it is clear that C's not belonging will also stand.
Φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι καὶ ἐὰν μὴ μιᾷ ὁδῷ δεικνύηται ἀλλὰ πάσαις, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, ὁτὲ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου ἢ τρίτου, ὅτι καὶ οὕτω στήσεται· πεπερασμέναι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ὁδοί, τὰ δὲ πεπερασμένα πεπερασμενάκις ἀνάγκη πεπεράνθαι πάντα.
And it is clear that even if it is shown not by one path but by all, sometimes from the first figure, and sometimes from the second or third, that even so it will stand; for the paths are finite, and everything that is finite must be limited when done a finite number of times.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς στερήσεως, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, ἵσταται, δῆλον.
Thus it is clear that in the case of privation, if indeed also in the case of belonging, it stands.
ὅτι δʼ ἐπʼ ἐκείνων, λογικῶς μὲν θεωροῦσιν ὧδε φανερόν.
And that it stands in those cases, is clear as follows to those who consider it logically.