§2.1.18Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει, ἔστι δʼ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δʼ ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς (ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ γένει ἔνια, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ᾗ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον), ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον.
It is also clear that, if some sense has been lost, it is necessary for some science also to have been lost, which it is impossible to acquire, if indeed we learn either by induction or by demonstration; and demonstration is from universals, while induction is from particulars; and it is impossible to contemplate universals except through induction (since even the things said by abstraction will be made known through induction, that some things belong to each genus, even if they are not separable, insofar as each is of such a kind), and it is impossible for those who do not have sense to be led by induction.
τῶν γὰρ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.
For sense is of particulars; for it is not possible to acquire science of them; for neither can it be from universals without induction, nor through induction without sense.
§2.1.19Ἔστι δὲ πᾶς συλλογισμὸς διὰ τριῶν ὅρων, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεικνύναι δυνάμενος ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ τῷ Γ διὰ τὸ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Β καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Γ, ὁ δὲ στερητικός, τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν πρότασιν ἔχων ὅτι ὑπάρχει τι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ, τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
Every syllogism is through three terms, and one is able to show that A belongs to C because A belongs to B and B to C, while the privative one has one premise that something else belongs to another, and the other premise that it does not belong.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι ὑποθέσεις αὗταί εἰσι· λαβόντα γὰρ ταῦτα οὕτως ἀνάγκη δεικνύναι, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τῷ ὑπάρχει διὰ τοῦ Β, πάλιν δʼ ὅτι τὸ τῷ Β διʼ ἄλλου μέσου, καὶ ὅτι τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὡσαύτως.
It is clear, then, that the principles and the so-called hypotheses are these; for it is necessary, having assumed these in this way, to show, as that A belongs to C through B, and again that A belongs to B through another middle, and that B belongs to C likewise.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν δόξαν συλλογιζομένοις καὶ μόνον διαλεκτικῶς δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον σκεπτέον, εἰ ἐξ ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἐνδοξοτάτων γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός, ὥστ᾿ εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔστι τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν Β μέσον, δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι, ὁ διὰ τούτου συλλογιζόμενος συλλελόγισται διαλεκτικῶς· πρὸς δʼ ἀλήθειαν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δεῖ σκοπεῖν. ἔχει δʼ οὕτως·
For those who syllogize according to opinion and only dialectically, it is clear that this alone must be considered, whether the syllogism is made from the most reputable premises possible, so that even if there is in truth no middle between A and B, but there seems to be, he who syllogize through this has syllogized dialectically; but for the truth one must consider from the things that belong.
ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν κατʼ ἄλλου κατηγορεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκόν ποτʼ ἐκεῖνό φαμεν εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγοντες καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον λευκόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὢν λευκάς ἐστι, τὸ δὲ λευκόν, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι λευκῷ—ἔστιν οὖν ἔνια τοιαῦτα ὥστε καθʼ αὑτὰ κατηγορεῖσθαι.
And it is thus: since there is something which is itself predicated of another not by accident—and I mean by accident, as when we say that white thing is a man, not speaking in the same way as when we say that the man is white; for the man is white not by being something else, but the white is white because it has happened to the man to be white—there are, then, some such things as to be predicated in themselves.
Ἔστω δὴ τὸ Γ τοιοῦτον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μηκέτι ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τούτῳ δὲ τὸ Β πρώτῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο μεταξύ.
Let, then, C be such a thing which itself no longer belongs to another, and B belongs to this first, and there is no other between.
καὶ πάλιν τὸ Ε τῷ Ζ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Β. ἆῤ οὖν τοῦτο ἀνάγκη στῆναι, ἢ ἐνδέχεται εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι;
And again E belongs to Z likewise, and this to B. Is it then necessary for this to stand, or is it possible to go to infinity?
καὶ πάλιν εἰ τοῦ μὲν Α μηδὲν κατηγορεῖται καθʼ αὑτό, τὸ δὲ τῷ Θ ὑπάρχει πρώτῳ, μεταξὺ δὲ μηδενὶ προτέρῳ, καὶ τὸ Θ τῷ Η, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ Β, ἆρα καὶ τοῦτο ἵστασθαι ἀνάγκη, ἢ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐνδέχεται εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι;
And again, if nothing is predicated of A in itself, but A belongs to I first, and to no other prior between, and I belongs to H, and this to B, is it necessary for this also to stand, or is it possible for this also to go to infinity?
διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ πρότερον τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ μέν ἐστιν, ἆρα ἐνδέχεται ἀρξαμένῳ ἀπὸ τοιούτου ὃ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει ἑτέρῳ ἀλλʼ ἄλλο ἐκείνῳ, ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι, θάτερον δὲ ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ τοιούτου ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλου, ἐκείνου δὲ μηδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐνδέχεται εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι.
And this differs from the former by so much, that the one is: is it possible, starting from such a thing which belongs to nothing else but another to it, to go upwards to infinity? and the other is, starting from such a thing which is itself predicated of another, but nothing of that, to consider downwards if it is possible to go to infinity.
Ἔτι τὰ μεταξὺ ἆῤ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι ὡρισμένων τῶν ἄκρων;
Further, is it possible for the middles to be infinite when the extremes are determined?
λέγω δʼ οἷον εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, μέσον δʼ αὐτῶν τὸ Β, τοῦ δὲ Β καὶ τοῦ Α ἕτερα, τούτων δʼ ἄλλα, ἆρα καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἄπειρον ἐνδέχεται ἰέναι, ἢ ἀδύνατον;
I mean, for example, if A belongs to C, and B is their middle, and between B and A there are others, and of these others, is it possible for these also to go to infinity, or is it impossible?
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν ταὐτὸ καὶ εἰ αἱ ἀποδείξεις εἰς ἄπειρον ἔρχονται, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἅπαντος, ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα περαίνεται.
To consider this is the same as considering if demonstrations go to infinity, and if there is demonstration of everything, or if they are limited by one another.
Ὁμοίως δὲ λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερητικῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ προτάσεων, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχει τῷ Β μηδενί, ἤτοι πρώτῳ, ἢ ἔσται τι μεταξύ ᾧ προτέρῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει (οἷον εἰ τῷ Η, ὃ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει παντί), καὶ πάλιν τούτου ἔτι ἄλλῳ προτέρῳ, οἷον εἰ τῷ Θ, ὃ τῷ Η παντὶ ὑπάρχει.
Likewise I speak also in the case of privative syllogisms and premises, as if A belongs to no B, either first, or there will be some middle prior to which it does not belong (as if to H, which belongs to all B), and again to another prior to this, as if to I, which belongs to all H.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ἢ ἄπειρα οἷς ὑπάρχει προτέροις, ἢ ἵσταται.
For in these cases also either those prior things to which it belongs are infinite, or it stands.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντιστρεφόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει.
But in the case of those that convert it does not hold likewise.
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικατηγορουμένοις οὗ πρώτου κατηγορεῖται ἢ τελευταίου πάντα γὰρ πρὸς πάντα ταύτῃ γε ὁμοίως ἔχει, εἴτʼ ἐστὶν ἄπειρα τὰ κατʼ αὐτοῦ κατηγορούμενα, εἴτʼ ἀμφότερά ἐστι τὰ ἀπορηθέντα ἄπειρα· πλὴν εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται ἀντιστρέφειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκός, τὸ δʼ ὡς κατηγορίαν.
For among things predicated of one another reciprocally there is no first or last of which it is predicated; for all are related to all likewise in this respect, whether the things predicated of it are infinite, or both the series in question are infinite; except if they do not convert likewise, but the one as accident, and the other as predication.