§2.1.12Εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἐρώτημα συλλογιστικὸν καὶ πρότασις ἀντιφάσεως, προτάσεις δὲ καθ᾿ ἑκάστην· ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὁ καθʼ ἑκάστην, εἴη ἄν τι ἐρώτημα ἐπιστημονικόν, ἐξ ὧν ὁ καθʼ ἑκάστην οἰκεῖος γίνεται συλλογισμός.
If a syllogistic question is the same as a proposition of a contradiction, and propositions in each science are those from which the syllogism peculiar to each is constructed, there would be some scientific question from which the syllogism peculiar to each science arises.
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐ πᾶν ἐρώτημα γεωμετρικὸν ἂν εἴη οὐδʼ ἰατρικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν δείκνυταί τι περὶ ὧν ἡ γεωμετρία ἐστίν, ἢ ἃ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δείκνυται τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ, ὥσπερ τὰ ὀπτικά.
It is clear, therefore, that not every question would be geometrical or medical, and similarly for the other sciences; but rather those from which something is demonstrated about which geometry is concerned, or those which are demonstrated from the same principles as geometry, like optics.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Similarly also for the other sciences.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ λόγον ὑφεκτέον ἐκ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ συμπερασμάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγον οὐχ ὑφεκτέον τῷ γεωμέτρῃ ᾗ γεωμέτρης· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν.
And about these things one must render an account from the geometrical principles and conclusions, but about the principles themselves, the geometer as geometer does not have to render an account; similarly also for the other sciences.
οὔτε πᾶν ἄρα ἕκαστον ἐπιστήμονα ἐρώτημα ἐρωτητέον, οὔθʼ ἅπαν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκριτέον περὶ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην διορισθέντα.
Therefore, one should not ask every question of each scientist, nor must the scientist answer everything asked on each subject, but only those things defined according to his science.
εἰ δὲ διαλέξεται γεωμέτρῃ ᾗ γεωμέτρης οὕτως, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ καλῶς, ἐὰν ἐκ τούτων τι δεικνύῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ καλῶς.
And if someone dialogues with a geometer as geometer in this way, it is clear that he does so well if he demonstrates something from these; but if not, not well.
δῆλον δʼ ὅτι οὐδʼ ἐλέγχει γεωμέτρην ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστʼ οὐκ ὰν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτοις περὶ γεωμετρίας διαλεκτέον· λήσει γὰρ ὁ φαύλως διαλεγόμενος.
And it is clear that he does not refute a geometer either, except by accident; so that one should not discuss geometry among those ignorant of geometry; for the one who dialogues poorly will escape notice.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει ἐπιστημῶν.
Similarly also it is the case for the other sciences.
Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι γεωμετρικὰ ἐρωτήματα, ἆῤ ἔστι καὶs ἀγειωμέτρητα;
Since there are geometrical questions, are there also non-geometrical ones?
καὶ παῤ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τὴν ποίαν γεωμετρικά ἐστιν;
And in each science, what kind of questions belonging to ignorance are "geometrical"?
καὶ πότερον ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμμένων συλλογισμός, ἢ ὁ παραλογισμός, κατὰ γεωμετρίαν δέ, ἢ ὁ ἐξ ἄλλης τέχνης, οἷον τὸ μουσικόν ἐστιν ἐρώτημα ἀγεωμέτρητον περὶ γεωμετρίας, τὸ δὲ τὰς παραλλήλους συμπίπτειν οἴεσθαι γεωμετρικόν πως καὶ ἀγεωμέτρητον ἄλλον τρόπον;
And is the syllogism belonging to ignorance the one from opposites, or is it the paralogism, but of a geometrical kind, or the one from another art, for example, a musical question is non-geometrical concerning geometry, but to think that parallel lines meet is in a way geometrical, and in another way non-geometrical?
διττὸν γὰρ τοῦτο, ὥστπερ τὸ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀγεωμέτρητον τῷ μὴ ἔχειν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον τῷ φαύλως ἔχειν· καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια αὕτη καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρχῶν ἐναντία.
For this is twofold, just like the "unrhythmical", and the one is non-geometrical by not having it, while the other is so by having it poorly; and this ignorance, and the syllogism from such principles, is contrary to the truth.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοίως ὁ παραλογισμός, ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τὸ διττόν· κατά τε γὰρ τούτου παντός, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν κατʼ ἄλλου λέγεται παντός (τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐ λέγεται πᾶν), ταῦτα δʼ ἔστιν οἷον ὁρᾶν τῇ νοήσει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις λανθάνει.
But in mathematics, paralogism does not occur in the same way, because the middle term is always twofold; for the predicate is said of all of this, and this again is said of all of the other (but the predicate is not said of all of the middle), and these things one can as it were see with the intellect, but in verbal arguments they escape notice.
ἆρα πᾶς κύκλος σχῆμα;
Is every circle a figure?
ἂν δὲ γράφῃ, δῆλον.
If one draws it, it is clear.
τί δέ;
But what?
τὰ ἔπη κύκλος;
Are epic poems a circle?
φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.
It is clear that they are not.
Οὐ δεῖ δʼ ἔνστασιν εἰς αὐτὸ φέρειν, ἂν ᾖ ἡ πρότασις ἐπακτική.
And one should not bring an objection against it, if the proposition is inductive.
ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ πρότασίς ἐστιν ἣ μὴ ἔστιν ἐπὶ πλειόνων (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐπὶ πάντων, ἐκ τῶν καθόλου δʼ ὁ συλλσγισμός), δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ἔνστασις.
For just as a proposition is not what does not hold of several things (for it will not hold of all, and a syllogism is from universals), it is clear that neither is an objection.
αἱ αὐταὶ γὰρ προτάσεις καὶ ἐνστάσεις· ἣν γὰρ φέρει ἔνστασιν, αὕτη γένοιτʼ ἂν πρότασις ἢ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἢ διαλεκτική.
For propositions and objections are the same; for the objection which one brings could become a proposition, either demonstrative or dialectical.
Συμβαίνει δʼ ἐνίους ἀσυλλογίστως λέγειν διὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἀμφοτέροις τὰ ἑπόμενα, οἷον καὶ ὁ Καινεὺς ποιεῖ, ὅτι τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῇ πολλαπλασίᾳ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ταχὺ γεννᾶται, ὥς φησι, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία.
But it happens that some speak non-syllogistically because they assume what follows both, as Caeneus also does, saying that fire is in multiple proportion; for fire is generated quickly, as he says, and so is this proportion.
οὕτω δʼ οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἀλλʼ εἰ τῇ ταχίστῃ ἀναλογίᾳ ἕπεται ἡ πολλαπλάσιος καὶ τῷ πυρὶ ἡ ταχίστη ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἀναλογία.
But in this way there is no syllogism; but there would be if multiple proportion follows the fastest proportion, and the fastest proportion in motion follows fire.
ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται συλλογίσασθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰλημμένων, ὁτὲ δʼ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁρᾶται.
Sometimes, therefore, it is not possible to syllogize from the assumed premises, while at other times it is possible, but it is not seen.
Εἰ δʼ ἦν ἀδύνατον ἐκ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι, ῥᾴδιον ἂν ἦν τὸ ἀναλύειν· ἀντέστρεφε γὰρ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
And if it were impossible to prove a truth from a falsehood, analysis would be easy; for they would convert of necessity.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ὄντούτου δʼ ὄντος ταδὶ ἔστιν, ἃ οἶδα ὅτι ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ Β. ἐκ τούτων ἄρα δείξω ὅτι ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο.
For let A be; and when this is, these things are, which I know to exist, e.g., B. From these, then, I shall prove that that exists.
ἀντιστρέφει δὲ μᾶλλον τὰ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ὅτι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκὸς λαμβάνουσιν (ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις) ἀλλ᾿ ὁρισμούς.
And conversion occurs more in mathematics, because they assume no accident (and in this too they differ from those in dialogues) but definitions.
Πὔξεται δʼ οὐ διὰ τῶν μέσων, ἀλλὰ τῷ προσλαμβάνειν, οἷον τὸ Α τοῦ Β, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ Γ, πάλιν τοῦτο τοῦ Δ, καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰς ἄπειρον· καὶ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον, οἷον τὸ Α καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Γ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Ε, οἷον ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ποσὸς ἢ καὶ ἄπειρος τοῦτο ἐφʼ ᾧ Α, ὁ περιττὸς ἀριθμὸς ποσὸς ἐφʼ οὗ Β, ἀριθμὸς περιττὸς ἐφʼ οὗ Γ·
And the syllogism is increased not through middle terms, but by adding on, for example, A of B, this of C, again this of D, and this to infinity; and laterally, for example A both of C and of E, for example, let "finite or infinite number" be A, "odd number as quantity" be B, "odd number" be C; therefore, A holds of C.
ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Γ. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἄρτιος ποσὸς ἀριθμὸς ἐφʼ οὗ Δ, ὁ ἄρτιος ἀριθμὸς ἐφʼ οὗ Ε· ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Ε.
And let "even number as quantity" be D, "even number" be E; therefore, A holds of E.