§2.1.11Εἴδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἢ ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται, εἶναι μέντοι ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη·
Therefore, it is not necessary that Forms exist, or that there be some "one" apart from the many, if there is to be demonstration; however, it is necessary that it be true to speak of one thing of many.
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου, ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ᾖ· ἐὰν δὲ τὸ καθόλου μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἔσται, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἀπόδειξις.
For there will not be a universal if this does not exist; and if there is no universal, there will be no middle term, so that there will be no demonstration either.
δεῖ ἄσα τι ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων εἶναι μὴ ὁμώνυμον.
There must, then, be something one and same over several things, not homonymous.
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι οὐδεμία λαμβάνει ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐὰν δέῃ δεῖξαι καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα οὕτως.
Now, no demonstration assumes the principle that it is not possible to affirm and deny at the same time, unless it is also necessary to prove the conclusion in this way.
δείκνυται δὲ λαβοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τοῦ μέσου, ὅτι ἀληθές, ἀποφάναι δʼ οὐκ ἀληθές.
And it is proved by assuming that the first term is true of the middle, and that to deny it is not true.
τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λαβεῖν, ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ τὸ τρίτον.
But it makes no difference to assume that the middle term is and is not, and likewise for the third term.
εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη, καθʼ οὗ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθές, ἀλλʼ εἰ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ζῷον εἶναι, μὴ ζῷον δὲ μή, ἔσται ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν Καλλίαν, εἰ καὶ μὴ Καλλίαν, ὅμως ζῷον, μὴ ζῷον δʼ οὔ.
For if it is granted that that of which it is true to say "man" (even if it is also true to say "not-man"), provided only that man is animal and not not-animal, it will be true to say that Callias (even if he is not-Callias) is nonetheless animal and not not-animal.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοῦ μέσου λέγεται ἀλλὰ καὶ κατʼ ἄλλου διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐπὶ πλειόνων, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ εἰ τὸ μέσον καὶ αὐτό ἐστι καὶ μὴ αὐτό, πρὸς τὸ συμπέρασμα οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
The reason is that the first term is said not only of the middle but also of another, because it is over several things; so that even if the middle is both itself and not itself, it makes no difference to the conclusion.
τὸ δʼ ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις λαμβάνει, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἀεὶ καθόλου, ἀλλʼ ὅσον ἱκανόν, κανὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους.
But the principle that everything must be affirmed or denied is assumed by demonstration leading to the impossible, and even then not always universally, but as far as is sufficient, and what is sufficient is within the genus.
λέγω δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους οἷον περὶ ὃ γένος τὰς ἀποδείξεις φέρει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.
By "within the genus" I mean, for example, the genus about which it brings its demonstrations, just as was said before.
Ἑπικοινωνοῦσι δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ κοινά (κοινὰ δὲ λέγω οἷς χρῶνται ὡς ἐκ τούτων ἀποδεικνύντες, ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ ὧν δεικνύουσιν οὐδʼ ἃ δεικνύουσιν), καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πάσαις, καὶ εἴ τις καθόλου πειρῷτο δεικνύναι τὰ κοινά, οἷον ὅτι ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, ἢ ὅτι ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἄττα.
And all the sciences communicate with one another through the common principles (and by "common" I mean those things which they use as that from which they demonstrate, but not that about which they demonstrate nor what they demonstrate), and dialectic communicates with all of them, as would anyone who tried to demonstrate the common principles universally—for instance, that everything is affirmed or denied, or that equals from equals leave equals, or any such things.
ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὡρισμένων τινῶν, οὐδὲ γένους τινὸς ἑνός.
But dialectic is not concerned with things thus limited, nor with any one genus.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠρώτα· ἀποδεικνύντα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὄντων μὴ δείκνυσθαι τὸ αὐτό, δέδεικται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς περὶ συλλογισμοῦ.
For otherwise it would not ask questions; for one who demonstrates cannot ask questions, because when there are opposites the same thing is not demonstrated, as has been shown in the treatise on the syllogism.