§1.1.37Τὸ δʼ ὑπάρχειν τόδε τῷδε καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύεσθαι τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε τοσαυταχῶς ληπτέον ὁσαχῶς αἱ κατηγορίαι διῄρηνται, καὶ ταύτας ἢ πῇ ἢ ἁπλῶς, ἔτι ἢ ἀπλᾶς ἢ συμπεπλεγμένας· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
But 'this belonging to this' and 'this being truly said of this' must be taken in as many ways as the categories are divided, and these either in some respect or simply, and further either as simple or as composite; and similarly also with not belonging.
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ ταῦτα καὶ διοριστέον βέλτιον.
But these things must be investigated and defined more clearly.
§1.1.38Τὸ δʼ ἐπαναδιπλούμενον ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσι πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ ἄκρῳ θετέον, οὐ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ.
But that which is reduplicated in the premises must be posited with the first extreme, not with the middle.
λέγω δʼ οἷον εἰ γένοιτο συλλογισμός ὅτι τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν, τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἀγαθόν πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ θετέον.
I mean, for example, if there should be a syllogism that 'of justice there is science that it is good', the 'that it is good' or 'as good' must be posited with the first term.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἐφʼ δὲ Β ἀγαθόν, ἐφʼ ᾧ δὲ Γ δικαιοσύνη.
For let A be 'science that it is good', B 'good', and C 'justice'.
τὸ δὴ ἀληθὲς τοῦ Β κατηγορῆσαι· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν.
It is true, then, to predicate A of B; for of the good there is science that it is good.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη ὅπερ ἀγαθόν.
But also B of C; for justice is just what is good.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀνάλυσις.
In this way indeed the reduction is made.
εἰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ Β τεθείη τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἔσται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Α κατὰ τοῦ Β ἀληθὲς ἔσται, τὸ δὲ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἀγαθὸν κατηγορεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ψεῦδος καὶ οὐ συνετόν.
But if 'that it is good' were posited with B, there will not be a syllogism; for A will be true of B, but B will not be true of C; for to predicate of justice 'good as good' is false and not intelligible.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν δειχθείη ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπιστητὸν ᾗ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τραγέλαφος ᾗ μὴ ὄν, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φθαρτὸν ᾗ αἰσθητόν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς ἐπικατηγορουμένοις πρός τῷ ἄκρῳ τὴν ἐπαναδίπλωσιν θετέον.
And similarly also if the healthy should be shown to be knowable 'insofar as it is good', or a goat-stag 'insofar as it is non-existent', or man perishable 'insofar as perceptible'; for in all added predications we must posit the reduplication with the extreme.
Οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ θέσις τῶν ὅρων ὅταν ἁπλῶς τι συλλογισθῇ καὶ ὅταν τόδε τι ἢ πῇ ἢ πώς, λέγω δʼ οἷον ὅταν τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστητὸν δειχθῇ καὶ ὅταν ἐπιστητὸν ὅτι ἀγαθόν· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητὸν δέδεικται, μέσον θετέον τὸ ὄν, εἰ δʼ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, τὸ τὶ ὄν.
But the position of the terms is not the same when something is syllogized simply and when as a 'this' or in some respect or in some way; I mean, for example, when the good is shown to be knowable, and when knowable 'as good'; but if it has been shown to be knowable simply, we must posit 'being' as the middle, but if 'as good', 'some being'.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τὶ ὄν, ἐφʼ δὲ Β ὄν τι, τὸ δʼ ἐφ᾿ ᾧ Γ ἀγαθόν.
For let A be 'science that it is some being', B 'some being', and C 'good'.
ἀληθὲς δὴ τὸ Α τοῦ Β κατηγορεῖν· ἦν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τινὸς ὄντος ὅτι τὶ ὄν.
It is true indeed to predicate A of B; for there was science of some being that it is some being.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β τοὐ Γ· τὸ γὰρ ἐφʼ ᾧ Γ ὄν τι.
But also B of C; for C is some being.
ὥστε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἔσται ἄρα ἐπιστήμη τἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν· ἦν γὰρ τὸ τὶ ὂν τῆς ἰδίου σημεῖον οὐσίας.
So that also of C there will be science of the good as good; for 'some being' was the sign of its proper essence.
εἰ δὲ τὸ ὂν μέσον ἐτέθη καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἄκρῳ τὸ ὂν ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ τὸ τὶ ὂν ἐλέχθη, οὐκ ἂν ἦν συλλογισμός ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ὄν, οἷον ἐφʼ ᾧ τὸ Α ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ὄν, ἐφʼ ᾧ Β ὄν, ἐφʼ ᾧ Γ ἀγαθόν.
But if 'being' had been posited as middle and 'being' simply and not 'some being' had been said with the extreme, there would not be a syllogism that there is science of the good as good, but as being; as for instance, if A is 'science that it is being', B 'being', and C 'good'.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐν μέρει συλλογισμοῖς οὕτως ληπτέον τοὺς ὅρους.
It is clear, then, that in particular syllogisms we must take the terms in this way.
§1.1.39Δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν ἃ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται, ὀνόματα ἀντʼ ὀνομάτων καὶ λόγους ἀντὶ λόγων καὶ ὄνομα καὶ λόγον, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοὔνομα λαμβάνειν· ῥᾴων γὰρ ἡ τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσις.
We must also substitute things that have the same value, nouns for nouns, and descriptions for descriptions, and a noun for a description, and always take the noun instead of the description; for the setting out of the terms is easier.
οἷον εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει εἰπεῖν τὸ ὑποληπτὸν τοῦ δοξαστοῦ μὴ εἶναι γένος ἢ μὴ εἶναι ὅπερ ὑποληπτόν τι τὸ δοξαστόν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον), ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ ὑποληπτὸν καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ὅρους θετέον.
For example, if it makes no difference to say that 'the assumable' is not the genus of 'the opinable', or that 'the opinable is not just what is some assumable' (for the meaning is the same), we must posit as terms 'the assumable' and 'the opinable' instead of the description mentioned.
§1.1.40Ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὁμοίως θετέον τοὺς ὅρους, ἀλλʼ εἰ μέν ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν, τἀγαθόν, εἰ δʼ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀγαθόν.
And since 'for pleasure to be good' and 'for pleasure to be the good' are not the same, we must not posit the terms in the same way, but if the syllogism is that 'pleasure is the good', we must posit 'the good', and if 'it is good', 'good'.
οὕτως κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Thus also in other cases.