§1.1.35Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ὅρους ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ὀνόματι ἐκτίθεσθαι· πολλάκις γὰρ ἔσονται λόγοι οἷς οὐ κεῖται ὄνομα· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀνάγειν τοὺς τοιούτους συλλογισμούς.
We must not always seek to set out the terms by a name; for often there will be descriptions for which no name is established; wherefore it is difficult to reduce such syllogisms.
ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβήσεται διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ζήτησιν, οἷον ὅτι τῶν ἀμέσων ἔστι συλλογισμός.
And sometimes it will also happen that we are deceived because of such a search, as, for example, that there is a syllogism of immediate things.
ἔστω τὸ Α δύο ὀρθαί, τὸ ἐφʼ Β τρίγωνον, ἐφʼ ᾧ δὲ Γ ἰσοσκελές.
Let A be 'two right angles', B 'triangle', and C 'isosceles triangle'.
τῷ μὲν οὖν Γ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α διὰ τὸ Β, τῷ δὲ Β οὐκέτι διʼ ἄλλο (καθʼ αὑτὸ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δύο ὀρθάς), ὥστʼ οὐκ ἔσται μέσον τοῦ Β, ἀποδεικτοῦ ὄντος.
Now A belongs to C through B, but to B no longer through another (for the triangle of itself has two right angles), so that there will be no middle term for B, though it is demonstrable.
φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μέσον οὐχ οὕτως ἀεὶ ληπτέον ὡς τόδε τι, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε λόγον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει κἀπὶ τοῦ λεχθέντος.
For it is clear that the middle term must not always be taken as a 'this', but sometimes as a description, which indeed happens also in the case of what has been said.
§1.1.36Τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρῶτον τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τοῦτο τῷ ἄκρῳ οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς αἰεὶ κατηγορηθησομένων ἀλλήλων ἢ ὁμοίως τό τε πρῶτον τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐσχάτου.
But that the first belongs to the middle, and this to the extreme, must not be taken as though they will always be predicated of each other or in like manner, the first of the middle and this of the last.
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν δʼ ὡσαύτως.
And similarly also in the case of not belonging.
ἀλλʼ ὁσαχῶς τὸ εἶναι λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τοσαυταχῶς οἴεσθαι χρὴ σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν.
But in as many ways as 'to be' is said, and to say this very thing truly, in so many ways must we think that 'to belong' also signifies.
οἷον ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη.
As, for example, that there is one science of contraries.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ τὸ μίανεἶναι ἐπιστήμην, τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐφʼ οὗ.
For let A be 'there being one science', and B 'contraries to one another'.
βτὸ δὴ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει οὐχ ὥστε τὰ ἐναντία μίαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἀληθές εἰπεῖν κατʼ αὐτῶν μίαν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμην.
Now A belongs to B, not so that the contraries are one science, but because it is true to say of them that there is one science of them.
Συμβαίνει δʼ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου τὸ πρῶτον λέγεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου μὴ λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη· τὸ μὲν δὴ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.
And it happens sometimes that the first is said of the middle, but the middle is not said of the third, as, for example, if wisdom is science, and of the good there is wisdom, the conclusion is that of the good there is science; now the good is not science, but wisdom is science.
ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου λέγεται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου οὐ λέγεται, οἷον εἰ τοῦ ποιοῦ παντὸς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἐναντίου, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐναντίον καὶ ποιόν, συμπέρασμα μὲν ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα.
And sometimes the middle is said of the third, but the first is not said of the middle, as, for example, if of every quality there is science or of a contrary, and the good is both contrary and quality, the conclusion is that of the good there is science, but the good is not science, nor is the quality nor the contrary, but the good is these.
ἔστι δὲ μήτε τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τοῦ μέσου μήτε τοῦτο κατὰ τοῦ τρίτου, τοῦ πρώτου κατὰ τοῦ τρίτου ὁτὲ μὲν λεγομένου ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λεγομένου.
And it is possible that neither the first is said of the middle nor this of the third, while the first is sometimes said and sometimes not said of the third.
οἷον εἰ οὗ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ἕστι τούτου γένος, τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστι γένος· κατηγορεῖται δʼ οὐδὲν κατʼ οὐδενός.
As, for example, if of what there is science, there is a genus of this, and of the good there is science, the conclusion is that of the good there is a genus; but nothing is predicated of anything.
εἰ δʼ οὗ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, γένος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τἀγαθόν ἐστι γένος· κατά μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἄκρου κατηγορεῖται τὸ πρῶτον, κατʼ ἀλλήλων δʼ οὐ λέγεται.
But if of what there is science, this is a genus, and of the good there is science, the conclusion is that the good is a genus; the first indeed is predicated of the extreme, but they are not said of each other.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον.
In the same way also we must take it in the case of not belonging.
οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ σημαίνει τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τόδε τῷδε μὴ εἶναι τόδε τόδε, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τόδε τοῦδε ἢ τόδε τῷδε, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεως κίνησις ἢ γενέσεως γένεσις, ἡδονῆς δʼ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἡδονὴ γένεσις.
For 'not belonging' does not always signify that 'this is not this', but sometimes that 'this is not of this' or 'this is not for this', as, for example, that there is not a motion of motion or a coming-to-be of coming-to-be, but of pleasure there is; therefore pleasure is not a coming-to-be.
ἢ πάλιν ὅτι γέλωτος μὲν ἔστι σημεῖον, σημείου δʼ οὐκ ἕστι σημεῖον, ὥστʼ οὐ σημεῖον ὁ γέλως.
Or again, that of laughter there is a sign, but of a sign there is no sign, so that laughter is not a sign.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ὅσοις ἀναιρεῖται τὸ πρόβλημα τῷ λέγεσθαί πως πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γένος.
And similarly also in all other cases in which the problem is refuted by being said in some way in relation to the genus itself.
πάλιν ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος δέων· θεῷ γὰρ καιρὸς μὲν ἔστι, χρόνος δʼ οὐκ ἔστι δέων διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι θεῷ ὠφέλιμον.
Again, that the right moment is not a necessary time; for to God there is a right moment, but there is no necessary time because nothing is useful to God.
ὅρους μὲν γὰρ θετέον καιρὸν καὶ χρόνον δέοντα καὶ θεόν, τὴν δὲ πρότασιν λτηπτέον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος πτῶσιν.
For we must posit as terms 'right moment', 'necessary time', and 'God', but we must take the premise according to the case of the noun.
ἁπλῶς γὰρ τοῦτο λέγομεν κατὰ πάντων, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ὅρους ἀεὶ θετέον κατὰ τὰς κλήσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἢ ἐναντία, οὐκ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐναντίων, τὰς δὲ προτάσεις ληπτέον κατὰ τὰς ἑκάστου πτώσεις· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι τούτῳ, οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ ὅτι τούτου, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἢ ὅτι τοῦτο, οἷον τὸ τύπτον ἢ ὁρῶν, ἢ ὅτι οὗτος, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως πίπτει τοὔνομα κατὰ τὴν πρότασιν.
For we say this simply of all, that we must always posit the terms according to the nominative cases of the nouns, as 'man' or 'good' or 'contraries', not 'of man' or 'of good' or 'of contraries', but we must take the premises according to the cases of each; for either that 'to this', as the 'equal', or 'of this', as the 'double', or 'this' [as object], as the 'striking' or 'seeing', or 'this' [as subject], as 'man is an animal', or if in any other way the noun falls in the premise.