§1.1.27πῶς δʼ εὐπορήσομεν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ τιθέμενον ἀεὶ συλλογισμῶν, καὶ διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ ληψόμεθα τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, νῦν ἤδη λεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἴσως δεῖ τὴν γένεσιν θεωρεῖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ ποιεῖν.
How we ourselves may always be well supplied with syllogisms in relation to what is proposed, and through what path we may obtain the principles concerning each subject, must now be told; for perhaps we must not only study the generation of syllogisms, but also have the power to produce them.
Ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι τοιαῦτα ὥστε κατὰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου κατηγορεῖσθαι ἀληθῶς καθόλου (οἷον Κλέων καὶ Καλλίας καὶ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον καὶ αἰσθητόν), κατὰ δὲ τούτων ἄλλα (καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῷον ἑκάτερος τούτων ἐστί)· τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ μὲν κατʼ ἄλλων κατηγορεῖται, κατὰ δὲ τούτων ἄλλα πρότερον οὐ κατηγορεῖται· τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ ἄλλων καὶ αὐτῶν· ἕτερα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος Καλλίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ζῷον.
Now of all existing things, some are such that they cannot be truly predicated universally of anything else (for example, Cleon and Callias, and what is individual and sensible), while other things can be predicated of them (for indeed, each of these is both a man and an animal); whereas other things are themselves predicated of other things, but other prior things are not predicated of them; and yet other things are both themselves predicated of other things, and other things of them, for example, man of Callias, and animal of man.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια τῶν ὄντων κατʼ οὐδενὸς πέφυκε λέγεσθαι, δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν σχεδὸν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ μηδενός, πλὴν ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός· φαμὲν γάρ ποτε τὸ λευκὸν ἐκεῖνο Σωκράτην εἶναι καὶ τὸ προσιὸν Καλλίαν.
That some existing things, therefore, are by nature not said of anything is clear; for almost each of the sensible things is such as not to be predicated of anything, except by accident; for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates and that the one approaching is Callias.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω πορευομένοις ἵσταταί ποτε, πάλιν ἐροῦμεν· νῦν δʼ ἔστω τοῦτο κείμενον.
But that, as we go upwards, this process also stops at some point, we shall explain again later; for now, let this be assumed.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεῖξαι κατηγορούμενον ἕτερον, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ δόξαν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κατʼ ἄλλων· οὐδὲ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα κατʼ ἄλλων, ἀλλʼ ἕτερα κατʼ ἐκείνων.
Now, of those former things it is not possible to demonstrate that another thing is predicated, except perhaps in opinion, but they themselves are predicated of other things; nor are individuals predicated of other things, but other things of them.
τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ δῆλον ὡς ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ κατʼ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων λεχθήσεται)· καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις εἰσὶ μάλιστα περὶ τούτων.
But for the intermediate things, it is clear that they admit of both (for they themselves will be said of other things, and other things of them); and almost all arguments and inquiries are especially concerned with these.
Δεῖ δὴ τὰς προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐκλαμβάνειν, ὑποθέμενον αὐτό πρῶτον καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς τε καὶ ὅσα ἴδια τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, εἶτα μετὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ἕπεται τῷ πράγματι, καὶ πάλιν οἷς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν.
We must, therefore, select the premises concerning each subject in this way: first assuming the subject itself, its definitions, and whatever properties belong to the thing; then after this, whatever follows the thing, and again, those things which the thing follows, and whatever cannot belong to it.
οἷς δʼ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἐκληπτέον διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ στερητικόν.
But those things which the subject itself cannot belong to must not be selected, because the negative proposition is convertible.
διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων ὅσα τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ὅσα ἴδια καὶ ὅσα ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποῖα δοξαστικῶς καὶ ποῖα κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλειόνων τοιούτων εὐπορῇ τις, θᾶττον ἐντεύξεται συμπεράσματι, ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν ἀληθεστέρων, μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει.
We must also distinguish among the consequents those which belong to the essence (in the "what it is"), those which are properties, and those which are predicated as accidents, and of these, which are according to opinion and which according to truth; for the more of such things one is well supplied with, the faster one will reach a conclusion, and the truer they are, the more one will demonstrate.
Δεῖ δʼ ἐκλέγειν μὴ τὰ ἑπόμενα τινί, ἀλλʼ ὅσα ὅλῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕπεται, οἷον μὴ τί τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλὰ τί παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἕπεται· διὰ γὰρ τῶν καθόλου προτάσεων ὁ συλλογισμός.
We must select not what follows a particular instance, but what follows the thing as a whole—for example, not what follows a particular man, but what follows every man; for the syllogism is through universal premises.
ἀδιορίστου μὲν οὖν ὄντος ἄδηλον εἰ καθόλου ἡ πρότασις, διωρισμένου δὲ φανερόν.
Thus, if it is indefinite, it is unclear whether the premise is universal, but if it is defined, it is clear.
ὁμοίως δʼ ἐκλεκτέον καὶ οἷς αὐτὸ ἕπεται ὅλοις, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.
In the same way, we must also select those things which the subject itself follows as a whole, for the reason mentioned.
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἑπόμενον οὐ ληπτέον ὅλον ἕπεσθαι, λέγω δʼ οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ πᾶν ζῷον ἢ μουσικῇ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἁπλῶς ἀκολουθεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ προτεινόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ ἄχρηστον θάτερον καὶ ἀδύνατον, οἷον πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι πᾶν ζῷον ἢ δικαιοσύνην ἅπαν ἀγαθόν.
But we must not take the consequent itself as following as a whole (I mean, for example, that "every animal" follows man, or "all knowledge" music), but only that it follows simply, just as we actually propose premises; for the other is both useless and impossible (for example, that "every man is every animal," or "justice is all good").
ἀλλʼ ᾧ ἕπεται, ἐπʼ ἐκείνου τὸ παντὶ λέγεται.
Rather, it is of that which the consequent follows that the "every" is said.
ὅταν δʼ ὑπό τινος περιέχηται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ᾧ τὰ ἑπόμενα δεῖ λαβεῖν, τὰ μὲν τῷ καθόλου ἑπόμενα ἢ μὴ ἑπόμενα οὐκ ἐκλεκτέον ἐν τούτοις (εἴληπται γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις· ὅσα γὰρ ζῴῳ, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἕπεται, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ὑπάρχει, ὡσαύτως), τὰ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια ληπτέον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄττα τῷ εἴδει ἴδια παρὰ τὸ γένος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῖς ἑτέροις εἴδεσιν ἴδια ἄττα ὑπάρχειν.
And when the subject for which we must get the consequents is contained under something else, we must not select in these cases those things which follow or do not follow the universal (for they have been taken in the latter; for whatever follows "animal" also follows "man," and similarly for whatever does not belong); rather, we must take what is proper to each subject, since there are some properties peculiar to the species besides the genus; for it is necessary that some proper things belong to the other species.
οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ καθόλου ἐκλεκτέον οἷς ἕπεται τὸ περιεχόμενον, οἷον ζῴῳ οἷς ἕπεται ἄνθρωπος· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ. ἀνθρώπῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀκολουθεῖν, οἰκειότερα δὲ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκλογῆς. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἑπόμενα καὶ οἷς ἕπεται· τῶν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προβλημάτων καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προτάσεων, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τινῶν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἑκάστου τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.
Nor indeed, for the universal, should we select those things which the contained term follows— for example, for "animal," those things which "man" follows; for if "animal" follows "man," it is necessary that it also follows all these, but these are more appropriate to the selection for "man." We must also take those things which follow for the most part, and those which they follow; for of problems which are for the most part, the syllogism is also from premises which are for the most part, either all or some of them; for the conclusion of each syllogism is similar to its principles.
ἔτι τὰ πᾶσιν ἑπόμενα οὐκ ἐκλεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν.
Furthermore, we must not select things which follow all things; for no syllogism will come from them.
διʼ ἣν δʼ αἰτίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἔσται δῆλον.
For what reason this is so will be clear in what follows.